Humans effortlessly categorize. Some concepts have referents in the real world (a tree), and some do not (justice). What about a 'face'?
Because most psych theories are verbal and informal, psych science is particularly vulnerable to how people think about and label categories.
Turns out we make predictable errors. A hilarious 2-min clip nailed the problem:
Wittgenstein and John Duncan were right: soup is just a functional word from everyday language and it has no 'real essence' at all.
'Essentializing' also describes the famous philosophical paradox of the Ship of Theseus. Imagine replacing the planks of a wooden ship one by one. When does it stop being the same ship? Pause to think.
(The paradox comes from the search for an illusory essence.)
We integrate examples of illusory essences across clinical, cognitive, and neuroscience because they seem more solid than areas like social psych and so offer a stricter test.
We talk about a lot of concepts: disorders, attention, faces, and my favorite, edge detectors in V1.
Borrowing from @EikoFried and friends psyarxiv.com/zg84s, is the label 'depression' the best explanation of variance and causes in symptoms and behaviors? Sometimes there is no single latent variable.
Essentializing is functional and useful but has specific risks for scientists, like shutting down the search for contextual and contingent explanations. E.g., we talk about vulnerable youth and the neglect of attention and interventions on social context.
Brick, C., Hood, B., Ekroll, V., & de-Wit, L. (2021, in press). Illusory essences: A bias holding back theorizing in psychological science. Perspectives on Psychological Science.
key omission: sorry for not finding your twitter handle co-author @profbrucehood !
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh