More detail on Army-Navy cooperation for C-HGB/LRHW from this year's Hypersonic Weapons Summit. Both expected to share Navy-developed 2-stage booster.
More on the basing modes: Army expected to have battery of 2-round launchers for a total of 8 rounds/battery. Navy will certify cold-launch system for Virginia Payload Module.
Map of C-HGB flight tests and the test vehicle configuration.
The roadmap for fielding C-HGB equipped missiles. Key points:
-Canister launch demos through 2022
-Army prototype LRHW delivery 2023.
-Larger scale Army procurement decisions will occur 2024.
-SSGN hypersonic capability 2025.
-Virginia Payload Module capability 2028.
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USAF Chief Scientist Victoria Coleman later noted ARRW was "the most mature weapon that we have" Disclosed prev. unreported successful Tactical Boost Glide flight test on Dec 8, 2020, over the Pacific, "an amazing day." Was coy on whether ARRW was fully zeroed out
Progress continuing on HACM, Congress and Global Strike Command apparently "huge fans and can't wait" for it to be in inventory. flight test next year will happen in Australia. This is why AUKUS matters.
Here's the top-level portfolio from Dr. Weber on current hypersonic acquisition programs.
[1/3] Real vs. AI-generated images: check out the Fourier patterns yourself. At right: the FFT output, which captures info on repeating patterns in images. You can generate them easily with ImageJ, as I've done here.
Fake:
Left: the infrared scene data we imported into our simulation. Right: a more detailed pic of the hypersonic model, with diff temps assigned to the leeward & windward sides, leading edges, and rear. It's not just distance; the diff in viewing aspects are modelled in.
It won't just be IR. @tomkarako and I have prev said that hypersonic weapons have unique kinematic vulns. But they also have unique, exploitable signatures. We don't model those, but see slide from Dr. Iain Boyd—complex interactions on vehicle surface => novel plumes & sigs.
There's so much buzz around new missiles; rockets are inherently attention-grabbing. But over time, you learn that it's everything upstream—the sensors, battle management systems, comms, command & control—that matters most. defensenews.com/opinion/commen…
But those things are murky. There's no easy way to prove to adversaries that you have software that speeds up your targeting cycles, or EW/cyber that bogs up theirs. Russia could see Ukraine's meager missile stocks, but couldn't see the murky stuff that actually wins wars.
Massive stakes on the assumption that deterrence works. As wars are increasingly decided by the murky stuff, that gets harder. The fact Russia was caught unprepared represents a failure of deterrence; their failure to understand they'd lose, our failure to show why we'd win.
Thread on post-Cold-War glow-ups. In 1993, Russia converted some Topol ICBMs to civilian space launch vehicles: "Start" and "Start-1". They took the same mobile missile launcher (left) and added a spiffy paint job. Could lift ~360 - 450 kg to LEO.
Before/After: The Fukuyama edit. Military version (left), civilian version (right). Both the 4-stage and 5-stage SLVs had a 5 km altitude, 2.5 s period, and 6 MoA inclination orbital injection accuracy.
Before/After: Armageddon (left), cool and normal satellite launch (right). The Topol missile (SS-25) still remains in service but is slated for replacement by Russia's new Topol-M and Yars ICBMs.
Why did the B-21 stay in budget? Lots of factors. Here are a few: 1) Production-representative lines. First ~100 F-35 prototypes didn't use similar lines to prod. models. B-21's proto line took longer to make, but it was more prod.-representative. Fewer surprises to EMD.
2) The fruits of the 2009 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act. Before, services had incentives to underestimate costs, to get more programs in their budgets. WSARA made services fund independent cost estimates from OSD CAPE, including for B-21.
3) B-21 was acquired thru USAF Rapid Capabilities Office. RCO had the "cream of the crop" of acquisition specialists, experienced hands with DoD process. Also had good USAF board attention, so funds available to reduce risk early in the program, instead of deferring to later.