In the past few years we've seen a huge contrast between how liberals show their outrage (largely peaceful racial-justice protests) and how conservatives do so (this, and Cesar Sayoc).
The people who describe the "defund the police" movement and racial-justice protests as attacks on law enforcement are the ones actually attacking law enforcement.
At what point do the Capitol Police start threatening to use the guns they're issued for situations like this? Could we actually get to that point? Is there a way to shut this down without that?
Every single one of these people would be dead or wounded right now if this were a BLM protest.
Every single BLM argument about white privilege and double standards in law enforcement is being validated in real time right now, as the world watches.
This is literally one of the nightmare scenarios described by everyone who has ever advocated for a massive, heavily armed federal security apparatus, and that apparatus is completely failing to confront it.
I understand desire to avoid excessive force. But we're at DEFCON 1.
My mind is reeling. We've spent trillions of dollars since 2001 on security plans to respond to terrorists attacks on high-value targets, and this one is playing out with practically no resistance.
The most gut-wrenching thing about this terrorist attack is that the elected officials who encouraged and enabled it will never accept responsibility for doing so and will continue to be treated like respectable public figures by the media.
Again, I just cannot fathom the value of the federal agencies tasked with protecting our capital city if they can't respond within minutes to a terrorist attack like this.
Even at this moment, it seems almost impossible to imagine the Cabinet invoking 25, but this is not the kind of statement that the national security adviser makes when he has great confidence in the president.
What happened today was one of those things that, if you described it to the average person, would prompt them to say, "Oh, well sure, if THAT ever happened, Congress would obviously snap out of it and act."
Is there any chance that D.C.'s inability to immediately dispatch its National Guard to respond to today's terrorist attack will change Joe Manchin's mind?
Interesting choice by Sasse on a day when his life was imperiled by D.C.'s lack of control over its own National Guard, a consequence of its lack of statehood, which deprives its residents of full civil and political rights even as they suffer under a curfew and mob violence.
Lots of sudden crises of conscience tonight from people who will be out of jobs in two weeks no matter what and may want to cloak themselves in virtue on the way out.
Cyber reporters have watched for years as McConnell has blocked Senate consideration of election security bills from Wyden, Klobuchar/Lankford, and House Democrats.
It's surreal to now hear the phrase "election security" from the mouths of ppl who basically never used it before.
I've been pretty critical of the Capitol Police today, but it's clear that the biggest issue was not isolated instances of cops going easy on the terrorists or taking selfies with them but agency leadership's failure to secure the entrances and interior with enough officers.
"The CVC...cost roughly $700 million and has multiple secure rooms and blast-resistant doors. An officer, holding back two doors, ordered us to head toward the Russell Senate Office Building because the pro-Trump mob had also breached the CVC." washingtonpost.com/politics/repor…
"One senior GOP aide, who has an office not far from the Senate floor, said he took a steel rod and barricaded his door when the pro-Trump mob approached. For what seemed like 20 minutes, he said, rioters banged on his door, trying to break in." washingtonpost.com/politics/repor…
Another reminder of the grave consequences of D.C.'s lack of statehood. If D.C. had been able to activate its own National Guard (1,350 soldiers), the Capitol Police would have had more than enough backup to apprehend the terrorists.
It's been stunning to watch the D.C. government have to single-handedly shoulder the public communications burden today, on behalf of a federal government (and especially legislature) that so often maligns its host city and the people who live in it.
So far, hearing that cyber risks of the Capitol attack were low.
* Congress isn't one big network
* Vulnerable machines held unclassified files
* Hill leaks so much already that truly sensitive stuff is walled off
* Rioters weren't there long enough for thorough, careful access
The only computer reported stolen so far was from Senator Merkley’s office. His staff declined to share details, citing an ongoing investigation.
For those wondering about the SCIFs, used for classified files and conversations, their doors were built to withstand embassy sieges, and they’re swept for bugs before every use.
We haven’t seen any indication that they were even targeted, much less seriously attacked.
More Trump admin CISA drama: DHS recently asked CISA to provide confidential SolarWinds data shared by private companies. CISA refused, fearing harm to industry partnerships if companies don't trust its confidentiality promises.
When companies share technical data about cyber intrusions to help CISA understand the activity, the data sometimes contains proprietary business information.
To encourage companies to feed it insights, CISA promises not to share confidential data with other agencies.
Neither DHS nor CISA denied our reporting, although both agencies emphasized that CISA regularly shares cyber info with DHS.
Add this to the list of strains that have emerged in the relationship between CISA and WH/DHS political appointees late in the Trump administration.
So I'm just now seeing that @OversightDems has published the latest Plum Book (govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GP…), and there are a bunch of errors. Most are attributable to the June 30 "as of" date, but not all — it says we don't have an NSA director!
Unsurprisingly, it still lists Krebs & Travis at CISA. It also lists Suzette Kent, who resigned as federal CIO in July (though she announced it before the Plum Book's "as of" date).
Maybe I'm missing something, but shouldn't it list the assistant directors at CISA? They're PAs.
Organizationally, there are some interesting choices, like listing the CISA director at the end of the agency's section and doing the same with the federal CIO in the relevant OMB section.
Isn't part of the value of this document that it conveys a sense of hierarchy?
I want to highlight a few of the things that stood out to me.
Hopefully we'll learn these lessons in time for the next crisis.
First, it's impossible to overstate the damage wrought by ignorance, incompetence, and antipathy. Trump appointees simply didn't do what the country desperately needed them to do.
The states haven't needed a strong, engaged federal government this badly since World War II, and yet the Trump administration routinely failed to help or actively made things worse.
Biden is answering press questions now and just talked SolarWinds.
"The Defense Department won't even brief us on many things. ... I know of nothing that suggests it's under control."
"We need international rules of the road on cybersecurity."
"The question of the damage done remains to be determined," Biden said of SolarWinds.
The hackers "can be assured that we will respond and probably respond in kind," he said. "There are many options which I will not discuss now."
"I promise you, there will be a response."
"It may take billions of dollars to secure our cyberspace," Biden says when asked about the practical implications of running a govt whose weaknesses remain unknown. "It may take a great deal to get it done."