COVID deaths & hospitalizations always lag cases. The lag has been demonstrated, is often 𝗺𝗼𝗿𝗲 than a month, and its timing can be predicted accurately (I have done it.) The #casedemic folks are just, well, wrong.
A thread explaining the lag with real-world examples.
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I will show what causes the lag, and how I can predict it accurately. First, there are multiple causes behind it:
Reporting delays affect hospital admissions as well. My locality—San Diego—warns hospital statistics are incomplete in the last 2 weeks. Indeed, the May 5th hospitalization peak took 15 days to be reported as the highest peak on the chart:
When an outbreak starts among the young it will initially have a near-zero impact on hospitalizations & deaths (remember: 20 y.o. are 100× less likely to die/be hospitalized) until it propagates to older age groups
The propagation delay can be 4 weeks or more eg. see Tokyo:
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The sum of all these lags is:
#1) 3 weeks infection-to-death
#2) 4 weeks deaths reporting
#3) 4 weeks propagation to older age groups
Total = it can take 11 weeks from increasing infections to increasing deaths.
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However rising *infections* to rising deaths isn't exactly what we want to estimate. We want to estimate rising *cases* to rising deaths. So how long does it take for an infection to be reported as a case?
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An infection occurs, symptoms appear days later, the patient is tested, and the lab or hospital reports the test result to public health authorities. Conservatively we could (over)estimate this delay to about 2 weeks.
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So the lag from rising *cases* to risings deaths would be 9 weeks in this example (11 minus 2.)
And of course, to confirm retrospectively that deaths are increasing, one would need to observe deaths for a few weeks beyond the 9-week point.
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See the chart below: the top panel shows Iran deaths up to 04 Jun.
Some people would say the declining trend of Iran deaths had not reversed by that point. It's only with more data (bottom panel) that it becomes clear the trend reversal started on 14 May
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In my experience the #casedemic folks who are so focused on visual charts have—ironically— the hardest time reading charts.
Specifically they lack an intuitive sense about what constitutes a statistically significant trend reversal.
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For example in June I argued with someone about this exact Iran chart but he could not be convinced the trend of deaths had reversed on 14 May until he had 5 weeks of data past that point:
Only with an extra 5 weeks he acknowledged it.
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In this extreme scenario a person may need a total of 14 weeks (9-week lag + 5-week retrospective observation) to get a visually convincing chart that deaths were really rising.
14 weeks! That's why "wait 2 to 3 weeks" has become a meme!
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In practice the lag is shorter than 9 weeks.
For example the summer COVID spike in Florida had a case-to-death lag of only 5 weeks. But with a retrospective observation of 1 week, it means 6 weeks were needed to show the #casedemic folks a chart of rising deaths.
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I actually did build a model to predict this lag.
It forecast the timing of deaths in Florida by taking into account the 3 causes of lag:
This model was super-accurate because Florida is one of the few states that publish full line list information, including the age of every COVID case, which is required to account for lag #3 (age prevalence.)
Without age information, we can still build decent guesstimates.
For example I also accurately predicted by how much deaths would rise in Spain, when many (such as @JamesTodaroMD) were wrongly claiming deaths wouldn't rise:
Having said all that, there are (only) two scenarios where increasing cases will NOT lead to increasing deaths:
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Scenario #1: increasing case ascertainment rate.
Sometimes more tests are performed and catch more milder cases. But the epidemic is otherwise not growing. This occurred in Spring in Sweden. A reliable indicator of this is when the share of positive tests decreases
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Scenario #2: when an outbreak grows among young age groups, but never propagates to the elderly.
This is uncommon. But it happened in September in Florida:
Let's point out numerous obvious flaws in his analysis, shall we?
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Firstly, Berenson chooses to ignore Asian countries. Why? Because geography is "the most important factor in how hard Covid hits a country"
In other words: "countries who did better than Sweden don't count, because, well, I sAy So"
Such well-reasoned logic. Much wow 🤣
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Secondly, he claims geography is the most important factor, but IGNORES ALL the countries geographically close to Sweden: Finland, Norway, Denmark (none of them are charted)
I modeled excess deaths per capita by age group, for each US state, since the beginning of the pandemic.
I believe this is the first time an analysis of this type has been done BY AGE GROUP for each state. This removes the need to do "age-adjustment" to compare states.
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Based on NYT's mask survey across United States counties, plot deaths/capita recorded during the survey & up to 30 days later, along with each county's mask wearing score
Result:
Linear regression (Y log-transformed) R²=0.144 in red:
There are hundreds of factors affecting the dependent variable (deaths). Ignoring ALL of these factors, looking at mask usage only, and still finding R²=0.144 is pretty cool/unexpected
Confounders abound!: people who wear masks often are likely doing more social-distancing. Etc.
Methodology behind the chart:
Two data sources:
- mask wearing survey github.com/nytimes/covid-…
- COVID deaths (and population) by US county as per JHU CSSE
His charts seem to claim that nothing works. Locking down doesn't work, masking doesn't work, vaccination doesn't work, your printer doesn't wo—wait scratch that one
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One iota of critical thinking is all you need to expose numerous errors in his charts:
Error #1 — Case ascertainment rate bias:
A country may detect 1 in 2 cases, while another 1 in 4. We say the case ascertainment rate is respectively 50%, and 25%.
This variance in case ascertainment rate alone is enough to put half of @ianmSC's charts where they belong: in the trash🗑️
Real Science™ looks at covid deaths—not cases—to compare the severity of the pandemic across different regions. This avoids case ascertainment rate bias.
I compiled a list—as exhaustive as possible—of all peer-reviewed & published research articles that evaluate the effectiveness of nonpharmaceutical interventions, specifically lockdowns on COVID-19
➡️Papers finding NPIs effective outnumber, by 8 to 1, those finding the opposite
Criteria for inclusion in the list:
1-Be a RESEARCH ARTICLE (data, methods, results). Commentaries, opinion pieces, etc, do not qualify
2-Be PEER-REVIEWED & PUBLISHED among the 26,000 titles in Scopus
3-Be EXPLICIT. No secondhand interpretation of the data
Regarding criterion #3: the authors must explicitly state in the text whether their results suggest NPIs are effective or not
Their exact words have been peer-reviewed & published. Your interpretation of figures or data tables has not.
2. President of Burundi died on 8 June 2020. The cause of death was given officially as "cardiac arrest" by the Burundian government, but is suspected to be COVID: economist.com/middle-east-an…
His wife was flown to Kenya and hospitalized for COVID a week before his death.