One of Germany’s most prominent economists, Hans-Werner Sinn, warns of hyperinflation; he links it directly to Hitler's rise to power. A distortion of history: the rise of the Nazis was preceded by deflation, exacerbated by fiscal austerity. Thread /1
Sinn says hyperinflation after WW1 impoverished the German middle class in the Weimar Republic: "Ten years later they elected Adolf Hitler as Reich Chancellor." Policy recommendation today against hyperinflation: "tighter budget constraints" /2
Sinn thus feeds a widespread misinterpretation. Mass poverty when the Nazis came to power in 1933 was not the result of hyperinflation, which at that time was ten years in the past; it was primarily a consequence of mass unemployment due to the recession in the early 1930s. /3
The Nazis had come to power after years of deflation - i.e. falling prices. From 1930 onwards, Reich Chancellor Brüning used emergency decrees to bring about tax increases and drastic state spending cuts that pierced the social safety net. /4
Austerity policies increased unemployment, led to social suffering and unrest. Hitler realised by the end of 1931 at the latest that Brüning's austerity policy would "help his party to victory and thus end the illusions of the present system." /5
Analysis of data from four elections between 1930 and 1933 shows that voters in areas more affected by spending cuts and tax increases gave significantly more votes to the National Socialists, supporting Hitler’s rise./6
HW Sinn calls for "tighter budget constraints" against hyperinflation after Corona. Dangerous distortion: he does not say a word about the link between the negative effects of austerity policies in the early 1930s and Hitler's rise to power. /7
Representative survey: Only 1 in 25 Germans today still knows that the crisis at that time was characterised by deflation. Almost half of the respondents - like HW Sinn - mix mass unemployment and deflation with the hyperinflation ten years earlier./8
Incidentally, this misconception is much more common among well-educated and politically interested Germans. Those who are following the ECB’s monetary policy closely are more likely to draw the wrong lessons from history and to be misled by HW Sinn. /9
Even if one were to agree with Sinn that hyperinflation "prepared the breeding ground for the Nazis", his comparisons would remain problematic: why should the ECB’s monetary policy today lead to hyperinflation similar to the early 1920s? /10
The ECB is not directly financing governments, as the Reichsbank did back then. Even in Germany, inflation rates have been negative recently. Sinn remains unconcerned about deflation, stressing risks of hyperinflation, although previous inflation warning have not materialised /11
Misinterpretations of history can be momentous if they lead economic policy down the wrong track. To prevent this, prominent economists must not go unchallenged when they fuel such dangerous misconceptions. /end
.@HansWernerSinn did it again: in his "Christmas Lecture", he warns of hyperinflation.He draws a direct line from hyperinflation in 1923 to the Nazis (which doesn't exist), fails to mention that Nazi rise was preceded by deflation, worsened by austerity.
In his reply to my comment, Sinn claimed that he saw the role of austerity measures similarly to me, but that he could not mention everything in an interview. In 73 minutes of "Christmas Lecture" he again did not mention deflation and fiscal austerity.
Sinn did not retreat from his economic policy conclusions for today ("tighter budget constraints", "no longer living off the printing press") - even if these are not compatible with his seeing a truly significant role for austerity in Nazi rise.
In his "Christmas Lecture" @HansWernerSinn again warns of hyperinflation with shrill words: "money flood"; "dramatic inflation of the money supply"; "ECB as a gold donkey".
Is this an appropriate way to deal with the subject - even if it is addressed to non-economists?
While Sinn's historical excursions are analytically expandable, they primarily aim at arousing emotions. Sinn talks about how money, like paper, was no longer worth anything in 1923, and shows a girl who had made a dress out of worthless banknotes.
Given the way Sinn spins things rhetorically, listeners are tempted to fear hyperinflation. Of course, hyperinflation won't come right away - but "what if the coachman can't find the reins" once it gets going?
"The €zone is not different from the monetary systems of earlier times. The potentates succumb to the temptation of using the printing press."-Thus @HansWernerSinn concludes his lecture.
Or has HWS succumbed to the lure of warning with historical distortions and thin arguments?
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I have a new paper on fiscal consolidation and its growth effects. I review how large the fiscal consolidations in €zone countries were in the past, what the research record shows about growth effects, and what that implies for the austerity outlook for the next years. Thread 🧵
Pressure to implement fiscal consolidation during the early 1990s coincided with the introduction of the Maastricht provisions. On average, the €zone countries had a cumulative fiscal adjustment of 5.3% of GDP over the 1992-1998 period, with the largest consolidation in Italy.
The 1999-2007 period (i.e. from the establishment of the common monetary union until the outbreak of the financial crisis) was marked by some sizeable fiscal adjustments motivated by deficit-reduction desires, but these were concentrated in only a handful of countries.
How far from full employment? Our paper in European Economic Review: based on unemployment-vacancy data, we find full employment episodes in EU countries during the 1970s. Labour markets became tighter when recovering from COVID-19, but few countries hit full employment. Thread:
Based on contributions by Michaillat/Saez, we apply a full employment concept derived from the unemployment-vacancies relationship to European countries. We use the Beveridge (full employment-consistent) rate of unemployment (BECRU) to study labour markets over 1970-2022.
We find full employment episodes in EU countries in the 1970s. The European unemployment problem emerged in 1980s and 1990s. Slack in labour markets initially increased during the pandemic. Labour markets became tighter recovering from COVID-19; few countries hit full employment.
Do higher public debt levels reduce economic growth? My meta-analysis is out in the September issue of Journal of Economic Surveys. By analysing 816 estimates, I find
- publication bias in favour of negative growth effects
- no uniform public-debt-to-GDP threshold
Summary 🧵
Reinhart/Rogoff (2010) had an impact on the policy debate; policy-makers used their results (threshold in public-debt-to-GDP of 90% beyond which growth slows) to argue for austerity. But what does the evidence tell us about growth effects of higher public debt? /2
Several papers argue that there is indeed evidence for a negative causal effect of higher public-debt-to-GDP ratios on economic growth, and for a (close to) 90% threshold in the public-debt-to-GDP-ratio beyond which growth falls significantly. /3
How did Italy become the Eurozone's Achilles heel, the monetary union's most vulnerable spot? In a new working paper, we answer this question by reassessing Italy's long decline in the context of European integration and globalisation 🧵
Italy is the Eurozone's Achilles heel; its large economy has fallen behind other Eurozone peers; given the Eurozone's institutions and rules, there are constantly questions on how to manage Italy's high public debt under constraints on monetary, fiscal, industrial and wage policy
We use a new structuralist framework to synthesise different supply-side and demand-side explanations for Italy's decline.
We need to promote public debate on fiscal policy and EU fiscal rules. Yesterday, I did a presentation in Vienna on climate investment in the context of public investment needs and EU fiscal rules reform. I stressed three main points (short thread):
1. If policymakers are serious about meeting the climate goals, they will need to significantly increase public investment for climate and energy. We are talking about *additional* public investment of at least 1% of EU GDP per year.
2. The European Commission has published EU fiscal rules reform orientations that were welcomed by EU finance ministers. Tough political negotiations ahead, but what's on the table will not sufficiently increase the scope for public climate investment.
The European Parliament requested me to write a study assessing the European Commission's orientations on reforming EU fiscal rules, with a focus on Debt Sustainability Analysis as an anchor for bilateral negotiations and surveillance.
Here is a summary of my main results 🧵
The Commission’s (COM) orientations (published in November 2022) were welcomed by the conclusions of the Council of the EU on March 14th 2023. COM proposes an enhanced role for debt sustainability analysis (DSA) in assessing fiscal risks. Focus: bringing down public debt ratios.
Reform orientations:
- COM conducts a DSA for each member state projecting the public-debt-to-GDP ratio over >10 years.
- DSA inputs used to derive reference fiscal adjustment path consistent with falling debt ratio
-Negotiations COM/governments on multi-annual expenditure plans