The Afghanistan JSOC task force has been using SIGINT to figure out where the Taliban needs help against ISIS in Kunar, then delivering it via drone strikes, troops involved told me.

They jokingly nicknamed the targeting team the “Taliban Air Force.” washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/1…
“What we’re doing with the strikes against ISIS is helping the Taliban move,” one special operator told me. The Taliban and ISIS are duking it out in the same old terrain—Korengal, Chowkay—where U.S. spent years relying heavily on airpower and artillery. washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/1…
It’s a way of tipping the scales against ISIS, which the US sees as more dangerous, without having to talk to Taliban. “It’s easy to capture the Taliban’s communications,” said Bill Ostlund. “Why directly coordinate with them when you can do it that way?” washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/1…
“Yeah, it raised eyebrows,” in the JSOC task force, a special operator told me. “Everyone in the task force would rather be out there fighting the war themselves. But I think everyone understands that it’s time to try something different.” washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/1…
“I can understand a certain distaste for doing it....[but] it’s the kind of thing that needs to happen” in a future where the Taliban is responsible for policing terrorist groups in Afg, former JSOC and CENTCOM commander Joe Votel told me. washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/1…
But some question how serious a threat ISIS-K really is. "We’re not seeing foreign fighters up there. These are localized folks,” Brig. Gen. Joe Ryan told me. "I don’t believe a transnational terrorist attack is going to emanate from Konar anytime soon.” washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/1…
That's while the Taliban remains allied w/ & supported by al-Qaeda. “Senior [AQ] figures remain in Afg" & Taliban have "offered informal guarantees that they would honor their historic ties" w/ AQ, a senior UN counterterrorism official said last week. voanews.com/south-central-…
"Are we more concerned about ISIS taking over Afg, or the Taliban?” asked @LorenCrowe, who did 2 Kunar tours & was wounded 2x there. “If ISIS in the Korengal is mostly a bunch of Korengalis, why do we care?...There will always be dragons to slay up there." washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/1…

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More from @wesleysmorgan

13 Oct
The Extortion 17 conspiracy theory is one of the dumbest around. CENTCOM investigation should qualify as a thorough debunking. At that pace of ops, a JSOC strike force was going to be lost to a lucky RPG eventually; see this prediction from a SEAL Team 6 chief a year before: Image
The Extortion 17 conspiracy theory comes in many flavors and has many fatal flaws. But a basic one is the premise that the shootdown killed SEALs who were on the bin Laden raid. It didn't: bin Laden raid was Team 6's Red Squadron, Extortion 17 was Gold Sqn
This person is trying to revive the Extortion 17 conspiracy theory—claiming to have new documents. But the redacted documents pictured here are just from the declassified CENTCOM investigation (under "Wardak CH-47 investigation" at www3.centcom.mil/FOIALibrary)
Read 4 tweets
13 Oct
This was going to happen eventually. Kind of amazing that it took this long. There are roughly as many US troops in Somalia as there are in Syria (500 is the Pentagon's official number).
Here's former JSOC and SOCOM commander Gen. (Ret.) Tony Thomas, who presided over JSOC strikes and raids in Somalia, recently saying that "whether al Shabab is a threat to the US is subject to debate." counthttps://twitter.com/TonyT2Thomas/status/1312414701092036610?s=20
Here's another US counterterrorism and intelligence veteran echoing that assessment:
Read 4 tweets
12 Oct
In this story for which @natepenn interviewed Clint Lorance, Lorance comes across pretty badly—but his defense/pardon team comes across a lot worse, touting “biometric” evidence that was really just willfully misread common Afghan names in a database story.californiasunday.com/clint-lorance-…
.@natepenn’s story about what Clint Lorance did, and what Lorance’s defense team and Fox News did to get Trump to pardon him, is worth reading in full. It sounds like Lorance himself accepted he was guilty and fairly convicted—until convinced otherwise. story.californiasunday.com/clint-lorance-…
Also, it’s funny that the story is about the Arghandab and is titled “The Last Patrol.” So is this fantastic Brian Mockenhaupt story about paratroopers from the same brigade in the same district on their previous, surge-era deployment theatlantic.com/magazine/archi…
Read 4 tweets
15 Sep
That 100 estimate is kind of a fascinating thing. Although they would repeat the number, a lot of senior military and IC folks, when asked, will say they don't really know what there were supposedly 100 of/how "AQ fighters" was defined: Arab AQ fighters? Non-Afghan AQ fighters?
Here are three comments different counterterrorism officials made to me about the longstanding "100 AQ in Afghanistan" (now supposedly 200) estimate for my Pech book: a senior CIA official, an Obama NSC CT official, and a senior JSOC officer
A 2015 unclassified military report suggested that 100 was the number of AQ fighters (however defined) who stayed year-round in Kunar/Nuristan with Farouq al-Qahtani, and didn't count others who came into other eastern provinces for the warmer months.
Read 8 tweets
17 Aug
Today I learned that during the 1970 NYC postal strike, the Nixon administration deployed 18,000 troops for a few days to replace strikers in New York—mostly sorting mail.

Here's the Department of the Army's after-action report on Operation Graphic Hand: governmentattic.org/2docs/Army-AAR… Image
As the strike heated up, the Pentagon drew on a standing contingency plan to prepare to deploy troops to post offices in as many as 35 cities to take over for striking postal workers.

They came close to deploying to Boston and Philadelphia, but wound up just going to NYC. Image
It wasn't just the National Guard, either. The 18,000 troops in NYC post offices at the peak of Graphic Hand included over 2,000 active-duty troops from across the services and about 9,500 Army, Navy, and Marine Reservists. Image
Read 7 tweets
5 Apr 19
This morning @USAfricaCommand's director of operations, MajGen Gregg Olson, did a call with reporters explaining how AFRICOM learned it killed a woman and child in a 2018 drone strike. These are the first civilians AFRICOM has admitted its strikes have killed in Somalia.
After @amnesty released a report last month alleging civilian casualties in 5 US strikes in Somalia (this wasn't one of the 5), AFRICOM publicly pushed back, saying Amnesty was falling for Shabab propaganda & couldn't get to the scene of the strikes (which AFRICOM also couldn't).
But on March 22, three days after @amnesty released its Somalia report, AFRICOM commander Gen. Waldhauser initiated an internal review of potential civilian casualties in Somalia, according to Olson.
Read 14 tweets

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