The most important chart of 2020 continues to evolve. We had the incredible situation that incomes spiked in a depression, because government transfers were so big. Now that transfers are declining, incomes are coming down, but spending is still on an uptrend via past savings.
This is why the fiscal stimulus debate remains the hottest issue of the day, as well as more strategically. The cut in Federal unemployment subsidies are feeding directly into this. So that piece is key, although maybe the aid for states is what the negotiation is more focused on
2020 is not like any other year. The aggressiveness of fiscal policy, in the US and globally, is different. And the interplay between fiscal policy & QE is also different. "FisQEl Policy", if you will... (as opposed to the pure asset swap QE of the 2008-2014 period).@TheStalwart
White line is 'personal disposable income, SAAR', yellow line is 'personal spending, SAAR'
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Everybody knows the details of US used car prices, the technicalities of the rent calculation, and even the oddities around obscure CPI components such as medical services...
but perhaps it is better to look at the big picture (global trends and China)...
- just a few of charts
The trend in global core inflation is almost back to normal (chart above)
And when you look at China, you think; should we not worry about deflation?
Headline CPI is as negative as in the covid shock, and almost as negative as in the CFC shock
And when you look at the latest China data, things are getting worse (assuming that you do not like deflation)
Despite the re-opening in 2023, the Chinese economy is observing greater deflationary effects, with momentum getting incrementally more severe in recent months.
The higher for longer narrative is looking increasingly stale
(a few big picture charts)
First, the global trend in core inflation momentum is very clear. The worst is certainly behind us...
Second, while some economies have shown greater resiliency to higher rates than expected, global credit is very weak, especially vs 2022, but also vs pre-covid trend.
I have been travelling, so only commenting on the terrible Chinese FDI data with a few days delay, even if it one important topic I care a lot about
Thread...
First, net FDI flows (counting both inflows and outflows) are now sharply negative, and it is the Chinese liabilities (the investment by foreigners into China, that is driving the swing)
- $66bn now
vs
+$100bn in Q1 2022
MASSIVE swing
Second, digging into the inflows, we can break the data into Greenfield FDI and reinvested earnings by combining SAFE and MOFCOM data.
The negative reinvested earnings (multinationals repatriating their earnings out of China, rather than reinvesting) is a key factor...