To clarify/amplify @paulkrugman's point: in a normal recession, the goal of stimulus is to raise people’s incomes in order to boost spending and raise employment, until we get back to whatever we think full employment is.
But right now, while we want that to some extent, we also want to raise people’s incomes so they do *not* have to go back to work. It’s much more feasible to close restaurants for instance if the workers are getting $1,400 checks and enhanced UI benefits.
Insofar as the goal is to allow people to have an adequate income without going to work at jobs that would contribute to the spread of the coronavirus, a successful package will *lower* measured GDP. Totally different from a normal stimulus.
It makes no sense to compare the relative size of the spending package and estimated output gap now vs 2009 or whenever, because the goal then was to raise employment while the goal today is in large part to maintain incomes without having to raise employment.
Of course it's also important that the output gap is almost certainly quite a bit bigger than the official estimates, as @rortybomb and I argued here: rooseveltinstitute.org/2021/02/01/sti… Plus there are major benefits for distribution, productivity growth, etc in running economy hot.
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If I understand Blanchard correctly, he thinks the Biden package will result in the rapid closing of the output gap, consistently on-target inflation for the first time in a decade, and a policy rate safely away from the zero lower bound.
It's very strange to see people say both (1) the zero lower bound on interest rates is a serious problem, and (2) we should under no circumstances pass a fiscal stimulus large enough to call for raising the policy rate above zero.
I think this is case where idea of R*, the natural or neutral rate of interest, imposes real costs. People who think the policy rate consistent with full employment is a function of "deep, structural" factors can't see how it also depends on fiscal position.
I think there's actually an important and non-obvious question here. When we talk about the multiplier from additional spending, how are we imagining that distributed over time?
When you say the multiplier is 1.5, does that mean you think 1) a dollar of public spending raises GDP by $1.50 this year, with no effect on GDP in future years? Or 2) $1.50 this year, plus some amount in future years? Or 3) a total of $1.50, distributed over several years?
If I understand him correctly, @GagnonMacro is using interpretation 1, while @ernietedeschi is using interpretation 3. It's not clear to me that literature on multipliers clearly distinguishes these cases.
Big news: Mike Konczal’s Freedom from the Market is out. I got an early copy of the book and read it last month, but now that it’s officially published, you too can, and should, acquire and read it. Here’s a thread on interesting stuff from the book. 1/ thenewpress.com/books/freedom-…
The book is organized around a series of public programs for the non-market organization of various areas of economic life drawn from past 200 years of US history, that were conceived of as protecting or expanding freedom. 2/
First chapter is free land - distributing federal lands in West as homesteads. Might seem like odd example of “freedom from the market,” since at first glance is a program for distributing private property more widely. Idealized “market” often imagined as small farmers. 3/
This Jacobin interview making the case for a herd-immunity approach to the coronavirus is really distressingly bad. jacobinmag.com/2020/09/covid-…
Weird for a socialist magazine to ignore the existence of people who *work* at schools, who are not themselves children. Even weirder that interviewer doesn't challenge them on this.
More broadly, greater transmission in one setting means more people infected across the board.
It's nonsense to say that we must reach herd immunity one way or another. Vietnam, New Zealand, etc. will not reach herd immunity because *there are no cases there*. Lots of diseases have been controlled not through immunity, but by limiting transmission.
I think a big debate in macroeconomic policy circles in coming years will be between people who say "The federal response to the coronavirus was successful in maintaining incomes despite a deep fall in employment. That should now be our standard for future downturns" 1/2
vs people who say "The response to the coronavirus was successful in maintaining incomes despite a deep fall in employment. But now that crisis is over, we can go back to doing things the way we did before." 2/2
In other contexts, we don't ignore extreme cases, but regard them as natural experiments that are *more* informative than the usual range of variation. There's a reason e.g. David Card picked the Mariel boatlift as an ideal case to look for effect of labor supply shifts on wages.
Besides what Nathan correctly says - that asset bubbles often happen with high rates - also important that low rats reduce debt burden, making bubbles less destructive when they do happen.
If we think that financial markets funnel abundant credit into asset specualtion, the answer is to better regulat private finance and/or replace it with public institutions. Not to make credit artificially scarce.