Help needed! Doing a case on how many Indian promoters of listed companies have lost them because of leverage. Wanted a comprehensive list so thought of asking here. Please give name of promoter and company name. We can go back 10 years for this exercise.
Leverage could be at the company level (think Hotel Leelaventures) and/or promoter level.
Thanks everyone. Lots of responses.
As I go through the list (thanks again everyone) I am fascinated to see so many cases where the kids blew up the businesses founded by their parents or grandparents.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
I agree with much of the piece and it's very well articulated.
The whole AI space is too risky for value investors like me. There is a better way to invest in this bubble, though, without compromising on the definition of what's an investment as per Ben Graham (safety of principal plus an adequate return). The same old idea of selling shovels to gold diggers applies.
That way is via energy.
Data centers are electricity guzzlers. Here is an old clip but I think it's relevant.
The AI revolution is fueling an unprecedented surge in global electricity demand. While renewable energy sources are expected to play an increasingly vital role, the sheer scale and critical reliability needs of AI and data infrastructure will ensure that fossil fuels will remain indispensable for powering our data-driven future.
A few years ago, I was at Buddh Circuit—India’s only F1 track—and I saw a beautiful GT2RS. Out of curiosity, I used an app to find out who the owner was. It turned out the car was owned by a listed Indian company. Subsequently, I found that the company owns several such cars.
So, when we discuss bad assets, we must decide from whose point of view we are looking at the situation. Those cars have been capitalized in the books of the listed company as fixed assets. Their purchase appears as capex to the stockholders in the cash flow statement, but those “assets” will do nothing for the minority shareholders. They are “good assets” for the users but bad for the minority stockholders.
So, I will focus on the idea of “bad assets, good liabilities” from the point of view of minority shareholders of listed or unlisted companies.
Traditional accounting tells us that our net worth is the surplus of assets over liabilities. The focus of the accountants here is the quantum of the assets and liabilities instead of their quality. Once we start applying our minds to the quality dimensions of assets and liabilities instead of just their quantity, some useful insights are found. I share some here.
One example of bad assets would be loan losses in a bank but think about this: Loan losses are a cost of doing business in the banking industry. Zero NPAs mean you are not taking enough risk, leaving money on the table. The idea here is not to have zero loan losses but to have a small amount to help you find the right place on the risk spectrum, ranging from being reckless to being too conservative. This is a controversial idea, and not everyone will agree with it.
Bad assets also appear in books but should not be there at all. In other words, fictitious assets. And there are so many of those out there. For example, accounting goodwill arises from paying a large premium over the book value of a bad acquisition. The goodwill will eventually be impaired by the accountants, but that will take a long time. In the meantime, the asset is sitting there, inflating the book value of the common stock.
Investing is a probabilistic game. Some bets are going to go bad no matter how good the process, due diligence, etc. But when they go bad it's important to distinguish between bets gone bad because of bad luck or a bad process that needs fixing.
Investor perfectionists tend to feel upset when things don't work out the way they thought. They attribute all bad outcomes to bad processes which they then try to "fix".
Interestingly, successful traders don't think like this at all. They accept that some bets will not work and will produce losses and they internalize this by telling themselves "you win some, you lose some."
Not all AT1 bonds are dangerous if we agree with Ben Graham who wrote about the "theory of buying the highest yielding obligation of a sound company." He wrote:
"If any obligation of an enterprise deserves to qualify as a fixed-value investment, then all its obligations must do so. Stated conversely, if a company's junior bonds are not safe, its first-mortgage bonds are not a desirable fixed-value investment."
"For if the second mortgage is unsafe the company itself is weak, and generally speaking there can be no high-grade obligations of a weak enterprise."
Also an example of one of the iron laws of economics: you can either control the price of something or its supply. But you cannot control both.
Important to make a distinction between price and supply controls by private parties and those by governments. After all cartels exist. And business models like Ferrari and LVMH control supply so they can charge high prices.