"China represents the most significant economic and national security threat to the United States over the next 20 to 30 years ... Russia’s long-term economic forecast makes its global power likely to recede over the next 20 to 30 years." armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2…
"Advancements in AI, biotechnology [etc] are making traditional battlefields and boundaries increasingly irrelevant. To remain competitive, the United States must prioritize the development of emerging technologies over ... legacy systems" armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2…
"Using the Manhattan Project as a model, the United States must undertake and win the artificial intelligence race by leading in the invention and deployment of AI while establishing the standards for its public and private use" armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2…
"Congress and the Department of Defense must ... require every Major Defense Acquisition Program to evaluate at least one AI or autonomous alternative prior to funding [and] require all new Major Defense Acquisition Programs to be AI-ready " armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2…
"To compete against 21st century adversaries, Congress & [DoD] must identify, replace, and retire costly and ineffective legacy platforms. The Task Force recommends that Congress commission RAND Corporation (or similar entity) ...to study legacy platforms" armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2…
"Because an engaged and informed electorate is essential for a republic to endure, the United States should expand voluntary National Service programs. Promoting volunteerism and active engagement in democracy bolsters our national security" armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2…
"binary notions of war and peace are becoming antiquated. Future conflicts will be...waged in the gray zone, the nebulous battlespace below open combat, [w/] tactics such as economic coercion, cyber espionage, disinformation & unattributed military forces" armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2…
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Trump's national security strategy is out and some of the Europe sections are shocking. "...the growing influence of patriotic European parties indeed
gives cause for great optimism." whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…
Trump national security strategy: Make Europe White Again.
"Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades ...certain NATO members will become majority non-European"
"the real and more stark prospect of civilizational erasure"
As far as I can see, this nat sec strategy is far harsher on Europe than on Russia. There is no mention of a threat from Russia or of deterrence, only that "re-establishing strategic stability" is a priority. Europe is cast as a major threat to freedom.
The proposal is nothing short of a very bad joke. I mean, read this:
"$100 billion in frozen Russian assets will be invested in US-led efforts to rebuild and invest in Ukraine;
-- The US will receive 50% of the profits from this venture."
The fact that this absurd and unworkable clause is in there is itself a suggestion that the proposal is the basis for further negotiation and not a "take it or leave it"
"military assessments seen by the FT show that Yantar was one of several Russian naval vessels that congregated in UK waters for 13 months of sustained surveillance around nodes of critical infrastructure starting in the autumn of 2023." ft.com/content/0b3510…
"adversaries could interfere with the timing signals in underwater communication cables by altering the frequency of pulses passing through them — causing severe disruption in time-sensitive industries such as high-frequency trading." ft.com/content/0b3510…
AIS/radar analysis "suggests that this vessel [Yantar] was stationary for several hours in a small stretch of sea containing three major cables — the CeltixConnect-2, Geo-Eirgrid and Rockabill—all of which are data connections linking Ireland with the UK." ft.com/content/0b3510…
Some defence stories in this week’s @TheEconomist. First, we looked at Ukraine’s new cruise missile. ‘Production…at least partially carried out abroad, but “over 90%”, the company says, of final assembly is in secret sites dispersed throughout Ukraine’ economist.com/europe/2025/08…
We reported on the Wagner group’s meltdown in Mali. “Murdering ordinary Malians, it turns out, is a bad way to win over ordinary Malians. Informants have dried up.” economist.com/middle-east-an…
We examined the US naval buildup in the Caribbean & whether it’s really for counter-narcotic purposes. ‘This “looks just right to scare the daylights out of Maduro’s supporters”, says Evan Ellis of the US Army War College.’ economist.com/the-americas/2…
🧵 I've been writing something on the intelligence & national-security applications of frontier AI models. This is an experiment in seeing what one of them, OpenAI's o3-pro model, might be able to do in an area relevant to national security.
I fed the model this chart, explaining that it was the manoeuvre history of a satellite (though not sure I even needed to do that). Could it identify the satellite? Yes, after reasoning for 22 minutes and 23 seconds, it could indeed.
o3-pro identified the two large east-west & minimal north-south movements as distinctive signatures of Russia's Luch-5X satellite. It reasoned by elimination: "No other GEO spacecraft executed delta‑V’s of that magnitude (tens of m s‑¹) in exactly those two windows."
Good account of a KGB "dangle" to the CIA in the cold war. "GTPROLOGUE exemplifies CIA’s troubled experience with hostile double agents during the 1980s, when a few select services—particularly the Soviets, East Germans & Cubans—badly burned the agency." cia.gov/resources/csi/…
"The ‘85–86 losses [due to Ames], as they became colloquially known within CIA, also signaled the need for a major KGB undertaking to deceive CIA as to the real reason for these losses. A multichannel KGB disinformation campaign, which operated from at least 1986, was launched" cia.gov/resources/csi/…
"Within the KGB, the Soviet preoccupation with secrecy fostered an institutional bias against release of the sort of valid feed typically required to establish the credibility of a deception channel." cia.gov/resources/csi/…