Thread by @Evie_Calling

The UAE in Yemen: From Surge to Recalibration
lawfareblog.com/uae-yemen-surg…
By Thomas Juneau Sunday,
October 11, 2020
(continued 2)

Recalibrating, 2019 and After

By 2019, the UAE had come to believe that the costs of its involvement in Yemen outweighed the benefits,

and that this negative cost-benefit ratio might worsen in the future. It therefore announced in June 2019 a partial withdrawal of its forces from Yemen.

It has, however, maintained a presence in the south, focused mostly on counterterrorism,

and continues supporting some southern groups.

Those earlier gains were important.

The UAE has built major influence in southern Yemen, much of which it has maintained even as it drew down its forces. It has also become skilled at mobilizing, training,

and equipping non-state militias and exploiting them to project its power regionally, a valuable asset that Iran largely monopolized in the Gulf until recently.

The UAE has also learned a lot by working closely with the United States

in mounting counterterrorism operations in Yemen.

Yet despite these real successes, the war in Yemen was proving costly.

The Emirati leadership, moreover, understood that the way ahead would likely become increasingly difficult to manage.

The war was increasing tensions inside the UAE, a federation where the balance among the seven emirates can be fragile.

Combat casualties, in particular, came primarily from the smaller and poorer emirates traditionally dominated by the richer Abu Dhabi and Dubai,

while more trade-oriented emirates (especially Dubai) were growing increasingly concerned at the risk of conflict as a result of an assertive foreign policy driven primarily by Abu Dhabi.

Heavy UAE involvement in Yemen was also creating uncertainty in Emirati-Saudi relations.

Despite successful efforts so far to manage these differences, on the ground Saudi Arabia and the UAE often work at cross-purposes; Saudi- and Emirati-backed groups have even clashed on several occasions.

The UAE also saw, with growing anxiety, mounting opposition to the war

from the United States. Finally, some of the UAE’s associations in southern Yemen have proved risky and could become costlier in the future.

The UAE, in particular, has supported—directly and indirectly—a range of groups and militias, including Salafists with ties to AQAP.

An eventual political process will see these contradictions play out.

In a best-case scenario, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi could eventually find common ground in supporting a federal solution, allowing the UAE to consolidate its influence in an autonomous south—though,

unfortunately, that scenario remains a long way off. In the meantime, even though the UAE has made efforts to minimize and contain its losses in Yemen, its ongoing commitment remains risky.

The situation in the south, in particular, is volatile.

The UAE’s involvement in Yemen, in sum, faces a rocky road ahead, as does its most important success: its partnership with Saudi Arabia.