1/ The @voting_works team has been working around the clock for the last week to support the State of Georgia in running their first state-wide risk-limiting audit, which turned into a full hand-count.
4/ The heavy lifting here was done by county & state officials. This is a lot of work, and it's hard to do accurately and quickly. Keep in mind the state of Georgia only recently moved back to paper ballots. Managing a secure chain of custody for 5M ballots is very tough.
5/ And of course the @voting_works team is unbelievable. @mcranechilders and @ginvdr on the ground, Jonah and Morgan on engineering, and the rest of the VotingWorks team providing phone and email support to 159 counties.
6/ All of this was run on Arlo (github.com/votingworks/ar…), the open-source auditing software we've been developing for the last 18 months with support from @CISAgov and others.
7/ We're proud to be contributing to public trust in elections. There's a lot more work to do. But today, we're feeling pretty good.
8/ a window into one part of the work: reconciling the data for 41,000 batches against all the paper tally sheets. Yes, this process, too, is backed by paper.
1/ I spent a bit of time looking at the Canada COVID Alert app this evening. Bottom line: this app is pretty much the model for how to do this kind of tech.
2/ It's super clear about what data it collects and doesn't, and about how it works. This is not easy stuff to convey.
3/ It's such a caring and lovely flow. Here it is letting you know it's about to ask for that single permission it needs – to access the Google/Apple API.
1/ In light of the voting question that will never die -- "if I can do X online, why can't I vote online" -- I'm reminded that most people don't have a good intuition for what makes things secure. So let's explore.
Security online depends predominantly on logging and auditing.
2/ This probably sounds weird and surprising, but hear me out. And there are exceptions that I'll get to. But truly, security depends predominantly on logging and auditing.
3/ Consider the Twitter hack from earlier this week. We found out about it because the attackers tweeted a Bitcoin scam visible to everyone. Twitter is, by definition, a public audit log. Those messages looked odd. We all saw them. That's why we all knew: Twitter was hacked.
1/ a little story. When I was 18yo, summer 1995, I had the immense luck of working as an intern at Hearst Publishing in NYC. I was a rising sophomore, the web was just taking off, and that internship taught me so much, it dramatically kickstarted my career.
2/ the group VP was a guy who dressed like a banker and led the effort to create the first dynamic web site for Hearst. His office was on the 5th floor, top most floor of the Hearst building at the time, 57th and 8th (there's now a huge tower at that address.)
3/ About every other day, he wanted a demo, so he would call me up to his office from the dungeon basement where the small engineering team worked.
1/ Who's ready for another Apple/Google contact tracing thread? I know I am!
To me, the most interesting piece of the puzzle is how much trust we place in the phone operating system vs. the app, and the role of the phone's operating system in protecting your privacy *from apps*.
2/ Let's start with the most recent news: Germany has relented and is adopting the Apple/Google approach, the so-called "decentralized" approach, vs. the one Germany wanted (along with France).
Today's news: "France is asking Google+Apple to weaken privacy protections around digital contact tracing" --> theguardian.com/world/2020/apr…
The news is misleading, the issues are complex.
🧵
2/ The key issue: G+A and the French+German govs are making different privacy tradeoffs.
The French+German protocol, known as ROBERT github.com/ROBERT-proximi…, seems more closely aligned with classic contact tracing privacy, but with one large risk.
3/ In classic contact tracing, as best as I can tell, you get a call from the health department saying "you've been in contact with an infected individual." They don't tell you who, and they don't tell you when & where, because then you might figure out who it is.
1/ OK, so a few days ago, I wrote some thoughts about the Apple+Google contact tracing API + framework. A few key topics have come up in the questions that I think are worth clarifying.
2/ Some are pointing out that tech is not the silver bullet. I strongly agree. There are many issues to consider beyond tech, including having a social safety net for people who need to be tested & quarantined.
Tech can, at best, accelerate contact tracing.
3/ One thing I didn't say clearly: with this framework, Apple & Google servers get ZERO additional data.
They're building a framework, not the apps that use the framework. Those apps will get some data, and the framework exists to *minimize* how much data they get.