The UK Army has been criticised because its 2025 plan is apparently unaffordable. This graphic shows what it set out to achieve: Five brigades including 2 x Strike, 2 x Armoured Infantry and 1 x Air Assault. Everything else was designed to support this core structure.
The above structure has been simplified to aid communication. It combines deployability with resilience, flexibility with focus. It enables high intensity warfare against a peer adversary, as well as low level peace support. It is no more than Italy, France and Germany have.
Component elements of the Equipment Plan designed to deliver this are: Ajax, Boxer, Challenger 2 LEP, Warrior CSP, MRVP, Mobile Fires Platform, Morpheus C4I, Apache E, and various minor upgrades. The only problem is we need to acquire everything at the same time.
The need for multiple parallel acquisition programmes is because the Army hasn't really been modernised since 1990. And when you postpone regeneration, you eventually reach a point of block obsolescence where everything, even Bulldog, eventually conks out all at once.
When you need to regenerate your entire portfolio of capabilities simultaneously it become more expensive, difficult and risky. That's before you factor in development problems when introducing technically sophisticated new platforms.
Given the likely impact of Brexit and Covid-19, it is easy to understand why the Army's equipment plan might have become unaffordable. More important, given the evolution of threats since 2010, the IDSR is right to question whether the Army 2025 plan is still viable.
Army 2025 Redux could end-up looking something like this, i.e. a whole brigade lost and Warrior axed or reduced in number. There's no other way to say it, but this would be salami slicing and would likely increase support costs rather than reducing them.
There must be another way to generate a credible number of brigades? Therefore, it's highly likely that we'll see a reduction in platform types. But, if one platform is lost, it has to be replaced with something else. (The image below is figurative not an actual proposal.)
While we have some hard choices to make, they could actually make the Army more capable as well as more affordable. Above all, we need a critical mass of fewer platform types:
- Main Battle Tank
- Tracked IFV/ APC/ CRV
- Wheeled IFV/ APC/ CRV
- MRVP
The question is what goes?
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THREAD ON AIRBORNE FORCES AND VEHICLES
Russia's failed attempt to seize Hostomel airfield in the early stages of its invasion of Ukraine provides confirmation (if any was needed after the lessons of Crete and Arnhem) that airborne assaults against well defended targets can be disastrous. The contemporary use of drones only adds to the risks.
This means that future airborne operations will primarily be conducted at battalion and company level for coup de main missions against bridges, airfields, and objectives that need to be physically seized and held by forces on the ground. Think WW2 Pegasus Bridge. Many previous airborne tasks, especially raiding tasks, can now be accomplished using PrSM, loitering missions, or armed drones, so demolition roles will be the exception rather than the norm.
Airborne missions at brigade level are likely to be risky, particularly for the large fleet of aircraft and helicopters required to deliver them. Where larger formations are needed, they will be used to occupy locations where there are no or limited enemy forces. In this respect, airborne units will become early entry forces rather than assaulting in contact with the enemy.
The cancellation of the US Army's M10 Booker has little to do with the quality of the vehicle itself, and more about the lack of supporting infrastructure of Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, which cannot effectively support 40-tonne tracked vehicles. 1/4
In the same way that the British Army's Ajax programme includes six different versions, so that armoured cavalry regiments are self-supporting, the Booker chassis lends itself to a whole range of variants based on the M10 Booker Repair & Recovery variant. 2/4
In case Ajax's issues still aren't fully resolved, migrating each variant to the M10 Booker chassis would be a certain fix for Ajax, Ares, Athena, Argus, Apollo, and Atlas. You'd have to compromise on the original requirements, but you'd have an excellent vehicle. 3/4
It was right to retire the British Army's Thales Watchkeeper WK450 UAS. It took far too long to bring it into service and by the time it arrived, newer and better systems were available. It was also difficult to operate. The question is what do we replace it with? (1/6)
An obvious choice is General Atomics Mojave, which is optimised for STOL operations from austere locations. This has a larger payload, double the range and better ISR sensors. It can also carry up to 16 Hellfire missiles for strike tasks. Crucially, it is harder to jam. (2/6)
Mojave, which is a modified version of General Atomics' MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS, weighs 1½ tonnes and has a reinforced undercarriage. Technically, it compares well to Watchkeeper while also being considerably less expensive to purchase and operate. (3/6)
The @GD_LandSystems M10 Booker is not a derivative of the ASCOD platform, but an all-new design. The hull has well-sloped armour, an 800 hp diesel driveline and @Horstman_Group hydro-pneumatic struts. The 105 mm gun based on the UK ROF L7 and is mounted in an Abrams-based turret.
As impressive as the vehicle itself is the acquisition approach. 12 prototypes from two companies were down-selected. These were tested extensively. A winner was chosen and awarded a LRIP contract for 26. Now that all issues are resolved a full production contract can be issued.
At each stage of the process, risk was managed. The onus was on @GD_LandSystems to resolve any issues in order to move the program to the next stage. Brigadier Glenn Dean, who has assumed overall responsibility for MPF deserves credit for doing a fantastic job.
Over the last 15 months, @LockheedMartin's M270 & HIMARS rocket launchers have performed extremely well, obliterating Russian targets while reducing collateral damage at ranges of 70 km, which is beyond the enemy's capacity to return effective counter-battery fire.
Ukraine's success with HIMARS confirms what we already believed, that precision-guided deep fires rockets and missiles enable smaller armies to deliver an effect that belies their size relative to larger, less capable adversaries.
Before the Russo-Ukrainian War, the USA had already initiated an upgrade programme to increase GMLRS range from 70 km to 150 km, while the new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) can hit targets at 499 km, versus the existing ATACMS with a 150 km range. This is a significant upgrade.
The British Army's Protected Mobility Pipeline (PMP) programme will see 14 platforms merged into 5. Three PM platforms (light, medium, & heavy) will replace Foxhound, Mastiff, Ridgeback, Wolfhound, Husky, Foxhound, and Panther. This will streamline through-life support.
As good as Boxer is, only 4 infantry battalions will be equipped with it. So having a larger fleet of lower cost PMVs will be essential. Also, the way in which they're being used in Ukraine, as battlefield taxis that move infantry out-of-contact, points to a new way of operating.
For some roles, it makes sense to purchase an off-the-shelf solution from abroad (e.g., Oshkosh JLTV) where the price is lower than domestically produced vehicles can match. But for others, British industry is perfectly capable of producing a state-of-the-art 4x4 or 6x6 PMV.