How should we think about the ideal size of fiscal stimulus right now? A thread with two approaches: (1) top down (based on filling the macro hole) and (2) bottom up (based on protecting people).
Three distinct issues:
(1) When do we need money? Simple: two months ago.
(2) How long do we need money? As long as it takes, could be years, ideally would have triggers to continue after Congress is fatigued.
(3) How much per month? Rest of thread is on this question.
A top down approach would ask what the output gap is and what the multiplier is. CBO's July forecast put the output gap at 6% in Q4, at a time when they expected the UR to be 10.5% this quarter. So presumably they would say something smaller, maybe 4%. cbo.gov/system/files/2…
Alternatively, Okun's Law says the output gap is 2*(7.9% unemployment - 3.4% full employment rate) = 8%. Let's round that up to 10% which could reflect the higher "realistic" unemployment rate, a further outbreak that hurts the economy more, or a lower full employment rate.
Next we need a multiplier. Most advocates of stimulus I see on twitter tout multipliers like 1.5. On the other hand, this may be too high and the very short-term multiplier might be lower, as low as 0.5. Let's use both.
Finally we can combine these with the fact that monthly GDP is $1.8T and get the following needs for monthly stimulus for the 0.5 multiplier / 1.5 multiplier case:
If the output gap is 4%: $36b / $108b
If the output gap is 10%: $90b / $270b
If legislating for 6 months then the total ranges from $216 billion to $1.6 trillion.
I would want to err on the side of more, I worry the output gap will remain large, and that the short-run multiplier is low. So I would be at the top of that range.
Now a bottom up approach. I'll consider four elements:
(1) Health needs like testing. I'm no expert, will arbitrarily pencil in $30b/month.
(2) Unemployed.
(3) States/localities
(4) Everything else
Second, how much do we need for the unemployed? Compensation in August was $56 billion below its pre-crisis trend. In theory for that amount of money could keep worker's whole (would still have lost business income etc.). That is about $350 billion over six months.
Alternatively, 28 million on UI or waiting to get on. If you support $600/week * 4.35 weeks per month that is $73 billion a month.
PUA for gig workers etc. ends at the end of the year. Need ~$10b per month for it next year.
Continued claims falling, so likely lower than $73b for month.
I prefer $400/month given the economy.
Nets to lower but I'll stick with $70b.
Third, how much is needed for states and localities? Auerbach, Gale and Sheiner put the *revenue* shortfall at $227b over three years. There is also additional demands on spending. Let's double the number and say $450b total, if over 6 months is $75b/month.
Finally, everything else? A lot of people not eligible for UI, in fact most suffering during CARES period appears to have been people not getting UI not people getting too little UI. Mechanisms for this is checks, SNAP, child allowance, housing vouchers, etc. Call it $60b/month.
I don't have a good basis for this, but $60b per month is as much as we spend on SNAP in a normal year, so would be enough for a 12X expansion of that program. Or enough for stimulus checks every three months. Or enough to close the personal income shortfall not counting UI.
Oh, and I would allocate $0 to restoring the state and local deduction and twice as much as that to PPP.
So the bottom up approach gets you the following per month:
Shelter inflation was moderate and the three month moving average continues to basically trend down, albeit slowly.
But you can't just assume elevated items like shelter will get better but that everything opposite won't get worse.
And that's what we've (predictably and predicted) seen: goods inflation was negative for a while but turned positive for 4 straight months. Offset shelter cooling.
Tariffs & exchange rates. A short explainer of the simple case of 10% across-the-board tariffs. Let's start with no retaliation.
Brief version: Tariffs will strengthen the U.S. dollar which will reduce impact on consumers but exacerbate it for exporters.
Three cases:
1. No exchange rate effect. In this case imports are 10% more expensive for consumers. Exports are the same (because the exchange rate did not change) and the trade deficit shrinks. The entire tariff is paid by Americans.
2. USD appreciates by X% where 0 < X < 10%. Imports are 10% - X more expensive & consumers cut back on imports. But the xr appreciation also makes it more expensive for foreigners to buy exports so exports fall. Trade deficit effect is ambiguous & foreigners pay part of tariffs.
Labor market tightness has stabilized over the last several months after a loosening steadily through the summer. Job openings were up and quits down. My favorite metric, job openings per unemployed, was stable.
Here are openings and quits. They've been telling a somewhat contradictory story in recent months as openings are up and quits are down.
The economy remains on the Beveridge curve--admittedly the tight part of it.
Broadly speaking what has happened is core services inflation as only slowed a little (less than people were hoping on lagged shelter) while goods prices have started rising--with unusually large auto price increases in November that could still be hurricane-related.
I believe it is useful to make small contributions to big things (many engaged in doing that now) & also bigger contributions to small things.
On the later, in @BostonGlobe I argue for zoning reform to enable Cambridge to help build more than 1,000 additional housing units.
A🧵
States and localities can resist the likely regressive thrust of federal policymaking while doing what they can to build a more progressive, inclusive and upwardly mobile society.
To do that we need cheaper housing.
And to do that we need more housing.
VP Harris was right to set a goal of building 3 million housing units. On a proportional basis that would require 1,050 from Cambridge. Unfortunately on current course we'll get 100. But with reforms proposed by the City Council that could be raised to more than 1,000.
I know many skeptics of prediction markets. I don't have an ideological faith in them (OK, maybe quasi ideological). But the empirical evidence is they have worked really, really, really well. And did again on Tuesday night.
A short 🧵 about this remarkable picture.
Markets gave Trump a 60% chance. How does that prove they know what they're doing? If Harris won could say, "but she had a 40% chance" so wasn't wrong.
That's correct. Can only judge when you've seen them many, many times. Do 60% chance things happen 60% of the time?
In Ec10 we should them 15 million data points from sports betting from @andrewlilley_au comparing the prediction market probability to the outcomes.
And guess what: if you collect 100 markets with a 6% chance of a team winning and look at the results you'll see them win 6 times.