EU foreign policy: ending the unanimity requirement by introducing some sort of majority voting (QMV) on foreign affairs has become the next holy grail in the debate. Quick thread.
Yet we have to get rid of the idea that some sort of institutional arrangement will end the disagreement and produce magically a united, coherent EU capable and will to act like a great power on the world stage.
We have been there before. Once it was the introduction of a Brussels-based diplomatic service and a foreign minister-like figure that would end the „gridlock“. Yet we have both now, and still no broad consensus, rather the opposite.
The question of how to turn a joint market into a world power remains unresolved. And QMV want change that. Bigger countries will always find a way to do what they want once the issue matters to them. And smaller countries usually cut their deals with the big countries.
The real problem lies elsewhere. In past decades, the US has operated as some sort of umbrella for Europe: defender, guarantor and strategic leader. Now this umbrella is largely gone (with the big exception of defense), and the global environment has become far more competitive.
As a consequence, European countries have to figure out themselves where they want to go geopolitically. Their answers are a result of traditions, fears and ambitions. Yet as their answers are national, they are also different, and there is little agreement on major issues.
In order to move from a joint market towards a coherent global power, EU countries would have to align their national strategies, from threat perceptions to ambitions, and they would have to overcome growing power competition inside the EU, to some extent at least.
A more coherent joint EU foreign and security policy then depends on the ability and will of individual member states, especially France and Germany, but also Italy, Poland, Spain, and smaller countries, to build alliances inside the EU — win hearts and minds of their peers.
The form than follows the function: Bilateral, mini-lateral, E3, EU-27, sometimes NATO; whatever works. Key is the substance, the content.
In short, there is no magic institutional formula that will save EU countries from the hard work of working out strategies on the main dossiers together with their EU partners. The ability and will to build intra-EU alliances with the most relevant peers is the key to success.
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Iran has built his bet to dominate the region as the new hegemon in a "post-American world" on its ally-proxies (Hamas, Hisbollah, Houthis, militias in Syria and Irak), on its missiles and its nuclear program.
After the attack by Iran's ally-proxy Hamas in October 2023, Israel has decided that it has to act to stop Iran's aggressive expansion -- and diminished all three pillars of Iranian power.
Deutschland kann recht leicht zurück auf den Erfolgskurs gebracht werden. Das Potenzial des Landes ist immens. Es müssen nur ein paar Dinge getan werden:
1) Die Migrationsfrage muss der radikalen Rechten entwunden werden, um diese wieder auf Normalmaß zu stutzen. Wichtig ist, dass sich die AfD nicht als Milieu großflächig etabliert, damit vernünftiges Regieren möglich bleibt.
2) Deutschland muss erheblich mehr in Verteidigung investieren. Hauptaufgabe ist die Verteidigung unserer Partner von Baltikum bis Rumänien. Deutschland muss dafür seine industriellen Kapazitäten endlich anwerfen. Nur dann gibt es Frieden und Stabilität in Europa.
Trump's ways to end /prevent war: give Russia and China what they want?
The current order is post-imperial, based on the principle of safe borders also for smaller and weaker countries.
But Russia and China want to change that: subjugate smaller countries in their neighborhood.
There is a "liberal international order"-case against Russian, Chinese and Iranian neo-imperialism; but also an "America first"-case, as all three are eager to diminish American power and influence, and want to put themselves (and their type of order) globally on top.
To give up support for "frontline states" -- countries in the vicinity of these autocratic power supported in their sovereignty by the US -- would mean to bring namely Russia and China in a better position, which would increase their appetite and belligerence.
Europeans have opportunities to strengthen their position vis-à-vis Russia but they fail to grasp them: Armenia, Georgia, Syria, also Libya.
Without the will to win battles over influence against Russia, Europeans will be on the loosing side in the ne geopolitical world.
Those opportunities may not come back. Capitals of big European countries -- Berlin, Paris, London, Rome, others -- need to get together and devise a geopolitical strategy that they will role out individually, but also inside NATO and the EU.
So far what we see is no sense of urgency, a lack of strategic capacity to analyze and draw conclusions, a failure to invest in capabilities and a lack of will to fight for the "European way of life".
Die Prämisse der Russlandpolitik von Scholz ist: der Krieg ist ein Ausrutscher, eine Abweichung vom Normalzustand, und die Aufgabe des Kanzlers besteht darin, Russland zu helfen, diesen Fehler einzusehen und zu korrigieren, um zum Normalzustand der Zusammenarbeit zurückzukehren.
Die Realität, die die große Mehrheit der Russlandkenner, die anderen Mitte-Parteien (Grüne, FDP, Union) ebenso erkannt haben wie die europäischen Partner Deutschlands, ist aber eine andere: Russlands Aggression gegen Europa ist der neue Normalzustand.
Aus der Diagnose folgt die Strategie. Scholz hat immer die Rückkehr zum vermeintlichen Normalzustand im Blick und arbeitet darauf hin, dass Russland wieder Partner wird.