Quite authoritative, @jack. Are you equally confident in the currency of $TWTR? It seems to have been diluted by 40% since your 2013 IPO, as shares outstanding rose from 569 million to 800 million, dilution of 5% a year. 1/
With a share price that’s $1.46 below the closing price on the day of the IPO, with no dividends ever paid, it appears insiders have fared slightly better than your shareholders? 2/
With the stock trading at a $35 billion market cap, ten times your revenues, I wonder how the long-suffering $TWTR shareholder will make money. 3/
When you consider there are already another 70.5 million option and RSU shares outstanding and another 241.4 million authorized to be graciously issued (to insiders), it seems a currency in decline (to outsiders). 4/
If you can grow sales by 10% annually for the next decade & grow profits to an impressive 33% margin, and if you promise to shrink dilution to “only” 3% a year to 1,075 shares out (a smaller number than are already out, granted & authorized for issue), then EPS will be $2.79. 5/
With the stock at $43.48, its already trading at 15.6 times that 2030 earnings number. Of course if paying 30 times earnings is still fashionable ten years hence, then the shareholder can make 6.8% per year using these assumptions. 6/
If the multiple 10 years from now winds up at “only” 15.6 times, then the shareholder makes zip. Unless, that is, they can figure out a way to denominate their $TWTR shares not in dollars US but apparently in bitcoin? What say you, @jack? 7/7
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Berkshire Hathaway will show a LARGE purchase, likely in a new name, and a lot of activity in their equity portfolio when they file the 3Q 13-F either after the close or on Monday. In total, $BRK purchased $17.6B and sold $12.8B in common stocks during 3Q. 1/
It looks they sold at least another 100 million shares of $WFC early in the quarter, following the 42% sale previously announced in 2Q. They likely either sold the the rest of the Wells and/or continued to sell down the $JPM and $PNC positions. 2/
Look for $BAC to be materially upped by ~$2B. If all 3 banks were sold then there will be a buy of an additional financial company as well, on top of the $BAC increase. There is a likely sale of ~$4B of $AAPL with a $1B cost basis, so from Todd/Ted, most likely Ted. 3/
If a company like $DIS trades at 18x earnings and 2.4x BV, why pay 25% of profit to a taxable investor who loses 23.8% to federal tax (possibly 43.4% depending on next week), To now reinvest my remaining after-tax $76.20 per $100 in dividends received (or $56.60...) 1/
I have to pay the 2.4 premium to BV, a 5.6% adjusted yield to a 13.3% ROE. If the company instead keeps the profit, and with ALL $100 dollars can buy back shares at the 5.6% earnings yield, retire debt if it’s excessive or expensive, make attractive 2/
acquisitions, or invest internally in at attractive returns, isn’t the investor better off? If $DIS, continuing with our example, earns 13.3% on equity & has projects available for investment that may earn perhaps ~20% returns, why pay a dividend that’s taxed, or at all? 3/
Too many managements will tell you the shareholder earned $2B because non-cash stock-based compensation is not a real cash expense and can be ignored. That may be correct but it’s $1B that the shareholder doesn’t get, insiders do. 1/
You see this in adjusted earnings or adjusted EBITDA presentations. Managements may also tell you they “returned” $3B to shareholders in the form of dividends and share repurchases. On a $20B market cap that’s a 15% shareholder return. All nonsense. 2/
Had the $1B in shares not been given to executives/employees, profit would have been ~$2B (ignore tax treatment). You need to know what percentage of shares outstanding are being granted each year and how many of each type (options/RSU’s/PRSU’s) are outstanding. 3/
This thread / debate has been interesting to read. Both sides are partly correct. The AQR paper referenced is a good read and did ferret out the proper conclusion that Berkshire has been rewarded for keeping quality high and price to value low, although beta and (1/22)
(2/22)low price-to-book wouldn’t be the measures I’d use. It drew some questionable conclusions and employed hypothetical, far from real world employable methods. The other side in the thread correctly I think, argued against a factor analysis of Berkshire having much utility
(3/22)but should have reasoned through counterpoints.
I’d suggest, in retort to the AQR paper and conclusion, that Berkshire enjoyed unique tailwinds from 1974 to 1998, and beyond to some extent, that none can replicate and stand to be harmed when trying, ala Greenlight Re and