One really important aspect of resiliency is redundancy.
We as organizers need to be buildong out communications redundancy right now.
Trump is a fascist who is already targeting comms infrastructure-- look at his attacks on Twitter and TikTok.
We as organizers need to be buildong out communications redundancy right now.
Trump is a fascist who is already targeting comms infrastructure-- look at his attacks on Twitter and TikTok.
https://twitter.com/rechelon/status/1315218982249459713
A lot of us use Signal more and more as our primary means of organizing communication, but we need to be building (secure) redundancy into our comms plans right now, both internal and external/turnout.
Another example of why: Facebook's recent mass limitations on event invites.
Another example of why: Facebook's recent mass limitations on event invites.
During more stable moments this wouldn't be the most practical use of time/labor, but I think we really need to be putting those contingencies in place in this leadup to the election/aftermath.
We just don't know what infrastructure Trump might target in desperation.
We just don't know what infrastructure Trump might target in desperation.
And, shit like the Facebook event invite thing is a very important reminder that tech companies just fuck around and do what they want unpredictably, in ways that can be deeply damaging to organizing at the worst possible times.
Remember when they mass-shutdowned COVID mutual aid groups and posts in March?
Worst possible action, worst possible time.
Building in comms redundancies makes it a lot easier to bounce back from that shit.
Worst possible action, worst possible time.
Building in comms redundancies makes it a lot easier to bounce back from that shit.
Do think about security, especially for internal comms.
Signal is great but vulnerable in ways this episode highlights.
Telegram is less great and may have backdoors, but is not particularly cooperative with US authorities.
Signal is great but vulnerable in ways this episode highlights.
Telegram is less great and may have backdoors, but is not particularly cooperative with US authorities.
(I personally have a hunch that Telegram probably has at least one foreign state backdoor, but no direct proof, so. Just something to keep in mind.)
Stay safe, remember that on mass turnout your security aim is to protect the list, not the content. Assume that mass turnout/external comms content will find its way into the hands of opponents and/or investigators.
On internal comms you likely want to protect both.
On internal comms you likely want to protect both.
Remember, fascists very often come for comms infrastructure first when they want to shut down mass protest, whether it's legal or not.
After the election, we are going to need to be ready for mass, sustained protest in case Trump attempts a coup.
He will likely be desperate.
After the election, we are going to need to be ready for mass, sustained protest in case Trump attempts a coup.
He will likely be desperate.
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