The agreement envisions Armenia ceding its southern east-west border control to Russia. This dramatically shifts Russia's position in Armenia to gatekeeper. The Kremlin will apparently run the "transport" link to Nakhichevan. No time limit for this is given. /3
As envisioned by the Goble Plan (though in different terms) this type of concession would be made in exchange for keeping the Lachin Corridor open between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Something like that is also envisioned here. /4
According to this agreement, the precise terms of the Lachin Corridor will be determined within three years, after which Russian forces will secure it. The corridor will apparently avoid Shusha/Shushi and go straight from Armenia to Stepanakert. /5
Amid the language envisioning these two corridors, there is a small clause that is easy to overlook. Point 9 -- the point about the route to Nakhichevan -- notes that all economic and transport links in the region will also be "unblocked." /6
It is unclear what that intends. If it means an end to the thirty-year shutdown of trade between Azerbaijan and Armenia, it is far from a throwaway clause, even though it is tucked into a discussion about land routes. /7
I missed this. Apparently, Aliyev in his speech noted that securing a route through Armenia to Nakhichevan was not part of the original plan. It was his last-minute idea. /8
Aslanian (Part 1): "If one wants a scapegoat to blame, well there are earlier administrations that came before Pashinyan and all those oligarchs, big and small, whose existence has been parasitical for thirty years.” /2
Aslanian (Part 2): "The real test for Armenia now is to protect itself from itself." /2
Is there evidence that the Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh was announced on Twitter before it occurred? This thread will explore an oddity that seems to suggest: Yes. 1/
Let's start with khankendi.az. Khankendi is the Azerbaijani name for the capital of Karabakh. This site is now down. But it appears to have been set up as a kind of municipal Web page in waiting. It's slogan was "Khankendi: We'll be back." /2
THREAD - For those of you following the Assange indictment, @emptywheel and @OrinKerr have been doing some great real-time response on CFAA and other issues, and @davidallengreen on the Sweden angle. /1
I think @emptywheel specifically wrote a thought-provoking piece sketching some of the potential dangers in this indictment /2
I would like to add one point. This material in the hands of any prosecutor will offer some serious complications, and the DOJ must know that. Or at least so it seems to me. /3
THREAD: Just a quick observation on recent Mueller indictment. In March 2017, I was sitting beside Julian Assange in the Ecuadorian Embassy, cruising Twitter, when up popped the following tweet from Roger Stone to @RVAwonk#backchannel 1/4
Assange said, "I think I know what Stone is talking about--I'm pretty sure--he says--there's some guy at WBAI. I did an interview with him. He said he knows Stone. He says he wanted to come to London to meet, but I didn't have time. You might want to talk to that guy." 2/4
Think about it. Assange was encouraging me--directing me--to talk to Stone's friend @Credico2016 ("Person 2"). This seemed immediately like a diversion. But I did reach out to Credico in good faith. I came away convinced he had no contact with Assange before Aug 25, 2016. 3/4
I have deep admiration for @thenation. I got my start in magazine writing at that publication. So, last year, when it published about the DNC hack being an "inside job" I tried to hold my tongue, even though it was a fiasco on many levels. bit.ly/2ftuwns (thread)
Then, last August, I read that after much criticism @thenation decided to review that article, and I was much relieved: wapo.st/2O0lI4e
But only briefly. Because I was then hugely dismayed to see that the result of that review was an editor's note, appended to the article with dueling memos debating arguments that were spurious to begin with "to encourage further inquiry."