War and Peace is considered Tolstoy's master piece and by some the greatest novel of all time. It is truly a master piece. The philosophical point of the book is summed up in the second epilogue... not the first one. In it Tolstoy speaks to man's hubris as generals believe 1/n
They sit astride history moving the fortune of war with their decisions. Tolstoy argued in reality, history was much less predictable with events being decided by thousands of small decisions outside the control of rulers. It is easy to believe in our data driven age this 2/n
Changed despite lacking strong supporting evidence. The US economy largely preforms the same regardless of political party. ACA has not fundamentally changed American health outcomes. We can't explain why observable data like mobility is so tightly correlated but corona 3/n
Rates differ so widely between localities and countries. It's so easy and tempting to believe like the Tolstoyan general that we or our leaders control the destiny of man but we really don't. We are subject to the same randomness and unknown events as our ancestors. 4/n
That scares us as humans but hopefully it relieves us off the burden of having to control our destiny. Bless and protect all leaders and may we treat each other with grace and mercy.
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So I have had a follower ping me multiple times about posting a bunch of my work on Chinese economics and tech over the years. I am happy to say I think everything I wrote holds up just as well today as when it was written and yes, I told the Galaxy Brains. 1/n
"Operational Monitoring and Control Of Small Arms Weapons Within the People’s Liberation Army" where "We present data from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of small arms monitoring from embedded electronics aggregated at a centralized database. Evidence is presented on the likely type of embedded electronics, how it interfaces with the weapon, transmits data back to the database, and likely uses of collected data. We use the data in implications for a brief analysis of PLA organization and management as well as Chinese weapons exports and what this may mean for foreign militaries and conflict zones." 2/n papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
"Chinese Automobile Surveillance Capabilities" where China has built an enormous surveillance state with access to data across connected devices. Previous focus concentrated on devices like telecommunications, but many do not consider the wide range of connected devices that can gather a range of data on individuals. In this report, we utilize Chinese data monitoring of domestic automobiles. China exercises extensive monitoring of domestic automobiles including wide collection of data in near real time on most cars. Data collected includes, but is not limited to, everything from various operational alarms to location and gradient data, speed and direction, environment, and even in some cases, passenger data. Given the recent Biden administration approval of Chinese car battery company Gotion plant in Michigan, it seems prudent to consider monitoring and data capabilities provided to a hostile government. 3/n papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
So since some recent Chinese cyber issues are now in the news let's revisit some of my research over the past couple years to see how much that matches with recent events. Does that sound like fun? Let's take a trip down memory lane 1/n
My first paper on this topic was the database of an MSS funded firm that collected data on prominent individuals at targeted institutions such as think tanks, universities, and technology firms 2/n papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
How would they use this information they collected on prominent individuals? How about hacking the telecoms system and gaining access to telephone and email systems of targeted persons? 3/n reuters.com/business/media…
Ever so often I find things written about China that are the kind of things, I almost wish I had written it myself they are just so good. This is one of those pieces. Allow me a moment to highlight what I think are some of the key pieces a couple of key extrapolations. 1/n
This piece is about local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) and how they came to be in China and their importance for both growth and their outsized importance to debt composition in China. As the author notes, the overall financial picture is bad. Really bad. 2/n
For the uninitiated, LGFVs are basically qusi-public entities that are not technically owned by the local government but for multiple reasons effectively local government vehicles that avoid government debt limits and fund primarily government projects. Their debt does not 3/n
This is a very good article and if I may say, I've been telling you this for a couple years. That said while continuing to say it is a very good article I would like to nibble at the edge of things I think are a little more important. First, making the transition from 1/n
Investment to consumption driven economy is not the matter of flipping a switch or changing some tax law but is literally just a little short remaking the entire economy. I don't think the magnitude of what is being asked is appreciated by these authors or others 2/n
Second, and the authors allude to this but I think still come up a little short in appreciating its importance, not only does Beijing not want to shift to a consumption driven economy but they really can not. Let me give you 2 simple examples. A. Assume (very simple example) 3/n
Sure. Let me provide two examples. Trans-shipment example: China produces the t-shirts WITHOUT a made in label, ships the t-shirts to Vietnam, someone in Vietnam prints "Made in Vietnam", ships to US. In this case, the Chinese controlled company and its representative 1/n
a) do almost no work in Vietnam b) control the USD outside of China earned from exporting. Now let's tackle the arbitrage example. Let's assume (hyper simplistic example) that China can make t-shirts at $1 and Vietnam at $1.05. China however, faces a 10% tariff so their 2/n
T-shirts cost $1.10 in the US. Vietnam is better off arbitraging the spread here so what they do is: a) export all the t-shirts they make to the US b) buy t-shirts from China for their own consumption(people in Vietnam need t-shirts too). This pushes up t-shirt consumption 3/n
This is an excellent follow up question to the Beijing move to centralize control over tech firms. This could easily house multiple dissertations but let me give you the broad outlines. First, 10-30 years ago centralization played minimal role in Chinese domination of 1/n
In fact, Chinese firms generally succeeded in spite of the state not because of it. Huawei legendarily had to fight for all kinds of things. Even sectors like low wage/skill garment manufacturers were not centralized but even were locked out of access to finance mostly 2/n
Second, Chinse centralization is multilayered and doesnt operate like people think. The most direct way China exercises central control not through input output directives (though they very much do in some cases) but more through channeling finance to preferred sectors 3/n