Last year, I spent my winter holiday reading hundreds of pages of equity research from the 1999/2000 era, to try to understand what it was like investing during the bubble
A few people recently asked me for my takeaways. Here they are -
2/ Every document hereon comes from my former employer Bernstein Research's internal research archive, which extend back to 1994
Unfortunately, they're not available to the public (even Bernstein's client website cuts off at 2003), but happy to give more details if necessary
3/ LESSON #1: Everybody knew it was a bubble
Unfortunately, the quip "it's not a bubble if everyone says it is" just isn't true
Investors were comparing the internet sector to tulip mania as early as mid-98. Bernstein held an entire conference on it in June 99!
4/ LESSON #2: Calling bubbles is easy, making money is hard
In truth, the hard part about the tech bubble wasn't noticing it. The hard part was timing it
Our equity strategist tried in January 99... he was off by 14 months (and another 30 point gap in value vs growth)
5/ LESSON #3: Nobody knew the bubble popped until months after it did
Nobody noticed in March 2000 when it finally popped. Our equity strategist (who bet his career on it!) didn't catch on until June
6/ LESSON #4: "Tech" bubble was a misnomer... it was really a large cap growth bubble
See the valuation table below, 1 year before the top
Yes, Microsoft traded at 70x earnings. But Coca Cola was 43x. Pfizer was 92x. Every stock here was a disaster over the next 10 years...
7/ LESSON #5: Most large cap tech stocks in the bubble had real businesses with strong fundamentals
The internet stocks were a sideshow. In 2000, the software sector had a $1 trillion market cap, 20% net margins, 20% annual growth
The problem? It was trading at 16x sales
8/ LESSON #6: Fundamentals follow price, not vice versa
The bubble popped in Q1 2000. Fundamentals didn't decelerate until Q4 2000.
It was reflexivity at work. Lower stock prices = less capex spend = less revenue growth = lower stock prices. A vicious cycle
9/ What's the takeaway here?
Be humble.
For bears, it's easy to call a bubble. Anybody can do that. Timing is the hard part
For bulls, it's easy to point to the fundamentals. Historical investors weren't dumb. The hard part is matching fundamentals with price...
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1/ Was this the biggest miss in the history of pharma? Apparently in 1990, Pfizer preemptively abandoned development of the first GLP1 drugs
Ozempic, Zepbound, Wegovy, Mounjaro, etc. were doing $60B+ in runrate revenues at the end of last year. None are made by Pfizer
2/ Source is this retrospective written by Jeffrey Flier (former dean of Harvard Medical School) about his biotech startup MetaBio in the late 1980s: muse.jhu.edu/article/936213
3/ MetaBio was founded in 1987. That was the year Joel Habener first reported GLP-1’s ability to stimulate glucose-dependent insulin secretion - in retrospect, the moment of “discovery” for GLP-1s
MetaBio became the first company in the world to license Habener’s GLP-1 patents
1/ If you really believe LLMs will dramatically compress the cost of software development in 3-5 years, doesn't this obviate the reason for independent software vendors to exist?
This doesn't seem obviously crazy to me - it'd just be a return to the days of mainframes
2/ When IBM invented the mainframe in the 50s, there were no independent software companies - IBM bundled their hardware with a COBOL compiler, which customers then used to write custom software themselves
3/ The world's first independent software vendors (e.g. ADR, Informatics, MSA) all started in the 60s as contract programmers - basically, consultants hired to write custom COBOL for clients - who then realized they could resell that custom code to multiple customers
1/ This internal 2007 Nokia presentation on the first iPhone is a really good example of how incumbents actually get disrupted
Oftentimes, the incumbent already knows what needs to be done. It's just that organizational incentives inhibit the incumbent from doing it
2/ This slide deck was posted on Hacker News earlier this week but just got taken down
I have no idea how they got their hands on a copy but it does look like a legit internal Nokia presentation from strategy team at the timenews.ycombinator.com/item?id=427247…
3/ Contrary to popular belief, people at Nokia in 2007 understood that the iPhone was a big deal
The iPhone's touchscreen would "set a new standard of state-of-art"
Nokia's own user interface paradigm was "in decline"
1/ I just finished a 2.5 week trip through China today, my first visit in about a decade. I was there for family reasons, but it also happened to be my first time in the country as a tech industry observer
My amateur travel journal on the China tech market -
2/ OBSERVATION #1 - Yes, everything really does run on WeChat
If you're a foreign traveler visiting China, you really must set up WeChat Pay and Alipay beforehand. For me, this was the Chinese equivalent of Whatsapp + Chrome + Venmo + my credit card + my subway card + Doordash
3/ I didn't use cash a single time on my 19 day trip. Everybody took WeChat Pay, from Michelin-starred restaurants, to McDonalds, to butchers at the farmers markets in tier 3 cities, to performing musicians in national parks
1/ Just caught up with a few investor friends in the consumer space last week about Ozempic and GLP1s
As far as I can tell, everything basically hinges on: how much does it matter that every consumer product in the world depends on a tiny cohort of super consumers?
2/ What happens if it turns out we’ve actually invented an all-purpose anti-addiction drug?
I suspect it’s not properly appreciated how many consumer categories follow a power law distribution of consumptiontheatlantic.com/health/archive…
3/ The top 9% of US adults account for 34% of US candy consumption