2. It was aimed at a few dozen cyber and election security policy folks whose tweets I sometimes embed and who I also speak w/ frequently. Most of them have told me to f*** off in the comments (I hope/ think also humorously).
3.If you don’t know me and we’ve never spoken I’ve almost certainly never embedded any of your tweets. Prove me wrong and I’ll buy you a drink of your choice.
4.I write the Washington Post’s Cybersecurity 202 newsletter, which focuses on the intersection between cyber, election security, policy and politics. It’s a reported newsletter, not a tweet farm. If that sounds interesting, I hope you’ll check it out. subscribe.washingtonpost.com/newsletters/#/…
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.@RonWyden exercising the nuclear (rhetoric) option in a new Medium post. "If Congress and states don’t act immediately, our country could face an electoral Chernobyl this fall." medium.com/@RonWyden/figh…
Here's the closer: "If Americans see a repeat of what happened in Georgia across the country, many will rightfully question whether the results — and by extension, the government itself — are truly legitimate."
FWIW, I think this post reflects a problem with talking about election security and cybersecurity generally. The rhetoric and analogies started so hot (cyber-9/11; cyber-Pearl Harbor) that it's tough to draw attention to something that's truly horrifying.
Just in: Treasury Sanctions Iranian Cyber Actors for Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities Targeting Hundreds of Universities:
Cyber sanctions vs. one Iranian entity and 10 Iranian nationals.
The entity is the Mabna Institute, which "conducted massive, coordinated cyber intrusions into computer systems belonging to at least approximately 144 United States-based universities, in addition to at least 176 universities located in 21 foreign countries"