The PBoC continues to try to limit credit growth in China, in this case household debt, arguing that “there is very little room for further expansion of household debt”. It warns that the household debt ratio nearly doubled, to 62% of...
GDP, or RMB 63 trillion, between the end of 2011 and the end of 2020.
The problem is that household debt is just one locus of debt-creation needed to keep GDP growth rates high enough to satisfy political needs. If the PBoC were to restrain growth in household debt, then...
3/4
either there must be a countervailing increase in corporate and government debt, or Beijing must accept lower GDP growth rates.
This is the problem with a "technocratic" approach that identifies individual problems and seeks to address them independently of their...
4/4
systemic context. While high levels of household debt create their own specific afflictions, China's problem isn't household debt, but rather debt itself, and a rapid rise household debt is simply one of the ways in which the system can manifest this underlying problem.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
One quibble. In spite of having terrible debt dynamics, I've always thought that China was unlikely to have a financial crisis because financial crises are caused by the sudden unravelling of balance-sheet mismatches. In China’s closed banking...
2/5 system, liabilities are easily restructured by the authorities, and so mismatches on paper are not mismatches in reality. But too many economists – who really should know better – simply assume that “excessive” debt matters only to the extent that it might lead to crisis.
3/5
This is not just wrong, it is circular. In fact both finance theory and most of the historical evidence suggests that over the medium and long term, countries with excessively-high debt levels that don’t suffer financial crises often sharply underperform those that do.
Chinese bank loans were up RMB 3.58 trillion in January, and total social financing was up RMB 5.17 trillion, both exceeding expectations, but because the growth in TSF seems to be slowing down, some analysts may be misinterpreting the implications.
Major changes in the base means you must be very careful about how you compare growth rates over time, and analysts and journalists must watch the real arithmetic of China’s debt burden. While it is true that January’s TSF growth rate was lower month-on-month in 2021 than...
3/6
it was in 2020 (1.8% versus 2.0%), this occurred on a much higher base, which necessarily undermines the comparability of these two numbers. It turns out that while the growth rate of debt decelerated, the growth in the debt burden actually accelerated.
The US bilateral deficit with China is down 10% since 2016, and down 26% since 2018, when the trade conflict began. This might suggest to some that Trump’s trade policies were “successful” in addressing the US trade imbalance, but in fact during...
this time the overall American trade deficit with the world soared, as did China’s overall trade surplus.
This isn’t just an unfortunate coincidence. In a highly globalized world in which frictional costs on trade and capital flows are almost zero, bilateral imbalances...
3/4
tell us almost nothing about the sources of trade imbalances, which is why country-specific trade measures have almost no real impact beyond shifting the imbalances around. As long as...
Good article, although I think the argument as to whether or not GDP is a good measure of economic performance largely misses the point. Of course it isn't, but no measure can be. GDP is a proxy for certain kinds of economic activity, and not only...
do we not know or agree what economic activity to include in our measure, but we're not even sure how to measure whatever we decide to include.
But as any mathematician can tell you, that doesn't make the GDP measure worthless. It can still be used comparably as long as...
3/8
the relationship between the GDP measure and whatever it is we "really" want to measure is unbiased and consistent. Last year's US GDP, for example, doesn't meaningfully measure the total value of goods and services produced last year in the...
For over 15 years Chinese regulators have implemented one reform after another aimed at taming the wildly speculative Chinese stock markets in an attempt to make them converge with more sophisticated markets in the US and Europe. I have long...
argued that because these reforms never really addressed the structural problems in the stock markets – mainly poor-quality macro data, false financial statements, a terribly opaque corporate governance framework, suppressed interest rates, unpredictable and...
3/5
ever-changing rules of the game, political vendettas, insider activity, and other features that made it impossible for fundamental investors to project and value cashflows except at very high discount rates – none of these reforms would make a...
This article suggests that the reason the surge in China’s surplus isn't being matched by an equivalent rise in PBoC reserves is because there was an increase in other net capital outflows. But this is true simply by definition. The balance of...
What really matters is what explains those other net capital outflows. There was of course a significant increase in net dollar assets among Chinese banks, which is where much of the suspicion lies, along with substantial errors and...
3/5
omissions, and the article quotes an analyst as suggesting that “Commercial banks are soaking up a lot of dollars so that they can use it for overseas lending and investments.”
That’s a little weird. It might have made sense two years ago when RMB interest rates...