Thread by @sb_moller

While the official launch isn't until 12/3, the much awaited #2030 report is out! 🧵

https://twitter.com/StevenErlanger/status/1333816333914529792

First, some background on what #NATO2030 is and why it matters.

Last December in London Allied leaders asked Sec-Gen Stoltenberg to initiate a “forward-looking reflection process” designed to strengthen NATO’s political dimension and consultation mechanisms. 1/x

In response, Stoltenberg appointed a working group of 10 experts, who were given the task of coming up with recommendations in 3 areas: (1) reinforcing allied unity, solidity, and cohesion; 2/x

(2) increasing political consultation and coordination among allies; and (3) strengthening NATO’s political role and instruments to address current + future threats.

What follows are (some of) my initial impressions:

3/x

It’s a consensus document (duh!); one that includes everything we expected to see (e.g. a call for a new Strategic Concept (SC); emp on resilience + tech, etc.) w/ visible “fingerprints” of respective Allies on specific issues/sections, e.g. terrorism = 🇫🇷.

4/x

But there were some surprises. In the pleasantly surprised category: the group did not call for increasing NATO’s core tasks. There’s been a lot of chatter of late about adding to NATO’s 3 post-Cold War core tasks (coll defense; crisis mngmt; & coop security). 5/x

Popular suggestions ranged from “conserve stability” to “resilience”. Yet the group did not embrace this vision. Instead, they called for allies to “preserve NATO’s three core tasks.” (FWIW, I’ve gone on the record arguing that NATO should offload the latter two core tasks.) 6/x

While only a recommendation (next year’s SC may ult decide otherwise) I’m happy to see that the working group resisted pressure to elevate more issues to the status of core tasks. Still, the group did recommend NATO “integrate the fight against terrorism into its core tasks.” 7/x

The report is largely silent on the issue of prioritization, which ofc will be what the SC will have to tackle. It’s where the rubber meets the road. SC announcement exp at spring ‘21 HOSG meeting, with SC release timed to occur before Stoltenberg’s 2nd term expires in 9/2022.8/x

The language on China is much stronger than I anticipated. Keep in mind that the first mention of China EVER by NATO came last yr in London. Back then, Stoltenberg was at pains to frame the discussion in terms of both “opportunities and challenges” associated w/ China’s rise. 9/x

What a difference 12 months (& a global pandemic) makes! Not only is China now openly referred to as a “systemic rival” right up there with Russia, it’s described as a “full-spectrum systemic rival, rather than a purely economic player or an only Asia-focused security actor.”10/x

The focus is clearly (still) on Russia, but there’s a noticeable change of tone. (FWIW, I think China > Russia but that’s for another thread.) Lots of stuff amount the need to develop political strategy toward China…11/x

…incld establishing a consultative body to discuss all aspects of Alliance interests vis-à-vis- China. (Unclear if this consultative body would be intra-Alliance body only, or along the lines of @IanBrzezinski call for NATO-China Council) Both would be good. 12/x

On #GlobalNATO: Stoltenberg (& others) have been talking up a more global NATO since London, but for the first time we’re starting to get a sense of what that might look like in practice: a NATO seat at the “intl order” table. 13/x

There’s lots for the Biden team to work with, incldg a call for NATO allies to redouble their commitment to dem principles, rule of law, etc. To help them, the working group recommends creating a Centre of Excellence (COE) for Democratic Resilience. #allianceofdemocracies 14/x

What would a NATO report be w/o a call for more COEs? In addition to the COE for Dem Resilience, there’s a recommendation for a COE on Climate and Security. 15/x

On the political coordination front, calls for more FORMINs, along with more informal meetings at lower levels; and the ⬆️ chief executive role of sec-gen. All seem reasonable and with exception of the last should be relatively easy to get consensus on. 16/x

Finally, in the “mostly for NATO-nerds category,” there’s a recommendation to create a NATO University. Where do I apply? 17/17

cc @AU_EuropeCenter @FPRI @thomaswright08 @LaurenSperanza @AnnwieAnna @TobiasBunde @elisabethbraw @JimGoldgeier @jteurope @benjaminhaddad