This is a great analysis by @Caffar3Cristina and @ProfFionasm of the strengths and weaknesses of the EC's (first draft) Digital Markets Act. There is a lot here worth promoting, so a short thread summarizing/emphasizing on the parts I liked most. voxeu.org/article/europe…
First, a discussion of the organizing principles of the DMA: not old-fashioned utility (price/access) regulation, but to promote entry and encourage fairness.
Second, a *very* useful mapping of (a) gatekeeper defns & (b) proscribed behavior into targets: obv GAFAM, but also Oracle & SAP [intentional?], w/ others meeting some but not all thresholds (Booking, Spotify, Uber). Lots of links in the f/notes to justify their decisions.
Third, convincing arguments that the regs need to consider *business models* (ad-funded, transactions, OpSys ecosystems) b/c the economics making s/o a gatekeeper differs across these (types of EOS, types/directions of net effects, pot. for multi-homing and disintermediation).
Fourth, the comparison to the UK's proposed regs is particularly good. The DMU would cover exclusion, exploitation, *and* consumer protection --> an enforceable code of conduct specific to the src of a gatekeeper's mkt power. Begs the Q: can the DMA move in this direction???
Last, flags two big omissions: little on data exploitation & nothing on mergers, topics at the heart of the disastrous Google-Fitbit merger (as @Caffar3Cristina & I summarized in Dec). Highlight that these need to be addressed for the DMA to be effective.
Overall, a great analysis of the EC's upcoming digital market regulations. Essential reading for antitrust followers (and - hopefully - policymakers!).
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The ACCC rejected the insufficient conditions w/ which DG Comp cleared Google-Fitbit. The EC decision shows a lack of courage and a refusal to learn from past mistakes. Having worked for months w/ @Caffar3Cristina trying to explain why, it’s time to put down a final marker. 1/
This is a (long) thread in four parts:
I.The Problem with Google
II.Google-Fitbit in a time of Digital Platform introspection
III.Google-Fitbit Theories of Harm
IV.The remedies are insufficient
2/
PART I: The Problem with Google.
We’ll start by agreeing that Google makes some great products. (That’s not the problem.) It claims: 3/
A few thoughts on (1) the @acccgovau bargaining code to encourage G/F compensation for news and (2) its potential for “Decentralized Regulation” for dominant DPs generally, written with @Caffar3Cristina. A thread summarizing the post for the TLDR crowd. 1/ voxeu.org/article/accc-s…
(Part 0/Context:) The premise is that regulation for dominant digital platforms is coming (e.g. the UK and EC are advancing legislative proposals). What should these address? How should they be designed? 2/
Re: what to address, most of the focus of international antitrust enforcement re: DPs has been on exclusion (e.g. the EC’s Google cases), but there is a burgeoning interest on exploitation and expropriation of value. 3/