There have been a number of questions about whether there are any kind of standards or requirements for generator winterization at either the state or federal level. From what I can tell, the answer is a firm "not really". Again, FERC/NERC's 2011 report is instructive. 1/
I don't have the bandwidth/resources to run this all the way to ground, but I did dig up this letter that FERC sent to NERC in June 2012. It explains that the 2011 report found a gap in federal, state, and regional standards w/ respect to winterization. 2/ nerc.com/FilingsOrders/…
In that letter, FERC asks NERC for an update on "the initiative to modify the Reliability Standards to address winterization and related issues. NERC's response (linked here) explains it had opened a "Standards Authorization Request (SAR)." 3/ nerc.com/FilingsOrders/…
A SAR basically starts the process of developing a potential new reliability standard, which if approved by NERC + FERC, becomes a requirement.
This SAR, though, was terminated in 2013 in favor of developing a detailed "reliability guideline." 4/ nerc.com/pa/Stand/Proje…
This is where I lose the trail. Docket No. AD11-9-000 contains many additional inquiries from FERC and responses from Texas Regional Entity the regional reliability entity for ERCOT) and others on winterization issues. 5/
Slow eLibrary and other commitments mean I can't read through them all, but I'm sure FERC and NERC are going to dig back through all of that to figure out where their 2011 recommendations went.
I remain confident that "not really" is the answer. 6/6
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[Take two!] Four events this week may send us once more into the fray of FERC, state policies, and RTO/ISO wholesale markets. A thread on them, starting with a significant announcement from 5 of the New England Governors . . . 1/
1. Today, @NESCOEStates released the "Governors Statement on Electricity Reform 2020", calling for the regional ISO to become "a committed partner in [their] decarbonization efforts." 2/ nescoe.com/resource-cente…
It's a forceful statement noting the misalignment of today's "electricity market and organizational structures" with the State's clean energy mandates, and suggesting these States will seek to be more in the driver's seat going forward. Significant and important! 3/
@EnergyCommerce@HouseCommerce First, I want to reiterate our overarching message - with wind, solar, energy storage, DER, EE, and all other advanced energy technologies now the least-cost resources, transitioning to a 100% clean power sector is an economic opportunity for America, not an economic burden. 2/?
@EnergyCommerce@HouseCommerce Second, the panel was almost unanimous that we need the federal government to establish a policy objective of reaching net zero carbon emissions by 2050. We strongly support this announced goal of @EnergyCommerce leadership and look forward to working with them. 3/?
Quick take on the PURPA proposal as I understand it so far: the proposal to drop the rebuttable presumption threshold under 210(m) from 20 MW to 1 MW, and the proposal to potentially extend 210(m) relief outside the RTOs, could both significantly harm competition. 1/?
One beef I have is that FERC seems to be progressing from the notion that PURPA was all about addressing dependence on oil and the 1970s oil shortages/embargo. But as I've noted here before, that's only one of the goals PURPA sought to achieve. 2/?
Another key goal of PURPA was to encourage more competition after a period of regulated monopolies making bad investments in power projects and leaving consumers to bear the costs. PURPA birthed non-utility generation as a competitor. 3/?
Here's a good thread on yesterday's NYT article about the La Paloma generating plant in CA, and the complaint they filed that FERC swiftly and unanimously rejected. In addition to @MilesFarmer's excellent analysis, here is my own quick thread. 1/?
The comparison to FERC's order proposing to impose minimum offer prices on renewables and some nuclear in PJM is tenuous at best, because that order's rationale (which I strongly disagree with) is based on PJM's centralized capacity market design. 2/?
The supposed "price suppression" FERC claims occurs in PJM simply can't occur under CAISO's market design. As Miles explains, CAISO doesn't have a centralized capacity market, and FERC has never suggested it will impose one. In fact, La Paloma basically asked FERC to do that. 3/?