Joe Biden leads Donald Trump in Pennsylvania and Florida, according to new Times/Siena polls taken after the first debate.
Biden leads in Pennsylvania, 49 to 42 percent among likely voters. He leads in Florida, 47 to 42. nytimes.com/2020/10/03/ups…
In an analysis of interviews conducted yesterday, including in Arizona (where a poll is ongoing), there was modest evidence of a shift in Joe Biden's direction after Trump's COVID diagnosis. That said, one day of interviews is not nearly enough to reach any firm conclusions
The shift, though, would be material if confirmed and it was statistically significant, controlling for the demographic and political variables used in weighting. That said, it's still just one day of interviews. We'll have to wait and see here.
Of the two results, the biggest surprise was probably Florida, where we found Biden+5 with a R+4 sample. This is a fully updated voter file that reflects some meaningful GOP registration gains in the states.
It's just a subsample, so big MoEs here, but we found no evidence of the big Trump gains among Hispanic voters in Florida or in Miami-Dade County. Biden even narrowly led a (very small) sample of Cuban voters; they were R 47-28 by registration. Again, small samples but...
The Pennsylvania poll was pretty in line with the poll averages and our pre-debate poll, which found Biden+9. I should note that this sample was much more GOP (R+1, in fact) than our prior sample by party identification, so we might just have a better-for-Trump sample this time
Nonetheless, if you take the two PA polls together we've got Biden+8 with N>1400 in perhaps the most important state with just over a month until the election. This is a fairly daunting deficit in a stable race.
The debate certainly did nothing to help the president. His ratings dropped across the board. An overwhelming majority of voters disapproved of his performance, including one-third of his own supporters.
That said, Biden didn't exactly kill it either. Most voters didn't want to declare anyone a winner and Biden's ratings didn't improve compared to our pre-debate PA poll, and even fell by a lot on whether he was a strong leader.
Nonetheless, it's Trump who trails and needed a win. Instead, he lost, even if his opponent didn't excel on his own terms. Not much time left.
And since a few of you have asked: the majority of our interviews last night were in AZ. So the shift in the Friday numbers had very limited influence on the toplines here.
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There are signs that Trump's Electoral College is fading. In our current average, there's just a .7 point gap between the popular vote and the tipping point state nytimes.com/2024/09/25/ups…
Our national Times/Siena polling this year shows a very 2022-like pattern by state.
This pattern holds (if a bit noisier ofc) in our three Harris-Trump polls.
I do think it's worth cautioning how tenuous Harris' EC-PV gains are - any meaningful error in MI/WI/PA would quickly restore much of Trump's advantage. This is not a robust edge (unlike Trump '16/20, where he still would have had a big edge even if WI, for ex, was D+5)
One question I've seen throughout my replies: does a seemingly strong result for Harris in PA signal a 2020 polling error repeat?
That's obviously hard to say, but I want to flag one thing that caught my eye: our polls do not show Harris doing well with the white working class
In PA, it's Trump 61-Harris 34; nationally, it's Trump 67, Harris 30. In each case, that's >= 10 points worse than our final pre-election polls four years ago. It's also worse than the estimated Biden '20 finish with these groups.
This doesn't rule out a polling error, whether by chance or bias. The polls entered the field immediately after a debate; this is a classic environment for response bias (notably, she leads PA bc of gains with college educated whites, who may be most likely to react to news).
The NYT/Siena poll is far from perfect - and in general I worry more about people expecting it to be perfect than I worry about it getting insufficient credit.
But the poll is very different from the others - and the differences help explain its record
Staying on the LV question: from its inception until last week's CNN/SSRS state polls (give them applause), the NYT/Siena poll was the only public poll incorporating self-reported vote intention and a model of turnout based no vote history
(in our data, someone's history of voting = more predictive of turnout than self-reported turnout intention -- though blending the two does best of all)
FiveThirtyEight released a new model today, showing Harris with a 58% chance to win. But it's clearly a very different model and I think it's important to hear more about the differences
The previous model made Biden the favorite bc it gave 4:1 weight to fundamentals > polls -- a view that would make Trump stronger today and perhaps still ahead.
Now it gives 4:1 weight to polls > fundamentals -- which would have made Trump a large favorite before
Importantly, the methodology page implies that the model would give more weight to polls > fundamentals all along, so this isn't a function of being one month closer to the election
Kamala Harris puts the Sun Belt back in play, with the race tied across AZ, NC, NV, GA
AZ: Harris 50, Trump 45
GA: Trump 50, Harris 46
NV: Trump 48, Harris 47
NC: Harris 49, Trump 47 nytimes.com/2024/08/17/us/…
The poll basically shows the race returning to "normal," with Harris obtaining far larger margins among Black, Hispanic and young voters, propelling her to nearly a 10 pt gain across the four states nytimes.com/2024/08/17/ups…
I probably wouldn't focus too much on the exact results by state. Individual state polls are a little noisy, and we were bound to get some head-scratchers eventually after conveniently getting identical 50-46 results in each of PA/MI/WI
That said, it is worth noting that the sample does look a little blue. It's about a net-1 pt more Democratic, Dem-leaning and 2020 'Biden compared to the last time we polled these three states in May. This could be an indication of a shift in response patterns, though it could indicate change in attitude as well
I do think the idea of a 'real' 1 pt change in Dem PID/Biden recall, etc., to be fairly plausible. Not only is that a fairly small shift, but no one can deny that the national political environment hasn't changed in a huge way over the last few weeks