The essay by @KofmanMichael in this volume is the single most interesting thing I've read on NATO-Russia military questions for a long time. "While in the abstract NATO may appear superior ... in reality Excel spreadsheets don’t fight" frivarld.se/wp-content/upl…
"The Russian General Staff would not expect the decisive phase of conflict to last beyond 2-3 weeks, at which time most precision-guided munitions would be expended and the war liable to escalate to nuclear employment." frivarld.se/wp-content/upl…
"From a Russian perspective, the initial period of war will be decided by the contest between aerospace assault and aerospace defense, and the ability of the two sides to destroy each other’s critical infrastructure. Ground forces matter little" frivarld.se/wp-content/upl…
"While Moscow expects any war with a coalition to constitute a regional war, there is a perplexing notion in the West that conflict can be localized to the Baltics ... a conflagration in the Baltics is a low probability event" frivarld.se/wp-content/upl…
"Those familiar with the last several decades of US combat operations would recognize that A2/AD as a strategy against US airpower is not especially viable, which is why Russian literature on the subject clearly indicates that they consider defense to be cost prohibitive"
"Russian operational-level thinking has leaned more towards the offensive ... far too much attention is paid in the West to the problem of getting forces into the theater, not enough time is spent on question of attrition in the initial period of warfare" frivarld.se/wp-content/upl…
On Russian options for escalation management. "These include deterrence by intimidation, the use of single or grouped strikes with conventional precision weapons, nuclear demonstration, and selective nuclear strikes in follow-on phases of conflict" frivarld.se/wp-content/upl…
"Whether NATO collectively responds to aggression is immaterial as long as the US commits and is afforded opportunity to do so by necessary allies .. without the US, even if all of NATO responds its chances of success in the initial period of war are slim" frivarld.se/wp-content/upl…
"deterrence remains a common place slogan for policies that are about anything except deterrence. Meanwhile, there is no strategy for dealing with Russia beyond sanctions, spending on military capability in Europe" frivarld.se/wp-content/upl…
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Some defence stories in this week’s @TheEconomist. First, we looked at Ukraine’s new cruise missile. ‘Production…at least partially carried out abroad, but “over 90%”, the company says, of final assembly is in secret sites dispersed throughout Ukraine’ economist.com/europe/2025/08…
We reported on the Wagner group’s meltdown in Mali. “Murdering ordinary Malians, it turns out, is a bad way to win over ordinary Malians. Informants have dried up.” economist.com/middle-east-an…
We examined the US naval buildup in the Caribbean & whether it’s really for counter-narcotic purposes. ‘This “looks just right to scare the daylights out of Maduro’s supporters”, says Evan Ellis of the US Army War College.’ economist.com/the-americas/2…
🧵 I've been writing something on the intelligence & national-security applications of frontier AI models. This is an experiment in seeing what one of them, OpenAI's o3-pro model, might be able to do in an area relevant to national security.
I fed the model this chart, explaining that it was the manoeuvre history of a satellite (though not sure I even needed to do that). Could it identify the satellite? Yes, after reasoning for 22 minutes and 23 seconds, it could indeed.
o3-pro identified the two large east-west & minimal north-south movements as distinctive signatures of Russia's Luch-5X satellite. It reasoned by elimination: "No other GEO spacecraft executed delta‑V’s of that magnitude (tens of m s‑¹) in exactly those two windows."
Good account of a KGB "dangle" to the CIA in the cold war. "GTPROLOGUE exemplifies CIA’s troubled experience with hostile double agents during the 1980s, when a few select services—particularly the Soviets, East Germans & Cubans—badly burned the agency." cia.gov/resources/csi/…
"The ‘85–86 losses [due to Ames], as they became colloquially known within CIA, also signaled the need for a major KGB undertaking to deceive CIA as to the real reason for these losses. A multichannel KGB disinformation campaign, which operated from at least 1986, was launched" cia.gov/resources/csi/…
"Within the KGB, the Soviet preoccupation with secrecy fostered an institutional bias against release of the sort of valid feed typically required to establish the credibility of a deception channel." cia.gov/resources/csi/…
Important. "The US military strikes on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities last weekend did not destroy the core components of the country’s nuclear program and likely only set it back by months, according to an early US [DIA] intelligence assessment" edition.cnn.com/2025/06/24/pol…
Wow. 'Two of the people familiar w/ the assessment said Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium was not destroyed. One of the people said the centrifuges are largely “intact.” “...the (DIA) assessment is that the US set them back maybe a few months, tops”...' edition.cnn.com/2025/06/24/pol…
And a caveat. "It is still early for the US to have a comprehensive picture of the impact of the strikes, and none of the sources described how the DIA assessment compares to the view of other agencies in the intelligence community." edition.cnn.com/2025/06/24/pol…
Pentagon briefing: “I know that battle damage is of great interest. Final battle damage will take some time, but initial battle damage assessments indicate that all three sites sustained extremely severe damage and destruction.”
Pentagon briefing: “In total, US forces employed approximately 75 precision guided weapons during this operation. This included, as the President stated last night, 14 30,000 pound GBU-57 Massive Ordnance penetrators, marking the first ever operational use of this weapon.”
Pentagon briefing: “our initial assessment… is that all of our precision munitions struck where we wanted them to strike and had the desired effect, which means especially in Fordo, which was the primary target here, we believe we achieved destruction of capabilities there”
1. Useful details here. “While some American officials find the Israeli estimate credible, others emphasized that the U.S. intelligence assessment remained unchanged” nytimes.com/2025/06/19/us/…
2. “American spy agencies believe that it could take several months, and up to a year, for Iran to make a weapon.” nytimes.com/2025/06/19/us/…
3. “new [White House] assessments echoed material provided by Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, which believes that Iran can achieve a nuclear weapon in 15 days.”
But: “None of the new assessments on the timeline to get a bomb are based on newly collected intelligence”