Great article, but while I definitely agree with @RobinWigg that in order to strengthen the robustness of the economy, governments should gradually eliminate the tax deductibility of interest payments, I think he is a little harsh on... ft.com/content/87efe5…
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the Modigliani and Miller framework, which is a deeply insightful one. It shows that debt doesn’t matter to economic value creation only if we ignored the tax deductibility of interest and bankruptcy costs (later adjusted to more general “financial distress” costs).
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The problem is that economists and analysts never really understood how financial distress costs are incurred by businesses (let alone by sovereign borrowers) and how they are self-reinforcing. They occur as agents change their behavior in response to changes in the...
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probability of default (or in the case of sovereigns, to changes in uncertainty over how debt-servicing costs will ultimately be allocated). Once debt levels are high enough, any adverse shock that can increase uncertainty will set the company off into a spiral in...
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which more uncertainty increases financial distress costs which, in turn, further raise the probability of default, so that, as the author points out, “the shares of companies with stronger balance sheets have this year massively outperformed those with weaker ones”.
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High levels of debt, in other words, exacerbate volatility, both on the way up, when we probably don’t need the help, and on the way down, when we certainly don’t need it.
That is why I agree with him that it makes no sense for governments to try to force businesses to...
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increase their debt levels by allowing them to deduct interest and not dividends. This just undermines the robustness of the economy in order to help business owners maximize returns by minimizing debt payments – not a trade-off we a government should support.
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As this FT editorial implies, China has responded to major social and economic changes in China and the world – which were not created, but were sharply accelerated, by Covid-19 – mainly by doubling down on its existing political and economic model.
For over a decade Beijing has promised economic adjustment in the form of a rebalancing of domestic demand, but probably because it does not accept the accompanying social and political adjustments, it has barely adjusted: the limited increase in the consumption share of...
3/4
GDP has had more to do with a decline in GDP growth than with a real rebalancing of income.
I am not a historical determinist, but in the past, systems that have resisted adjusting their institutions during periods of great underlying change have always seemed more...
Parents are protesting in Beijing because an education company to whom they made payments has gone bankrupt, and are demanding that somebody (the government, I guess) make up those payments.
Clearly moral hazard is strongly embedded within the economy, and while much has already been written about its effect on lending discipline, I would add that moral hazard is also a kind of positive feedback mechanism. It reinforces economic activity and growth when times...
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are good by encouraging risk-taking and by effectively lowering transaction costs, but when conditions reverse it can exacerbate the slowdown by inhibiting risk-taking and forcing a (sometimes chaotic) adjustment of expectations.
I don’t think there were any big surprises in China’s very lopsided Q3 GDP growth data. As I have long argued, China is well on its way to recording GDP growth for the year of 2-3%. GDP growth is up 4.9% for the quarter and 0.7% year to date.
It was driven by a 6.9% acceleration in industrial production for the month of September and 5.8% in Q3, adding up to 1.2% growth for the year to date.
Retail sales were better than expected for the month (up 3.3%) but were up only 0.9% for the quarter and are still...
3/6
down a whopping 7.2% for the year to date. Whether you look at the most recent month, the quarter, or the year to date, it is obvious that the recovery in production vastly exceeds the recovery in consumption (for which retail sales is a proxy).
Was import substitution really as much of a failure as Arvind Subramanian, and many others, seem to think? He says that after Raúl Prebisch argued for it in the late 1950s and 1960s, “Many developing countries consequently focused on their...
domestic markets — and fell further behind the west."
But it was really in the 1980s, after the LDC debt crisis, that these countries fell behind – before that the Latin American grew at roughly 5-6% for two decades – and I would...
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say that the unsustainable build-up of a very inverted debt structure in the 1970s had far more to do with the need by international banks to recycle massive petrodollar flows than with anything intrinsic to the import substitution model.
Very interesting thread. Capital Economics says China’s GDP growth has been overstated by roughly 12% in the past five years – a very hefty number – while the San Francisco Fed accepts the numbers in aggregate but says Beijing has been smoothing out the data.
I don’t know enough to say whether either is true, but for me the biggest problem with China’s GDP growth data is that they do not have the same relationship to underlying economic growth that GDP growth data in other countries do, and so it is meaningless to compare...
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Chinese GDP growth with GDP growth elsewhere.
While GDP growth in most countries is a measured output that depends on volatile real economic activity, Chinese GDP is an input into the economic process in which local governments are required to add whatever additional...
In the first few decades of the last century the international settlements in China – in places like Shanghai, Hong Kong and Guangzhou – became important Chinese centers of cultural, intellectual and scientific innovation (including as the... scmp.com/economy/china-…
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birthplace of the CPC), perhaps because they operated within very different legal and political institutions. To a certain extent China’s Special Economic Zones of the 1980s and 1990s may have operated on similar principles.
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I've always wondered – given the obvious political constraints within China – if the country wouldn’t do a better job of encouraging technological, cultural and intellectual innovation by creating similar “innovation zones” with different legal and local-political...