CCP control/influence over Chinese media here has long been assumed to be high, but the extent and mechanisms of it haven't been survey before. Our report looked at 24 media companies, 4/24 funded by CCP, 12/14 tied to UF groups, 17/24 otherwise connected to CCP
Sydney's Nan Hai Culture & Media Group had some of the strongest CCP connections. Its WeChat account is Australia's 3rd most popular, but it's registered to a United Front Work Dept company. Its office building is owned by a joint venture between Nanhai's owner and UFWD figures.
Nan Hai, as well as many other popular outlets, either didn't report on or had one-sided pro-CCP coverage of incidents like the AFP raids on John Zhang and Shaoquett Moselmane in June. E.g. Sydney Today removed paragraphs from its article on the raids that mentioned the UFWD.
WeChat is accelerating CCP influence through its censorship and account restrictions. Australian-registered WeChat accounts can only post *four times a month*, compared to daily for PRC ones. So nearly every outlet we looked at was registered in China, subjected to PRC law
THREAD on my new report about the united front system. This report traces the structure of the system from its leadership in Beijing, to the agencies carrying it out, the platforms and proxies they work through, and its central role in political interference and tech transfer. 1/
More and more is being written about the United Front, but not much has been written about the united front system—the network of agencies, groups and individuals carrying out united front work. This report covers the breadth of the system, which goes far beyond the UFWD. 2/
The UFWD's role is supposedly to coordinate and carry out united front work. It and its local counterparts across China run thousands of united front groups with hundreds of thousands of members. It's also linked to 26+ WeChat accounts active in several countries. 3/
Groundbreaking precedent: US to cancel visas for Chinese military scientists. Affirms @ASPI_ICPC's ongoing research into implications of military-civil fusion and research collaboration. Other countries should do the same. 1/ nytimes.com/2020/05/28/us/…
Since 2007, roughly 3k People's Liberation Army scientists have been sent overseas to work on dual-use technologies. Aside from the US, Australia, Canada, Germany, Singapore and UK are also major destinations for these scientists. 2/ aspi.org.au/report/picking…
But the problem isn't just with scientists directly from the military. @ASPI_ICPC's China Defence Universities Tracker showed how some civilian universities, like the so-called 'Seven Sons of National Defence', are attached to the military. 3/ unitracker.aspi.org.au
THREAD on the PLA ties of Xiang Xin, defector Wang Liqiang's former boss and alleged intelligence officer. Open-source research reveals a web of links to COSTIND, a defence technology agency implicated in political interference and espionage. aspistrategist.org.au/analysing-wang… 1/
Much commentary has focused on casting doubt on Wang's claims without carrying out research to test them. What we can find is that Xiang Xin has no fewer than 9 business partners or colleagues who worked in COSTIND. 2/
Xiang's wife, Gong Qing, worked in COSTIND's intelligence research institute. Chairman of Xiang's China Innovation Investment Limited from 2005-09 ran a COSTIND university and was a COSTIND arms company exec. 3/
My take on Wang Liqiang's defection, having met him and analysed his claims over several weeks. New details on PLA links and many holes in the Shanghai Public Security Bureau's statement. [THREAD] 1/ smh.com.au/world/asia/def…
First, it's important to appreciate the messiness of defections. Defectors do so for a range of motivations at the same time. Some defectors have been accused of spicing up their claims. Many commentators have been confused about Wang's seniority and exact role. 2/
But there's evidence to support some of Wang's claims. Alleged intelligence officer Xiang Xin has numerous links to COSTIND, a PLA defence tech and intelligence agency. Xiang's wife worked for COSTIND's Intelligence Research Institute. 3/
THREAD on the reorganisation of the United Front Work Department, which is behind much of the CCP's overseas interference. This is one of the largest restructurings of a core CCP agency since the 1950s, documented in @ChinaBriefJTjamestown.org/program/reorga… 1/
After October 2018, I kept seeing references to entities like the 12th bureau of the UFWD. The department's website only lists nine bureaus. It turns out four bureaus were created (9, 10, 11 and 12) while one appears downgraded, so the department now has 12 bureaus (see chart) 2/
This follows the creation of the New Social Strata Individuals Work Bureau in 2016 and the Xinjiang Bureau around 2017. Since 2016, the number of bureaus has increased from 7 to 12. The department also has more vice ministers, incl 2 responsible for Chinese diaspora work 3/
Meeting of the World Guangdong Community Federation in Vancouver, run by the Guangdong Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, hampered by 200 (10%) of attendees failing to obtain visas. Are visa denials being used to push back against UF work? h/t @OGcdndushi.singtao.ca/vancouver/%E6%…
One of eight executive council members of the World Guangdong Community Federation is Huang Xiangmo's Federation of Australian Guangdong Community 澳洲廣東僑團總會 aka Australia Fellowship of China Guangdong Associations fagc.com.au/?page_id=430
The last conference of the World Guangdong Community Federation was hosted in Sydney in 2015 by Huang's group, with Bill Shorten, Philip Ruddock and Ernest Wong speaking at the event, many more politicians in attendance youtube.com/watch?v=-zbgU5…