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https://twitter.com/JonathonPSine/status/1775473073640317282This piece is about local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) and how they came to be in China and their importance for both growth and their outsized importance to debt composition in China. As the author notes, the overall financial picture is bad. Really bad. 2/n
https://twitter.com/PM_Thornton/status/1773334233613824281Investment to consumption driven economy is not the matter of flipping a switch or changing some tax law but is literally just a little short remaking the entire economy. I don't think the magnitude of what is being asked is appreciated by these authors or others 2/n
https://twitter.com/e_blyler/status/1767211796987809998a) do almost no work in Vietnam b) control the USD outside of China earned from exporting. Now let's tackle the arbitrage example. Let's assume (hyper simplistic example) that China can make t-shirts at $1 and Vietnam at $1.05. China however, faces a 10% tariff so their 2/n
https://twitter.com/seanthekelly/status/1760121231393833162In fact, Chinese firms generally succeeded in spite of the state not because of it. Huawei legendarily had to fight for all kinds of things. Even sectors like low wage/skill garment manufacturers were not centralized but even were locked out of access to finance mostly 2/n
https://x.com/BaldingsWorld/status/1754507832806752765?s=20Before we even dive in, especially when we look at the balance sheet expansions of like the Fed and BoJ, it makes perfect sense to use that as a framework to both ask the question and whether this could be applied in China. So let's review a couple of things specific to China 2/n
https://twitter.com/Brad_Setser/status/1674525617700700170It is at best fool hardy to count foreign loans as anything close to shadow reserves for many reasons. Why? Since most of this is Belt and Road related, these are loans to Zambia, Pakistan, and other countries. At best these loans are completely illiquid and cannot be 2/n