Thread by @ric23

New #FIUCubaPoll shows that despite 54% of #Cuban-Americans still support the continuation of the embargo, majorities also support the temporary suspension of sanctions during the Covid-19 pandemic, something the Trump administration has refused to do.

Full 2020 #FIUCubaPoll report here: cri.fiu.edu/research/cuba-…

Of the 1,002 #Cuban-Americans surveyed in the 2020 #FIUCubaPoll, 57% support the temporary suspension of trade sanctions on Cuba during the Covid-19 crisis; 69% support food sales and 71% support medicine sales to Cuba by U.S. companies. (starting thread) /1

Also, 56% support diplomatic relations between the US and #Cuba; 58% oppose recent restrictions on the issuing of visas at US Embassy Havana; and 58% support the resumption of the Cuban Family Reunification Program (#CFRP), which was suspended in 2019. /2

Support for unrestricted US travel to #Cuba dropped below 50% for the first time since the Bush-era, with cruise ship being the least popular (40%). Yet, 62% favor allowing U.S. commercial airlines to re-establish routes throughout the island, not just to Havana. /3

This suggests that while a majority of #Cuban-Americans may now favor some restrictions on U.S.-Cuba travel, they remain lenient on what those may be. /4

Notably, on Qs defining US-#Cuba policy as “carrots” vs “sticks”, strong majorities supported a combined approach: 68% favor policies “designed to put maximum pressure on the Cuban gov't” while 66% support policies that improve "the economic well-being of the Cuban people.” /5

iow, Obama-era view that “US-#Cuba policy should be tough on the gov't but soft on the people” has held firm. So has the shrinking salience of Cuba policy among election-year issues, ranking below the economy, healthcare, race, immigration & China(!) policy across parties. /6

Most startling number in poll is % of new émigrés who identify as Republican: 76% of those who migrated to the US between 2010 and 2015. Paradoxically, the same Cubans-Americans who most often travel to #Cuba, maintain relations on the island and favor the engagement policies. /7

Re: the 76%, appeal of Trump’s strongman/"business mogul" persona & anti-socialist bombast is a factor. But strong GOP affiliation among #Cuban recent arrivals most likely represents a rebuke of the system they struggled under & abandoned, than a defined ideological leaning. /8

#Cuban officials must reckon with this 76%. It suggests the Cuban government's relationship with its diaspora is at a new nadir. Those who arrived between 2010 to 2015 aren't batistianos. They are a direct product of the Revolution. /9

The #Cuban government's policies and resistance to reforms continue to create generational waves of opposition. But instead of granting them opportunities and representation at home, the system casts its aggrieved citizens off to Florida, where they do vote. /10

Ultimately, #FIUCubaPoll implies that party preference among Cuban-Americans is less tied to #Cuba policy preferences than hardliners claim. Put another way, although they respond well to anti-socialist rhetoric, a majority of Cuban-Americans still supports engagement policy. /11

A lesson here for Biden is that reversing those Trump measures that directly harm #Cuba families will be popular among Cuban-Americans. These include restarting commercial/charter flights, lifting remittance limits, opening consular services & fully staffing the US Embassy. /12

Another lesson for Biden & especially @TheDemocrats: you neglect this community at your own peril. 47% of #Cuban-Americans in both Miami & FL are reg. D/NPA. For most of the past 2 years, they've been courted aggressively by Trump & GOP, while local Ds have been on their own. /13

For Trump, the poll suggests #Cuba sanctions have a political ceiling, which his policies hit long ago. Rhetoric & presence did most of the work. Should he get a 2nd term, Trump could at least ease unnecessarily harmful restrictions on travel, remittances w/o losing support. /14