ShadowFall is short Kerry Group ($KYG).
We found @theOntake note compelling, with it echoing several concerns we raised a while back. We view Kerry’s financial statements to be opaque and sometimes unreliable. Having read the latest findings, we’re more convinced of this. 1/6
To those that say this is old news, the truth is still the truth regardless of time. What we find interesting is that a fresh set of eyes has similar observations to us, with more recent information strengthening our view. 2/6
When we raised the flag on @Wirecard in 2015 then 2016, this was also largely dismissed as “nothing new”. The same occurred with subsequent reporting by @FFJ_report and @FD. Yet @Wirecard was just as much a fraud in 2015-19 as it was when it collapsed in 2020. 3/6
This type of lazy and vacuous argument made by some sell side analysts is absurd. Why not instead challenge companies to come up with a response to legitimate questions instead of acting as the PR to the company? 4/6
Incidentally, @FD has also highlighted the oddities of Kerry in the past and presented straight forward questions to the group, for which the response in our view made little sense. ft.com/content/7523ee… 5/6
Isn’t it funny how the same companies appear to draw criticism but fail to adequately address the concerns.
For professional investors interested in our original report, please feel free to get in touch. 6/6
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
ShadowFall is short Network International $NETW
Burkhard Ley (former Wirecard CFO): “I read through the 101-page [Zatarra] report . . . page by page. After that I knew that not a single allegation was correct.”
For us, the NETW response is reminiscent of the Ley defence. 1/6
Like dear Burkhard’s response in 2016, we believe NETW’s response doesn’t do investors justice after promising a full response. Despite saying not a single allegation was correct, Burkhard couldn’t provide one example to back up this claim. 2/6
Now from NETW “The [SF] report contains a number of factual inaccuracies”. Yet despite taking critique of the company seriously, it doesn’t provide one example to back up its claim, & instead moves from prior suggesting a “full response” to updating its FAQs. 3/6
ShadowFall is short Temenos, $TEMN.
We’ve been short some time, it’s always surprised us that while the company spends significant amounts on R&D, it seems to us to be behind other technology companies on the transition to SaaS. 1/4
Whilst we’re on R&D, it’s never been clear to us where this goes. TEMN expensed USD 270m on R&D in FY19 & capitalised USD 65m. Presumably this is focused on India, since Temenos says R&D is conducted in India and its Indian employees broadly follow employees in R&D. 2/4
Further, its Indian subsidiary’s filings also say it performs development activities & 100% of its revenue is internal. But the Indian sub revenue was USD 64m with employee costs of USD 42m in FY19. We can’t help wonder where the rest is? 3/4
ShadowFall is short Network International ($NETW). Report available to download from: shadowfall.com/researchservic…
Some of the Wirecard connections to NETW’s intended acquisition, DPO, are already known. However, we have found numerous links…. 1/7
Yes, DPO bought Acona from Dietmar Knöchelmann, who was subsequently convicted for money laundering & fraud. However, we also find that DPO has been audited by a former co-director to Knöchelmann. 2/7
As for DPO’s initial company secretary & Director, these are the same individuals connected to Greymountain Management, which is currently involved in an ongoing US CFTC court case regarding binary option scams. 3/7
ShadowFall is short Blue Prism ($PRSM). shadowfall.com/researchservic…
We believe PRSM is being left behind by its peers in the highly competitive & commoditised RPA market. In our view, PRSM’s prospect of ever reaching meaningful profitability is low. 1/4
Meanwhile, PRSM’s key metrics appear to be worsening, such as revenue per average customer, the quality of its receivables, upsell rates, customer churn, while significant board churn and what we view as lack of appropriate independence we find also of concern. 2/4
We find consistent inconsistencies within the filings and company statements, whether it’s between the P&L & corresponding notes in the accounts, gaps in the main subsidiary filings or claims regarding its recent acquisition. 3/4
ShadowFall is short Boohoo (£BOO).
Below are several questions that we believe should be put to Boohoo’s management:
1. Of the £89.8m in EBITDA for 1H20, what percentage of this do you estimate was driven from unintentionally benefiting from the exploitation of Leicester factory workers due to their low pay and poor working conditions in the supply chain?
2. What percentage of the £367m in cost of goods in 1H20 was attributable to supply from Leicester? Going forward, what percentage of this would you envisage will continue to be attributable to supply from Leicester?
ShadowFall Fund is short Boohoo (£BOO)
We believe that Iain Dale’s @LBC show from yesterday was enlightening. In particular an extended interview with @ABridgen: lbc.co.uk/radio/presente… 1/4
Mr Bridgen MP makes reference to two buildings, the Dunlop Building and the Imperial Typewriter Factory. In the former reference, we believe that he meant the Dunlop Business Centre (DBC). According to Land Registry details, the DBC is owned by JAK Property Jersey Limited. 2/4
JAK Property provides Boohoo’s headquarters, 49-51 Dale Street, Manchester, as its contact address with HM Land Registry. Further, based on filings with UK Companies House, we believe that JAK Property is associated with Jalaludin Abdulla Kamani (Perhaps the JAK reference?). 3/4