EU foreign policy: ending the unanimity requirement by introducing some sort of majority voting (QMV) on foreign affairs has become the next holy grail in the debate. Quick thread.
Yet we have to get rid of the idea that some sort of institutional arrangement will end the disagreement and produce magically a united, coherent EU capable and will to act like a great power on the world stage.
We have been there before. Once it was the introduction of a Brussels-based diplomatic service and a foreign minister-like figure that would end the „gridlock“. Yet we have both now, and still no broad consensus, rather the opposite.
The question of how to turn a joint market into a world power remains unresolved. And QMV want change that. Bigger countries will always find a way to do what they want once the issue matters to them. And smaller countries usually cut their deals with the big countries.
The real problem lies elsewhere. In past decades, the US has operated as some sort of umbrella for Europe: defender, guarantor and strategic leader. Now this umbrella is largely gone (with the big exception of defense), and the global environment has become far more competitive.
As a consequence, European countries have to figure out themselves where they want to go geopolitically. Their answers are a result of traditions, fears and ambitions. Yet as their answers are national, they are also different, and there is little agreement on major issues.
In order to move from a joint market towards a coherent global power, EU countries would have to align their national strategies, from threat perceptions to ambitions, and they would have to overcome growing power competition inside the EU, to some extent at least.
A more coherent joint EU foreign and security policy then depends on the ability and will of individual member states, especially France and Germany, but also Italy, Poland, Spain, and smaller countries, to build alliances inside the EU — win hearts and minds of their peers.
The form than follows the function: Bilateral, mini-lateral, E3, EU-27, sometimes NATO; whatever works. Key is the substance, the content.
In short, there is no magic institutional formula that will save EU countries from the hard work of working out strategies on the main dossiers together with their EU partners. The ability and will to build intra-EU alliances with the most relevant peers is the key to success.
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The US and Israel can degrade Iran's nuclear program and diminish its ability to attack neighbors.
But if the regime survive, Russia and China may help it to rearm; and it may become even more dangerous -- and able to present a third front in a China/Russia vs West war scenario.
If the current campaign is supposed to lead to regional stability in the Middle East and to the weakening of China's and Russia's global power, there is no other way than regime change.
Europeans have a strategic interest in helping the US and Israel to achieve such an outcome. As have the Gulf Arabs, Turkey and Japan, India and other Asian countries who oppose Chinese hegemonic ambitions.
Russia's war against Ukraine could have been the moment at which the Europeans would have gotten together and proved that their talk about "sovereignty", "learning the language of geopolitics", "Europe as a power" is a true ambition, backed up by deeds.
Yet that didn't happen. Only the North and the Northeast delivered. Most European countries failed to rise to the occasion. They were happy to be led by Biden. Only under the shield of the US were they ready to deliver weapons to Ukraine. And they always just did the minimum.
The fact that the US is leading the negotiation with Russia is not an accident; it is a logical consequence, a reaction to the non-existence of Europe as a serious, homogenous power willing to push back against Russia seriously.
My quick take on tomorrow's meetings in Washington.
The problem: After having failed to convince Putin, Trump has lost interest in Ukraine.
The risk is that he a) blames Zelenskyy for the failure, and b) entirely stops supporting Ukraine.
Europeans join Zelensky to prevent that he gets ambushed by Trump -- that Trump tells him what he has agreed with Putin and that he must pursue on that path.
Putin has skillfully laid that trap.
What Europeans want to achieve is a) that Trump doesn't look at Ukraine from Putin's perspective (after the meeting with him), and b) doesn't entirely turn against Ukraine, stopping all support, even weapons that Europeans can buy from the US.
Iran has built his bet to dominate the region as the new hegemon in a "post-American world" on its ally-proxies (Hamas, Hisbollah, Houthis, militias in Syria and Irak), on its missiles and its nuclear program.
After the attack by Iran's ally-proxy Hamas in October 2023, Israel has decided that it has to act to stop Iran's aggressive expansion -- and diminished all three pillars of Iranian power.