The document notes that "North Korea debuted the Hwasong-14 ICBM in an October 2015 parade." (USIC calls the October 2015 ICBM mockups the KN14, but this designator system is not used in the NASIC report.)
Page 28 of the NASIC report then includes this photograph, from North Korea's July 4, 2017, launch of an *actual* Hwasong-14 ICBM (KN20). The caption notes it's a "modified Hwasong-14."
So, the problem is that the October 2015 missile is *not called the Hwasong-14 by North Korea*. Yes, it commonly appears as the Hwasong-14 in lots of open source databases, but we have proof the North Koreans call it the Hwasong-13.
Which missile am I talking about? This one. This is from the October 2015 parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea's founding.
Notice the red nameplate on the TEL's cab?
Here's a closer look at that. (h/t @stoa1984 for originally sharing this image, I believe; I've had it saved for a while.)
So, if you can't make it out, it says "Hwasong-13." If you know North Korean ICBMs, you might ask if this thing below (KN08 to USIC) isn't the Hwasong-13. Well, it is. But so is the 2015 missile.
Why does this matter? Well, firstly, IC publications should be held to the highest standards. But implying that the actual *Hwasong-14* was a modified version of the October 2015 parade mockup ICBMs is seriously misleading.
The Hwasong-14 (KN20) that was tested successfully for the first time in July 2017 relied on a totally new liquid propellant engine setup for its first stage. The October 2015 Hwasong-13 (let's call it Hwasong-13 mod 2) used clustered Scuds for its first stage.
This thread probably seems very nit-picky, but there's no detail to small, IMHO, for NASIC to get right when the evidence is openly available. I hope we'll see better in the future.
Getting this detail right leads to a completely different account of the design heritage of North Korea's successful liquid propellant ICBMs (Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15). They didn't simply iterate off the KN08 and KN14 designs.
"At 8:44 am on September 25, the Rocket Force of the People's Liberation Army of China successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile carrying a training simulated warhead into the relevant high seas waters of the Pacific Ocean"
1. Pacific Ocean ICBM testing is not the SOP for the PLARF these days. Most testing takes place over PRC territory.
2. Interesting timing following PRC takeover of the P5 process, but doubt there's a direct link given how their bureaucracy does things.
A thought on this: large solid-fuel missiles are *operationally* advantageous to their liquid counterparts in nearly every way, but have certain downsides relating to their maintenance/storage/handling that deserve to be noted. 1/n
Solid propellant grain, once cast, is sensitive to humidity/temperature/physical stress (during transport, for instance). That's why large, valuable solid-fuel missiles are canisterized. Over years in storage, solid fuel missiles can degrade. 2/n
India, for instance, has seen some of its older Agni-II MRBMs encounter failures after years in storage; to statistically evaluate its older inventories of solid fuel missiles, India randomly test-fires missiles. 3/n armscontrolwonk.com/archive/120615…
NEW: North Korea claims first successful flight-test of a new, solid-fuel ICBM, dubbed the 'Hwasong-18'. This was a major objective set forth by Kim Jong Un for 2023 at the start of this year.
One more image. Per North Korean state media, the test was meant to demonstrate a “nuclear counterattack” capability and to “make the enemies suffer from fear and anxiety.”
Looks like a towed, mobile erector mechanism. Probably sensible for an inaugural launch; don't want to lose an integrated TEL if things go wrong.
Beginning in 2009, North Korea began to comply with internationally accepted satellite prenotification practices (ICAO, IMO, etc.). Unclear if that practice will resume for a satellite with an ostensible "military" role. voanews.com/a/a-13-2009-03…
Here's an example of a North Korean SLV NOTAM (from the April 2012 launch that blew up the Leap Day Understanding).
Interesting tidbit underscoring command and control practices (negative controls) in new KCNA on latest Hwasal-1/2 cruise missile tests for "tactical" nuclear strikes.
Emphasizing negative control is important as KPA moves toward deploying TNWs to "frontline" units (as was decided at last June's WPK CMC meeting): "...adopting important military measures to enhance the operational capabilities of the frontline units" kcnawatch.org/newstream/1656…
Kim maintains assertive control of all nuclear weapons in peacetime, crisis, and war unless and until he is incapacitated/killed/severed from his NC3 system; per updated 2022 nuclear law, that would then result in authority to release nuclear weapons becoming delegated.