Thread: If Iran judges that the conflict in Armenia and Azerbaijan is creating any instability in Iran or stoking ethnic tensions, it will move quickly to secure a ceasefire via work with Ankara and Moscow based on the Astana model. Those talking about "Turkey vs. Iran" are wrong
Why are they wrong? Because the hidden deal between these countries, who may not always share interests, is no stoking tensions inside sovereign borders of the other. For instance Russia is wary of extremists, Turkey of PKK, Iran of ethnic tensions;
The idea that the conflict which Turkey encouraged between Azerbaijan and Armenia might be used in any way to weaken the Iran regime will stop immediately if Tehran feels this way through quick calls to Ankara and Moscow.
Ankara understands this and plans accordingly. Only some people in the West think there is some mythical idea of Ankara helping the US against the Iran regime, i.e that Turkey supports US sanctions and maximum pressure...no Turkey does not. Ankara works with Iran.
While Ankara, Iran and Russia may partition Syria into areas of influence...when it comes to internal borders...there can be no acceptance of any of these big states meddling inside eachother borders...same with relations with China.
Tehran messaging already is concern over the battles near the border. While some suggested Azerbaijan would be able to take areas of Nagorna-Karabakh or even move along the Iran border towards exclave near Turkey, Iran would be concerned about this.
The correct analysis that Turkey, Iran and Russia are the emerging powerful states is accurate and the era of 10 years of recent wars; or even 30 years of instability and global war on terror; and US hegemony is changing...as powerful states return.
The powerful states share common interests, they want to co-opt extremist groups and use them, contract them, make them proxies, but they don't want chaos and instability. They want to move in to create spheres of influence or frozen conflicts in weak states
They want to stop weak states from spreading extremism, they learned over the years that weak, ungoverned, unstable areas, spread instability. Turkey's obsession now with PKK was a result of seeing that in Syria in 2014-2015. Russia from Chechnya's lessons, Iran from various.
The goal now is for powerful states to grab up areas in other states, like Russia does in Georgia-Ukraine, or Turkey in N. Syria and Libya or Iran in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon. This is how things work. No one will be allowed, by Tehran, to destabilize Iran, certainly not Turkey
Why do we know this. Because Iran also wanted to make sure there are no more Kurdish groups carrying out attacks in Iran, and it sought to stop PJAK and then also KDPI etc. It did that also through pressure and deals abroad.
The idea that the US, stretched as it is with various issue...could use the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict to somehow fan flames inside Iran of protest is unlikely. Turkey won't wan that...Tehran will work to make sure it doesn't happen. And Azerbaijan is on the border, not far away
I always get complaints from Ankara analysts who claim "no, Seth, you're wrong, Ankara is hostile to Iran"...but it isn't. There are no statements by the foreign minister etc. In fact Ankara understands Iran and can work with it and has a way of doing that. It hedges.
Ankara is hostile to Israel, hostile to France...it knows how to put out statements attacking numerous countries, from Holland to Germany, Austria, India, UAE, etc...it almost never critiques Iran.
What is the end game of Israel's current multi-front war? This is worth considering in the wake of the strike on Hamas in Doha on September 9 and a new round of airstrikes on the Houthis in Yemen. In addition Israel continues to operate in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. This is unprecedented in Israel's history to be fighting in so many places for so long.
There is no doubt that when it comes to tactical precision strikes and intelligence gathering that Israel has excellent capabilities. After the massive failure of October 7 Israel has clawed back this perception of being able to operate on multiple fronts at a high tempo.
However, the continues to be an elephant in the room in terms of end game and strategy. The war with Hezbollah was a trickle in 2023-2024 until Israel escalated in Sept-Nov and got a ceasefire. Since then Israel has struck Hezbollah but Hezbollah does not strike Israel. Will that be a "norm" for years?
It always surprised me that Doha didn't re-think its Hamas hosting strategy on October 7. It should have seen that Hamas was a destructive sunk cost. Doha had sent large sums to Gaza and Hamas was risking everything through its attack and massacre.
Doha could have used that as an opportunity to pivot, to get Hamas leaders in Doha to distance themselves from the disaster that Sinwar had unleashed. Doha could have leveraged its influence and probably got something out of this. It could have leaked that Hamas leaders in Doha were shocked and that they wanted the movement to go in a different direction. Hamas in Gaza could have been isolated and removed and Doha could have swept in with the "good cop" Hamas leaders from Doha and tried to get a coalition government with Abbas, something Hamas could try to control behind the scenes.
There was an opportunity on October 8 to re-think decades of failed Gaza strategy. For instance, after Oct. 7 Hamas released two American women, and also two elderly women. Clearly someone was advising Hamas abroad, likely via Doha, that holding Americans, women, the elderly, was not a good look.
The pro-Houthi griftersphere is fascinating. It’s solely made up of people who had never heard of the Houthis before October 7, 2023. They were then operationalized, or self-operationalized to suddenly back a group they knew nothing about in a country they never heard about and couldn’t locate on a map; solely because the group claimed to be fighting Israel in the name of Gaza. They adopted the cause of the Houthis, who they often confusingly claim is the government of Yemen (the Houthis are not the government); and now they are all aping eachother like leap frog to one-up how much they back “Yemen” and its “Prime Minister” after Israel targeted the Iran-backed Houthi government.
There isn’t a lone voice among these folk who cared about the Yemen civil war before 2023. It’s just people that adopted this cause and then accept any Houthi slop they are fed.
You could make up a group and claim it is fighting Israel “for Gaza” and these grifters would back it. “The Abjababians are fighting Israel to stop the Gaza war” and the next day you’d have 100 “influencers” very passionate about the Abjababians and their leader General Landocjabr…any random thing you could completely make up…put some AI slop on it and they’d consume it
I don’t know if griftersphere is a word, but I’m happy to coin it and will use it more often. It is the most appropriate word for the phenomenon of these folk.
The pro-Houthi griftersphere should be mapped and studied. It’s so obviously not authentic and so ridiculous.
I found this CNN article about Gaza city interesting because of the elephant in the room. It tells the tale of a city that was once thriving and is now a chaos of war and tragedy.
But what seems to be missing in the larger discussion is why Hamas purposely risked all this to commit the genocidal Oct. 7 attack; Hamas would have known that murdering 1,000 people and taking 250 hostage would result in a long war of destruction. They purposely set out to destroy Gaza city.
"you could still get a matcha latte on the way to a yoga studio, or relax in a park."
So shouldn't someone hold Hamas to account for having destroyed all this?
The report says "institutions set up by the militants, with help from regional governments like Qatar and a robust United Nations aid system, gave some structure to the strip’s exhausted population."
So why haven't those organizations and countries that funded Hamas-run Gaza condemned Hamas for unleashing this terrible war.
I'm fascinated and saddened every time I see a news story about Hamas in Gaza, such as the recent statements about EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas speaking with her Israelis counterpart and discussing Hamas in Gaza. It always shocks me that after 655 days of war that Hamas continues to control part of Gaza and negotiate to return to control most of it. The existence of Hamas in Gaza shouldn't even be a discussion today. It shouldn't be there. But it is. It is unclear if Hamas will be removed from Gaza. If it is to be removed there doesn't appear to be a clear roadmap for doing so. This lack of a process is part of the wider series of missteps and challenges that plagued the war for 21 months.
It's fascinating that despite murdering more than 1,000 people on October 7 and kidnapping 250; that decisions were made in the early months of the war that would result in keeping Hamas in power. Instead of being laser focused on removing Hamas, so Israelis wouldn't be kidnapped again, so they wouldn't be massacred again; the war was treated as another round in Gaza, another 2006, 2009, 2014. In fact, the plans for the offensive in Gaza were almost identical to past raids. The concept: Go into part of Gaza city or Khan Younis, uproot some tunnels; and then leave. Go into the Philadelphi corridor, clear it out and then negotiate over leaving it.
One of the early examples of a decision that was obviously made to result in Hamas staying in power, was the decision to move civilians in Gaza to be under Hamas rule. The IDF or other officials made decisions early on that under no circumstances would Israel deal with the civilians, and under no circumstances would an alternate authority be created to administer their lives in a non-Hamas zone. As such the result was to move 2 million people to remain under Hamas rule.
There is a lot of talk today about sheikhs in Hebron who want to for an "emirate" of Hebron. This is being greeted by some as a positive initiative. Let's take a look at the claims and also what the results could be.
First, the context. Israel is engaged in a 637 day war in Gaza against Hamas. Hamas still controls around 40 percent of Gaza. In Gaza, Israel has backed an initiative to have armed militias involved in some activities in the rest of Gaza. There is one named commander, Abu Shabab (not his real name obviously) and there are rumored to be others.
Some see this as a wise decision to have multiple armed gangs and militias run a post-war Gaza. Israel's current government opposes having the PA run Gaza, so the theory is that armed militias fighting eachother and Hamas is a good future.
In the West Bank the PA has been relatively successful at ruling Palestinian cities and towns for thirty years. However, Israel's current government includes parties that oppose the PA. The PA leader Mahmoud Abbas is aging and there is talk of what comes next.