There's a lot of chatter about those “airborne nuclear command centers”, but these two Boeing E6A Mercury aircraft were indeed flying almost daily since over the past month, publicly available flight data shows: the AE0414 flew at least on 20 days, and the AE0415 at least 14.
The Boeing E6A Mercury #AE0414, one of those “flying nuclear command centers,” was publicly tracked on 20 out of the past 31 days.
And here's the flight data for that other E6A Mercury, #EA0415. It was publicly tracked on 18 out of the past 31 days. (That's 4 more days than I initially mentioned; I'm sleepy. H/t @Amstelsam and @BillDedman for making me properly fact-check these flights btw.)
And, as @BillDedman noted, there are more than those two E6B aircraft. Thanks to @steffanwatkins I'm aware of at least another handful of those that are publicly trackable. (Oops, I called them E6As in the thread, but hey, I was about to sleep when I came across this.)
So, tl;dr = these are highly likely to be routine flights, the E6Bs are up in the air regularly, also on a larger timescale. As @GuardedDon points out, the need for their function is constant, not occasional. Here's some background info: nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/dead…
“I can confirm these flights were pre-planned missions. Any timing to the President's announcement is purely coincidental,” Karen Singer, Chief of Media Operations for the U.S. Strategic Command, told CNN's @jimsciutto.
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New @Maxar satellite imagery from the past 48 hours shows the Russian military vehicles and equipment continue to be withdrawn from Khmeimim Air Base, and likely arrived at the Tartus naval base. Thread 🧵
This image from December 15 shows military trucks, armored personnel carriers (APC) and personnel assembled on the tarmac at Khmeimim Air Base. An Il-76 transport aircraft is parked nearby. 🛰️📸: @Maxar
@Maxar Several additional transport aircraft are also seen at Khmeimim Air Base on that December 15 image.
This satellite image from today, via @Maxar, shows three key vessels in Iran's strategy of converting commercial ships into military platforms ancored near Bandar Abbas:
SHAHID BAGHERI (new drone ship, probable net-covered drone on deck)
SHAHID MAHDAVI
SHAHID ROUDAKI
This is a closer crop of the SHAHID BAGHERI, the newest of the three. Originally a commercial container ship, the vessel was converted into a military drone carrier and is now undergoing its first sea trials after departing the ISOICO shipyard in late November, per @Maxar.
A closer view of the SHAHID MAHDAVI, originally a Panamax container ship, it was converted into a military vessel in 2023. It reportedly can carry helicopters and drones, has air defense missiles and other armament onboard. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IRIS_Shah…
New high-resolution satellite imagery from @Maxar of the key Russian location in Syria: the Tartus naval base and the Khmeimim airbase near Latakia. 🧵
Nearly all Russian naval assets have left their usual positions at the Tartus port base, as @riley_mellen and I reported for @nytimes yesterday. nytimes.com/live/2024/12/0…
@riley_mellen @nytimes Two Russian Navy frigates are now positioned offshore, approximately 7-12 kilometers to the west and northwest, as @MT_Anderson also observed.
Young Dutch journalist @OmeBender filmed Maccabi Tel Aviv fans in Amsterdam stealing steel pipes, putting on masks, and chasing someone. A metal pipe appears to be thrown at a police vehicle. The footage also shows an Israeli fan warning him to stop filming.
The incident shown in the clip above of the Maccabi fans chasing someone is the same one as seen in this video. This happened after the match, around midnight, in front of Centraal Station.
Several Maccabi fans interviewed by @parool said pro-Palestine demonstrators were waiting for them at Centraal Station after the match, and said they had to defend themselves. The timeline of these videos in relation to these accounts is unclear. parool.nl/amsterdam/isra…
Since it didn't make it into this story, threading some geolocations of airstrikes near Tinzaouaten by Turkish-made drones. These strikes could be conducted by Mali and/or Burkina Faso.
Overview map. Pink line is Wagner's route toward Tinzouaten, pink pins are location of first battle, green line is earth berms around the gold mines, and yellow pins are the drone strikes.
On July 30, three days after Wagner's defeat, multiple drone strikes hit in the middle of the gold mine known as Inatiyara, as well as a refugee camp known as Ekhariban. Location of damage filmed is at: 19.924667, 2.980035 (@GeoConfirmed).
In July, Wagner suffered its biggest defeat in Africa. Our visual investigation, using satellite imagery, battlefield footage and firsthand accounts, shows a moment-by-moment breakdown of what happened — and the fallout with families in Russia. nyti.ms/3Yx2Orx
Please read the full article for our main findings. In this thread, I’ll share extra details that didn’t make the story — focusing on geolocations, messages from family members and some insight on what’s going on with Wagner after the mutiny and Prigozhin’s death.
Some abbreviations used: CSP for the (mostly) Tuareg separatists, JNIM for the Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamist militants, FAMa for the Malian military.