Good article, in which Gavyn Davies is right to argue that government debt limits in the US are probably pretty far off, although I disagree that government debt sustainability is increased when interest rates are below the GDP growth rate.
This is a systemic fallacy. Low real interest rates are just another way to service the debt through real transfers, no different than inflation or taxes.
I think the problem with much of the discussion about whether or not Washington should run larger deficits is that...
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it ignores the purpose of these deficits. As long as the fiscal deficit is used to fund productive infrastructure investment, or is used to prevent a larger contraction in GDP, or funds income redistribution that incentivizes further business investment by boosting...
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domestic demand (although unfortunately until we fix our participation in the global trade and capital regime a large part of this demand will bleed abroad through the current account), there is really no limit to the size of the fiscal deficit.
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This is because in each of these cases the deficit is self-liquidating: it results in future GDP growth that matches or exceeds the fiscal deficit. What matters in the end is not the size of the fiscal deficit but its purpose.
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Many analysts are arguing that the surprise suspension of the Ant IPO was mainly, or at least partly, the consequence of Jack Ma’s angry speech two weeks earlier, but my understanding is that his speech was itself a response to regulatory...
concerns that were already being widely discussed.
If true, perhaps the IPO should've been withdrawn much earlier by Ant and its bankers, pending clarification of the new regulations. It may be that regulators were not the only ones to have handled this whole thing badly.
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By the way this article explains that had the IPO occurred, Ant would have become overnight the most valuable bank in the world, which is ironic because the IPO was very pointedly organized not as a bank IPO but rather as a tech IPO.
Given how good Chinese infrastructure is, and how much it has over-invested in infrastructure in the past 5-10 years, it might at first seem surprising that fixed-asset investment in the transport sector nonetheless grew by 9.8% year on year in...
the first three quarters of 2020, but infrastructure spending in China is less about increasing economic efficiency and more about generating economic activity and subsidizing manufacturing. In that case the resulting increase in debt will have exceeded the...
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resulting increase in the country's ability to produce goods and services.
Or to put it differently, debt will have risen faster than real debt-servicing capacity, which means that ultimately the debt must be serviced through real transfers from some sector of the economy.
Very interesting piece on the gradual and imperfect transition (“GDP adoption in China was an experimental – and ultimately unsuccessful – process of translation”) in China from the Soviet-invented Material Product System (MPS) of accounting for...
the size of the economy and its rate of growth to the more widely used System of National Accounts (SNA). For the latter the GDP calculation is the main indicator of aggregate economic production, whereas for the former it is NMP (net material production).
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At the heart of these methods are different ways of measuring what counts as productive activity with, among other things, NMP reporting physical output numbers rather than the value of income flows. More output, not necessarily more value, increases the size of the economy.
Good article by Janan Ganesh, but while I agree that governance is what democracies are supposed to do best, I would also argue that democracies, as Churchill is supposed to have said about the US, do end up usually doing the right thing, but...
only after having tried out the alternatives. While non-democracies often go to their graves sticking rigidly to their institutions, healthy democracies are pragmatic and flexible, trying first one thing and, when that fails, trying something else.
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This adjustment process may seem uglier and more dispiriting than the steadfastness of countries that don’t adjust as quickly, but for that reason, ironically, it most undermines the credibility of democracies just as they are proving their greatest worth.
It’s pretty well-known that while the balance sheets of China’s biggest banks, which account for just under 50% of total lending, combine questionable assets with cheap and stable funding, most of the other, smaller banks in China have...
terrible assets and very risky funding. This Bloomberg article does a very good job of explaining just how bad these can be, and how difficult it is for the regulators to solve a problem that has been festering for well over a decade.
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Among other things the article points out that Chinese regulators lack a coherent strategy for dealing with the banks, and as a result have resorted to a crazy patchwork of one-off solutions for each of the at-least five banks that have been intervened since Baoshang, in...
The PBoC yesterday asked banks to suspend the counter-cyclical factor in yuan fixing, which was introduced in 2017 as a way to limit further depreciation. This initially caused the offshore markets to weaken.
Three weeks ago the PBoC announced it would reduce to zero the reserve requirement ratio, established in 2018, for financial institutions conducting foreign exchange forward trading. This was also established to limit depreciation in the RMB, and the announcement caused...
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the currency again to weaken. There were also reports last week that SAFE would be issuing new quotas under QDII and other outbound investment schemes to allow greater outflows.