In 2014, I was on a 'task force' convened by Guinea's President to forge a nat'l Ebola response
Cases were spiking, it was a polarizing election year &, though many efforts were happening, there was no overall strategy or unified response
Here's how we set up the response
1/15
The first step was to establish a clear chain-of-command leadership structure under the National Ebola Coordination Cell with Dr Sakoba Keita as its head
All partners (eg, WHO, MSF, other ministries) & all response activities had to go through the Cell
2/15
We then created an overarching national strategy that included all interventions (eg, testing, contact tracing)
This wasn't just a laundry list of things that could help but aimed to spell out the combo of measures needed to actually reach zero within a defined timeframe
3/15
Many aspects & especially timelines had to be periodically updated based on the trajectory of the epidemic but this strategy created an overarching framework for how & where to focus efforts with ending the epidemic as the goal
4/15
We then translated this national strategy into location-specific & timebound operational 'micro-plans' with 4Ws--who will do what where by when?--with the idea that each organization was assigned to what they uniquely did best (eg MSF led treatment, WHO/CDC contact tracing)
5/15
With that, we had an overarching nat'l response but the most important work was implementation at the local level. The 'ground game' defined whether or not we'd succeed
A similar structure was set up in each district to adapt strategies & coordinate day-to-day execution
6/15
Once main response structures & activities were in place, we investigated new cases to try to understand where gaps still remained or lapses in execution were occurring & used that info to improve execution
A major challenge we saw was misinformation & rational mistrust from communities who had for years been neglected or exploited (nejm.org/doi/full/10.10…)
To overcome this, we implemented an intensive & systematic community engagement strategy led by Cheikh Niang & others
8/15
Teams of anthropologists went village-by-village, neighborhood-by-neighborhood to listen to communities, understand their concerns & feed that back into how we did things, such as safe burials of those who had died from Ebola
9/15
This process--though painstaking--was essential & built trust over time
We also tried to engage politicians from both leading parties & empower religious and traditional leaders to push messages to their communities
10/15
In summary, we: (1) set up unified leadership & coordination structure (2) created a coherent national strategy (3) translated overarching strategies into operational plans (4) built up local level capacity & organization to execute
11/15
(5) used data to refine our approaches & implementation (6) systematically & deliberately engaged & built trust with communities
All of this didn't happen seamlessly or even smoothly. It involved lots of local, national & organizational headbutting, politics & sheer grind
12/15
But many of the steps mirror with what we need to do now in the US
Broadly, we know the strategies to pursue but have to weave them into a coherent overall strategy ideally spearheaded by CDC
13/15
We then need to convert that into local action informed by local data ideally by adequately supported & funded state & local health departments
We also need to find a way to bridge political, ideological etc divides & get groups resistant to control efforts on board
14/15
All of this will be important to respond to the unprecedented 'supersurge' we're likely about to face, save lives until vaccines are ready & make sure they get deployed as efficiently as possible once they are
(2/3) #1 can be achieved by merging best practices that thus far happen in isolation into integrated systems that leverage technological- connectivity, AI, automation- tools to orchestrate/facilitate high-quality replicable execution at scale
(3/3) #2 is less of a technical & logistical challenge than a human, social & political one & therefore much more complicated to find a clear path towards achieving but achieve it we must
(1/5) To put Trump being started on dexamethasone in perspective, we do it for patients when they become hypoxic
Some patients I've had are on remdesivir/dexa like Trump is now & only require a touch of oxygen (eg, 2L) for a day or two & then come off it.
(2/5) Even when on oxygen, they may look, feel, talk etc. like they're fine & you wouldn't know they were hypoxic unless you took off the oxygen & saw their O2 saturation
(3/5)Others on remdesivir/dexa end up as sick as anyone can be including on a ventilator, paralytics, etc & either pass away or recover after a prolonged & arduous course
Bottom line: there's huge variation which makes it tough to pinpoint where someone might be on that spectrum
(1/4) Other than the experimental antibodies, Trump has gotten what - remdesivir, dexamethasone - we give to our Covid patients with hypoxia
(2/4) From the way questions were answered, the fact that dex was started (which can have side effects including confusion) & he was on supplemental O2 suggests to me that his O2 may have been lower than they are letting on
Supplemental O2 usually isn't given unless O2 sat <90%
(3/4) With Covid19 & pneumonias in general, you typically don't get 'transient' drops in O2 as much as persistent (& potentially progressive) hypoxia lasting for at least hours
Transient drops usually happen from mucous plugs or aspiration
1/ A hang-up on rapid tests that I've heard is that it'll be difficult for health depts to track results
Decentralized screening makes that difficult but stopping spread should be the overwhelming priority; monitoring indirectly helps stop spread but is a secondary consideration
2/ We shouldn't hold up something that can stop transmission because it will be harder to monitor or collect data on
The current counterfactual is that we're missing most infections anyway & neither stopping onward transmission from them or getting any data on them
3/ What's generally been missing from the rapid testing discussion are counterfactuals
Anyone can point out issues that arise if using them but that is meaningless without considering what is happening w/o them & thoughtfully strategizing on how to address potential downsides
2/ There was a lag between determining a need & getting it established so the best we could do was use modeling to start deployment &, if transmission shifted & changed, we revised our models & adjusted our projections & plans
3/ In many instances, we were part of the way towards establishing a testing or treatment site when transmission shifted differently & they were no longer needed at the place we planned but required elsewhere
1/ I work in a hospital with a steady flow of Covid. Just a few weeks ago, we were overcapacity- more ICU patients than beds, more Covid patients than isolation rooms, more telemetry patients than telemetry beds
This was in August when we usually have a lull in overall caseload
2/ In pre-Covid winters, we typically fill to capacity & periodically have to 'surge' not even because of flu but other respiratory viruses & environmental triggers for chronic lung disease
If that happened a few weeks ago, there'd literally be no way to manage the patient load
3/ Without more aggressive reductions in circulating virus, we are on pace for not a 'twindemic,' but a 'multidemic'
This will come at a time when many hospital systems are actually cutting back staffing due to revenue losses from elective procedures