If you want to know more about how law enforcement has been transformed into a regressive revenue generation mechanism, here's a🧵of resources wrapped in an argument for why the problem runs deeper in our democracy than you might think (1/n)
Let's start with 1) the consequences for individuals caught in the system, so we can then better appreciate 2) why the political mechanisms behind them are not to be taken lightly, and then close out with 3) policy solutions
@planetmoney did an amazing job telling the story from the point of view of the people living the problem. Once you're caught in the system, you're in economic quicksand.
But it doesn't take a felony arrest to lead to the unraveling of a household. It can start with a citation for speeding or jaywalking, and then quickly spin out of control, even leading to a bench warrant for your arrest.
see: aclu.org/report/penny-r…
and: tinyurl.com/1dd57ami
States have created multi-layered systems for collecting every penny of fines and fees. *California has literally hired private debt collection agencies to get pennies on the dollar.* woodstockinst.org/research/repor…
Public finance context: 1) Normal taxes: progressive, minimal collateral damage. The system *wants you to make more money* 2) Fines & fees: regressive, destroys your lifetime earning power. The system *undermines how much income you can earn, lowering lifetime taxes paid*
So how did we end up here? Simply put, local governments need the money. In his painstaking collection of data, @mikemaciag found >600 municipalities where fines and fees were >10% of the budget, and 80 where >50% 🤯
During the "tax revolt" of the 70's and 80's, states started putting limits on local taxes, especially property taxes. As we've learned though, these limits don't stop politicians & voters from wanting more spending. So where does the money come from?
The answer to local budget shortfalls has increasingly become the criminal justice system. And who better to target? From a politician's point of view, it's a nearly perfect tax.
1) Felons often can't vote 2) Drivers are often from out of town 3) You can blame the victim 4) You can adjust it year to year 5) Private property doesn't have the same rights as people 6) Low income-->Public defender-->Guilty plea
We summarize how law enforcement generates revenue in this paper
So how do we fix this? Glad you asked! First, we should just end revenue retention from seized property. I won't get into the details here. Several states are making real progress on this front.
At a far deeper level, we can dilute the revenue incentives from individual arrests/citations by re-routing all local criminal justice revenue through the state budget for disbursal back to local govt's.
Better still, we can refund the revenues from the criminal justice system as a state top up to TANF. No new institutional scaffolding needed, everything is already in place. Money in, money out. Fines and fees never enter the fiscal calculus.
A TANF top-up rebate means that criminal justice is now revenue neutral, like most government public goods. Instead of putting a bullseye on the finances of our poorest families, criminal justice would become the source of small yearly financial windfalls.
You are, of course, now both convinced and outraged that the criminal justice system has been corrupted into a system of regressive taxation. Welcome to the club! But, if you'll indulge me, let me briefly discuss the even bigger picture
Officer and judicial discretion is power, and power is the chief commodity of the political marketplace. When elected officials make deals with voters, donors, and each other, what they are really trading is power.
Officer discretion is quickly commodified, doubly so if that discretion leads directly to money. When laws allow for enforcement discretion, that discretion is internalized into the political marketplace.
Whether its speeding tickets, drug arrests, regulatory investigations, or immigration audits, the more discretion the officer has, the more they and their bosses are going to be leaned on to make decisions that fill budgets and ballot boxes. michael-makowsky.squarespace.com/index#/lawenfo…
When we design laws & policies, we need to spend more time thinking about how it will actually be enforced. It doesn't matter what we intended for the consequences of a law to be if its enforcement ends up harming the very people we were trying to help.
/end 🧵
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
YouTube is interesting to me because I think you can make a good case that it is a, in many ways, unique regulatory target, and one that lends itself to bespoke policy solutions. So here's a thread no one asked for w/ a punchline I didn't expect [1/16]
YouTube is a network good w/ a high fixed costs, which means it's likely characterized by increasing returns to scale and decreasing avg costs. For those keeping score, that means it's a likely natural monopoly and the pro-regulation folks should be licking their chops [2]
But wait, there's more! You can also make a strong argument that it also enables significant amounts of "cultural pollution" i.e. hate speech, fear-mongering, conspiracy theories, etc. That's an externality! Even more reason for government to step in. [3]
New (accepted!) paper and thread: “To Serve and Collect: The Fiscal and Racial Determinants of Law Enforcement” by myself, Thomas Stratmann, and @ATabarrok, forthcoming in the Journal of Legal Studies 1/17 papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
Punchline: when local governments are running budget deficits, black and Hispanic arrest rates increase, while white arrests remain (mostly) unchanged, *but only if* local police are legally able to retain forfeiture revenues in their budget 2/17
To better understand our results, I’d like to walk through two important *correlations* first, and then our discuss our strategy for identifying a *causal* relationship between fiscal incentives and arrests 3/17