What happens to our explanatory/predictive models of UK politics if we drop the assumption that the Tories are actually committed to preserving the Union, as opposed to say, maximising resource extraction and shoring up their power in a breakaway South-East rump state?
There are obviously plenty of Tories/Tory voters who are avowedly committed to preserving the Union, but the tides of opinion have a tendency to change all at once, when strategic realities involved in other commitments align in ways that cannot be ignored. What else is Brexit?
The Tories as a unitary political force haven't decided to turn the South East into Singapore on Thames, ringed by commuter belts and pocked with internal ghettos from which precarious essential labour can be drawn, but they also haven't been a unitary force for a while now.
Insofar as there is any ideological project left in the party, it's not the austerity-forward consolidated unionism of Cameron, but the dynamic 'classical liberalism' of Rees-Mogg and Cummings: new wave of post-industrial economic interventionism disguised as liberalisation.
This project hasn't really coalesced yet, at least not in a way that's visible in public, but this is the rough intellectual vector of finance capital eager to abandon the pretence that London is anything but the core enabler of global capital flight and its associated dynamics.
In some sense it's worth looking at The City within the city of London as an autonomous entity directing and distorting the political processes around it. It's outlived every political formation it's been embedded in, and put down every upstart competitor (e.g., Birmingham).
Dublin fought back, and now Edinburgh, Belfast, and Cardiff are agitating for greater autonomy, which will most likely mean independence and re-entry into the EU for the first two. The only long term alternative is a new federalism or renewed forms of central domination.
Of course, there's Boris's own brand of divide and conquer One Nation Toryism, which successfully broke what remains of the demographic compact that might have let to a Corbyn government, and won't be healed by the promise of a Starmer government. But this Toryism is incoherent.
The new wave of Tory MPs from deprived post-industrial areas in the North of England and elsewhere are largely idiots. Ascribing any political strategy to them is stupid, and Boris is only marginally better. Low cunning has let him fail upwards, but there's nowhere else to go.
It's unlikely that the combined economic catastrophies of COVID and Brexit will endear him to the deprived areas he's courting, because he's not smart enough to follow through on the promises he's making. His greatest strength is Starmer's abject political cowardice.
I'm still a Labour Party member, for my sins. I was as enthused by the Corbyn project as the next millennial, and as crushed by its failure too. I'm not planning on leaving, unless they kick me out for tweeting truth to weakness (they'd got little power to speak of, or to).
But I'm now committed to thinking about the long arc of the century we find ourselves in, rather than capitulating to the endless rehash of late C20 politics still being peddled over a decade after the financial crash exploded every ideological illusion of liberal technocracy.
This means beginning from the imminent collapse of the economic conditions maintaining the tacit social contract encoded by the Union. That means that the long term choice for the regions, as articulated by @Alex_Niven, is between a new federal compromise and independence.
This means seeing our opponents for what they are, even if they don't yet see themselves in such historical terms. It largely doesn't matter how they see themselves, only the tangled webs of complicity they tie themselves and others in, and the direction they're driving us in.
Consider this a promissory note for thinking through the long-term shape of politics in the UK, and in my own region (the North East) specifically. If you like the direction of these thoughts, maybe check out 'Uncanny Solidarity' (deontologistics.files.wordpress.com/2021/01/uncann…). Till next time 🖖
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The only thing that beats it are Seneca’s letters on suicide (emilkirkegaard.dk/en/2010/01/sen…): “It is criminal to “live by robbery”;[12] but, on the other hand, it is most noble to “die by robbery.” Farewell.”
@NegarestaniReza has done the deep reading on this topic though.
"Conceivably Manchester’s ambitious building programme, which includes for example the Alliance Manchester Business School with attached 19-storey hotel, reduced their ability to absorb the shock of the virus."
To be completely clear, universities were one of the last sectors to be fully infected by the mind-virus of general purpose management, a slow motion crash in which the worst of public and private sectors collided and destroyed the economic base of centuries old institutions.
Everything thats happening to UK universities are delayed consequences of choices made by New Labour in the 90s. Not just fees, but the whole metrics based approach to maximising student enrolment. It's so obvious that one feels a bit strange when it's said out loud in the media.
So, I've gained ~500 followers since New Year, and I'm glad so many of you have decided to join me on this journey exploring the limits of Twitter as a philosophical medium. I didn't really realise what I was doing when I came back here, and it's evolving in ways I didn't expect.
What started as a way to just get myself thinking again as I regained functionality after a long convalescence has unexpectedly turned into something strange and worth pursuing in a more systematic and rigorously experimental fashion. I've got ideas, but I'll air them in time.
For now it's worth admitting that I'm accidentally writing a small book on Laruelle in response to a twitter poll and that I should probably approach it as such. I still don't know quite what it will be, as I only let myself think about it in short bursts, but I'm excited to see.
Here’s the way in which I’ve begun to parse Badiou’s definition of evil: it is complicity against complicity against complicity.
1. Primal complicity is the state of nature, in which complex systems of interacting processes evolve in ways analogous to rational agents without yet realising autonomous agency.
2. Autonomous agency, be it individual/collective, epistemic, pragmatic, or aesthetic, is causal complicity turning on itself and bootstrapping networks of control systems that tighten analogies into homologies, elevating self-control to the level of genuine self-legislation.
So, here’s a way of reframing this question: which societies enabled coexistence and collaboration between people with divergent social styles, rather than imposing a dominant social style? Such social pluralism is very important indeed.
I suspect that the vast majority of the answers to the original question will fall foul of the tendency to project ideal social arrangements that reflect our own style of social understanding and engagement, and that this will lead them to talk past one another.
Consider the perspective of someone far away from you on in the neurological map, who doesn’t overlap with your socially calibrated genetic resources for social intelligence: the social heaven of an autist introvert may be the social hell of a bipolar extrovert, and vice versa.
This is what happens when you train neural networks largely on tone and its stylistic relics. They pick up formal features of arguments (not so much fallacies as tics) that have almost nothing to do with semantic content (focus on connotation over implication).
This is a secular problem in the discipline. It's got nothing to do with the Analytic/Continental split in the anglophone world. They've both got the same ramifying signal/noise problem, it's just that the styles (tics and connotations) are different in each pedagogical context.
And this is before we start talking about tone policing and topic policing, which are both rife and essentially make the peer review journal system completely unfit for purpose, populated as it is by a random sampling of pedants selecting for syntactic noise over semantic signal.