This op was based on a website called the Newsroom for American and European Based Citizens, NAEBC.
@Alexey__Kovalev might enjoy this name: it’s close to the Russian swear word “наёбка”.
Just like PeaceData sounded like the Russian epithet “пиздато.”
There’s a theme there.
The other theme it had was being heavily into the far right. Gothic font, “war on faith,” “media bias,” “war on family”... Playing to a very specific audience.
The operation claimed to be based in Hungary, with editorial staff also in the Netherlands.
I love the coyness here. “We’re a group of friends in *certain European country*” (blame secrecy on those pesky EU laws).
But here’s a funny thing: the vast majority of the website’s articles were about the U.S., and especially race and politics.
Not, y’know, Hungary or the Netherlands. Or even the EU.
The content it posted was… inflammatory. This was its very first headline, on July 2.
Note the tag, “War on Citizens.”
The early articles look like they were written by the operation itself. No byline, not copied from elsewhere, unidiomatic English.
This was their first ever lede.
The reporting on race was not subtle.
“It’s time to say goodbye to White law enforcement officers. That means that Law and Order will be forgotten.”
That was the build-up phase. They didn’t much advertise those articles: it’s more like they were stocking the website with appropriate content, to give it a track record.
From August, they switched to publishing articles by real Americans. Some were copies…
Others, they managed to attract genuine freelancers to write for them.
Especially in late August, they reached out directly to bloggers. One-on-one targeting, inviting them to contribute.
Never forget, journalists can be targets as well as reporters.
And where did they advertise those articles? That’s one of the interesting things.
They had a couple of accounts on Twitter, and tried (but failed) to create one on Facebook, but…
...as this went on, they focused more and more on Gab and Parler.
Permissive environments, and an audience appropriate to their content?
As far as we know, this is the first Russian operation exposed on those platforms.
(Timeline of asset activation here.)
To do that, they used just five fake personas.
“Oh Grandma, what a small operation you have.”
“All the better to evade detection with, my dear.”
Also to evade detection, three of them used AI-generated faces. Again.
These assets formed a self-sustaining community. On Parler, they liked each other lots, and then liked prominent voices on the right and far right, trying to get attention.
There’s no indication that any major amplifiers picked them up, though.
For an operation that was only really active on social media for two months, they weren’t a total flop. About 14k followers on Parler, 3k on Gab.
But every account followed many more accounts than it was following. That isn’t a sign of viral appeal.
One of the most interesting questions now is: what are Gab and Parler going to do about it?
As soon as @jc_stubbs exposed them, all the fake assets scrubbed mentions of NAEBC from their bios. They even changed their Parler handles to do the same.
Operation Guilty Conscience?
But this looks really like the Russian IRA.
The resemblances with PeaceData, which has been attributed to IRA-linked individuals, go well beyond the punning name.
Both claimed to be young European news outlets. Both targeted very precise demographics. Both hired genuine freelancers, including people who’d never written before - perhaps the better to steer them editorially.
This describes the editorial direction they sent by email, per @Reuters.
Both had personas with GAN faces. Oddly, many of those personas had names beginning with “Al” - a stylistic quirk?
(PeaceData top two rows, NAEBC bottom. Eye alignment is typical of AI-generated sets.)
Put them together, and what were they doing?
Well, NAEBC posted pro-Trump and anti-Biden messaging. This dropped an hour ago - again, timing publication for the US market, not just Europe.
PeaceData pushed anti-Biden messaging to further left groups, especially Democratic Socialists and progressives.
That's very similar to what the original IRA did in 2016: energise support for Trump, depress support for the Democratic candidate, and push polarising content to both ends of the spectrum.
These two efforts were much, much less viral than in 2016. The PeaceData Facebook page in English had 200 followers. The NAEBC ones had a few thousand, and followed more than they had followers themselves.
As @RidT pointed out yesterday, one question about operations like this is whether they were just working the budget in some way.
But by the same token, operations that look like utterly futile exercises in budget-burning - like Secondary Infektion - can actually break into the mainstream under the right circumstances, like a hack-to-leak operation.
I'd rate NAEBC as a Category 2 on the breakout scale of info ops - multiple platforms, but not really breaking out of its immediate communities.
Even with PeaceData, it edges up towards Category 3, but it's a pretty borderline case.
So it's important for what it shows, not what it achieved.
Ongoing attempts by Russian operators to target American voters with polarising and partisan messaging.
As always, keep calm. But keep watch, especially as the election comes.
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🚨BREAKING🚨 @Meta took down two covert influence ops:
Big one from Russia🇷🇺 targeting Europe with spoofed media websites like the Guardian and Spiegel
First one from China 🇨🇳 to focus on both sides of domestic US 🇺🇸 politics and Czech-China relations. about.fb.com/news/2022/09/r…
@Meta The operations were very different, but both worked on multiple social media platforms and petitions sites.
The Russian op was even on LiveJournal (cute).
List of domains, petitions etc in the report. #OSINT community, happy hunting!
@Meta China: this was the first Chinese network we’ve disrupted that focused on US domestic politics ahead of the midterms and Czech foreign policy toward China and Ukraine.
It was small, we took it down before it built an audience, but that’s a new direction for Chinese IO.
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Takedowns from around the world:
Cyber espionage in South Asia;
Harassment in India;
Violating networks in Greece, South Africa, India;
Influence ops from Malaysia & Israel
AND... about.fb.com/news/2022/08/m…
A deep dive into a Russian troll farm, linked to people with ties to what’s known as the Internet Research Agency.
It used fake accounts across the internet to make it look like there’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine - and to pretend the troll farm's doing a good job.
The operation called itself “Cyber Front Z”.
We think of it as the Z Team, because it was about as far from being the A Team as you can get.
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Much to dig into:
State & non-state actors targeting Ukraine;
Cyber espionage from Iran and Azerbaijan;
Influence ops in Brazil and Costa Rica;
Spammy activity in the Philippines... about.fb.com/news/2022/04/m…
🚨 TAKEDOWN 🚨
This weekend, we took down a relatively small influence operation that had targeted Ukraine across multiple social media platforms and websites. It was run by people in Russia and Ukraine: about.fb.com/news/2022/02/s…
It consisted of approx 40 accounts, Groups and Pages on FB and IG, plus on Twitter, YouTube, VK, OK, Telegram.
It mainly posted links to long-form articles on its websites, without much luck making them engaging. It got very few reactions, and under 4k followers.
It ran a few fake personas posing as authors. They had fake profile pics (likely GAN), and unusually detailed public bios - e.g. former civil aviation engineer, hydrography expert.
The op posted their articles on its websites and social media, & amplified them using more fakes.
Personal 🧵 based on years of OSINT research into influence operations since 2014.
Looking at the Russian official messaging on “de-nazification” and “genocide”, it’s worth putting them in context of the many different Russian IO that targeted Ukraine over the years.
* Iran, targeting the UK, focusing on Scottish independence;
* Mexico, a PR firm targeting audiences across LATAM;
* Turkey, targeting Libya, and linked to the Libyan Justice and Construction Party (affiliated w/Muslim Brotherhood).
It’s not the first time for an Iranian op to pose as supporters of Scottish independence.
In the past, FB found a page that copied and posted political cartoons about independence as far back as 2013. @Graphika_NYC writeup here (pages 26-27) graphika.com/reports/irans-…