Thread: I see these odd debates, mostly among westerners, about whether something is "jihadist"...it reminds me of the old debates about what kind of "Marxist" people were...it views "jihadist" as some academic reality, when the reality on the ground is not so simple, or binary
It also reminds me of the debates in the US about what group is "far right" or "white supremacist"...in the end what we are talking about is groups in the Middle East on a spectrum of far-right extremism as well, some of whom are genocidal.
It misses a key aspect, which is that groups may profess some ideology, some worldview...but the people that join and leave the and move in their circles and commit crimes sometimes for these ideologies, are not so doctrinaire.
And the nonsensical stories of "group X would never work with country Y because that country is a different religion or viewed as 'apostates'" doesn't hold up in history. Groups often work with countries and other groups based on money, shared interests, convenience.
It also reminds me of the use of the word "terrorist" to describe some groups and not others...just because one government labels a group "terrorist" and not another. So what? Governments use terms like "terrorist" or "jihadist" for reasons that may not reflect the ground reality
One has to be careful about entering these debates with people who are trying to whitewash group as "non-jihadist" for reasons, such as giving a country the blank check to work with them...it's about politics, and less about what the groups do, are they ethnic-cleansing, etc?
The idea that you can take a bunch of groups and easily divide them into some arbitrary system of definitions, with little bases in what the members are doing or what they think or why, is an academic exercise, but not one that reflects what is happening.
It's better to ask "what does the group do"...less than what it claims to believe. Does it harass and kidnap minorities, enforce dress codes, ethnic-cleanse or genocide...or is it non-violent...what is it doing? Groups change. Hamas has changed, for instance. Taliban changes.
So we need to know more...groups in Sinai and other places targeted historic Islamic shrines as part of their campaigns. Is it worth knowing if they fit a "jihadist" definition...as if somehow if we whitewash the term we use for them, then the crimes go away?
I think the whole thing is an exercise in attempting to make some extremist groups seem acceptable...and I don't think it helps with definitions of "neo-Nazis" or other extremists either. One needs to ask "what do they do" more than "what do they claim to believe."
Someone may say "your not an expert on Jihad"...yeah ok. I'm not an expert on the religious underpinnings of the Crusades either. But it's worth knowing more about what the Crusaders did, then the often impenetrable complexities of their beliefs at the time.
For instance the massacres of the Rhineland during that era were carried out...do we need to get deep into the theocratic underpinnings of the whole movement to get at that? I would say that may be less helpful than know about the massacres and hate. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhineland…
One can imagine such a discussion where people are like "these are non-Crusader units of the Crusader kingdom"...yeah sure...I understand...some signed up for money and adventure. Ok. Some joined ISIS for the same reason.
When these modern groups murdered Hevrin Khalaf and celebrated, or ethnically-cleansed Afrin...those are the actions they did. Coming along and saying "but this is non-Jihadist"...so? Maybe the "non-Jihadists" are worse? And they get support from a state, which is bad.
If governments or security services only look for "jihadists threats" they will be missing the elephant in the room, they should ask "what does the group do" first...and see if it attracts extremists and then understand the threat. Not just ask about supposed ideology
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There is a lot of talk today about sheikhs in Hebron who want to for an "emirate" of Hebron. This is being greeted by some as a positive initiative. Let's take a look at the claims and also what the results could be.
First, the context. Israel is engaged in a 637 day war in Gaza against Hamas. Hamas still controls around 40 percent of Gaza. In Gaza, Israel has backed an initiative to have armed militias involved in some activities in the rest of Gaza. There is one named commander, Abu Shabab (not his real name obviously) and there are rumored to be others.
Some see this as a wise decision to have multiple armed gangs and militias run a post-war Gaza. Israel's current government opposes having the PA run Gaza, so the theory is that armed militias fighting eachother and Hamas is a good future.
In the West Bank the PA has been relatively successful at ruling Palestinian cities and towns for thirty years. However, Israel's current government includes parties that oppose the PA. The PA leader Mahmoud Abbas is aging and there is talk of what comes next.
Israel's Ynet says IDF possibly "preparing for a new phase in its campaign against Hamas on Sunday, as heavy airstrikes pounded northern Gaza and military officials weighed a deeper ground maneuver, potentially including a renewed incursion into Gaza City."
Is this the third "new phase" since March 2025? There was one that began on March 1 after the ceasefire fell apart; it truly began on March 18...then another one began after May 5 with Gideon's Chariots. Now, it's June 29...and yet another.
What the report says is a "deeper" maneuver...the IDF has spent the last months basically re-taking buffer areas around Gaza, leaving Hamas in charge of the central camps and Gaza city. 632 days of war and the IDF basically never went into parts of Gaza city or the central camps.
I remember having a conversation with someone a year ago and I'd said that the IDF still needs to defeat Hamas and remove it. They said "but hasn't Israel taken all of Gaza and defeated Hamas"...I had to remind them that, no...the Israeli offensive always leaves Hamas in charge of around half of Gaza. And it's the same a year later.
Iran's targeting of Qatar appears counter intuitive because Doha has generally been the most friendly country toward Tehran in the Gulf. Unlike the tensions that have existed between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the past with Iran; and to a lesser extent the UAE; Doha is close to Iran. Al-Udeid US base in Qatar is also just one of MANY US bases in the Gulf; there is also the naval facility in Bahrain, and al-Dhafra in the UAE and sites in Kuwait.
However, on the other hand Iran may assume it has enough political capital built up with Doha, and also cooperation with them in the energy sector; that Iran can do this and climb down after. If Iran focused on Saudi Arabia it could harm the fragile Beijing brokered new relations with Riyadh; it if targeted the UAE this could cause a crisis; also Bahrain could lead to a crisis.
Doha is therefore the least obvious choice. Iran could have targeted Al-Asad base in Iraq, or US bases in Syria, or in the KRG or US naval ships, or many other locations. However, Tehran may have assumed Doha is a kind of safe bet. It could tell Doha before hand what it would do, then there will be a formal complaint but maybe this leads to a deal brokered by Doha and Ankara?
What happened to the Iranian hardliners? Remember back in the era before the JCPOA and also after we were always told that it was important to "empower" the "moderates" in Iran's regime and that if we didn't do everything the regime wanted then the "hardliners" would be empowered? What happened to this fiction?
The narrative of hardliners and moderates was obviously a transparent nonsense designed to cater to the West's need to feel that it can "do X and then Iran will be happy and do Y"...it was sold to the West in a nice package and hundreds of opeds in Western media and commentators employed this paradigm to explain Iran
Notice how Iran's regime never felt it needed to "empower moderates in the US"...or that its behavior, such as attacking Saudi Arabia or Israel or other countries would "empower hardliners." Iran never had to sell itself this fiction because this was a talking point cooked up in the West, probably at a focus-group decades ago, as a way to sell the West, and especially the US, a mythical Iran policy.
In February 2019 Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami, who was then the second-in-command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, claimed that if a war with Israel took place, then it "will result in Israel’s defeat within three days."