Some of the agony is a rage against the injustice of winning popular majorities and being unable to govern. But it's important to recall that modern America has no tradition of 49-47 or 51-48 majorities leading to sweeping legislative change.
The major eras of ideological legislation -- New Deal, Great Society, and to a lesser extent Reaganism -- all depended on larger presidential majorities. Presidents who sought big change on smaller majorities (Bush after '04, for instance) have been quickly rebuked.
So if you just looked at the last century of U.S. history, you would assume that progressive goals needed a big-Democratic-majority "moment," not just "winning a series of presidential popular votes super-narrowly."
The same goes for my populist friends on the right: The problem with Trump as a vehicle for a new populism *as an agenda* was always that his support had (yes) a ceiling, that he probably wasn't ever going to match even Dubya in '04.
Now maybe under polarization there's just no possibility of landslides so you simply have to force any reform agenda through 51-49. But if so that represents a big change in how US politics works, w/no clear precedent, and it shouldn't be surprising that it's tough to pull off.
My own view is that the (hopefully) post-decadence American future belongs to the first statesman who can be a 55-45 president for more than Obama's six months. But admittedly he or she has not yet made their appearance.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Proposed magazines:
The New Standard (The Bulwark + The Dispatch)
The Populist (American Affairs + Modern Age + The American Conservative)
Contrary (Sullivan/Taibbi/Greenwald + The Tablet)
The Populist should be based in Dallas, Contrary on the Pacific Coast, the New Standard in DC.
Persuasion, Harper's and the new Wieseltier venture can merge to form Liberty, based in Boston, occupying the Atlantic's former offices.
Any critique of Roberts has to acknowledge that he really has maintained the court's public prestige at a time when no other institution has much: news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supr…
And Barrett, I suspect, benefits from that cautious project; the polls showing plurality support for her nomination may reflect a (relative) trust in the court as well as a favorable response to the nominee herself.
The fact that Trump isn't on Twitter and Fox and Friends every day pressuring Congressional Rs to make a big-number deal with Democrats says a lot about why his brand of right-populism is likely headed to defeat rather than re-election:
To return to this @SohrabAhmari tweet, what's hard about building a "Red Toryism" (or, if you will, a "Sam's Club Republicanism") is that GOP stakeholders aren't interested. Trump once ran against them; now their inaction is tanking his re-election.
One reason "populists nearly always win a second term" in other countries is that they shift the right's econ policies to make them more, well, popular. Trump has done that a little, but not enough, and the delayed Covid relief is just insane malpractice.
I'm going to stick with the same assessment till the last: Trump is unfit and proves it every day, but he's incapable of an authoritarian coup and in the event of a FL-in-2000 tipping-point-state tie, his toxic rhetoric only makes him more likely to lose the post-election battle.
This take is the more plausible one, but under the same set of Bush-v-Gore-style facts that would lead John Roberts to rule for a normal Republican, he is less likely to rule for Trump.
Ditto for the two, maybe soon three, Trump-appointed justices: Every time the president opens his mouth, he makes it less likely that Gorsuch or Kavanaugh rules for him on a set of facts where they might rule for a President Pence or Rubio or Hawley.
It's a "lasting" disadvantage that has currently lasted for six years (since the last Dem Senate majority) or ten (since the last time Dems had a supermajority), and it may not outlast 2020.
The Senate's rural bias disadvantages a very specific Democratic Party ideological formation that has existed since the middle of the Obama presidency.
The electoral college, meanwhile, disadvantages the Democratic Party formation that existed in 2016, but not the formation that existed in 2012, 2008 or 2004.
Wherever you stand on Enlightenment rollback, this from @DamonLinker gives too much credence to a Whig-history interpretation of the relationship between modern liberalism and modern science. theweek.com/articles/93761…
There is clearly some relationship between liberalism, science and secularism, but sustained Western technological progress starts in the Middle Ages, and the Scientific Revolution happens amid Reformation and Counter-Reformation; Lockean liberalism is more its child than father.
An alternative timeline: Catholic Christendom >> technological progress; tech progress >>> tech-driven break-up of Christendom (thanks a lot, Gutenberg); break-up >>> liberalism's promise of religious truce; liberalism takes credit for continuing progress to legitimize its rule.