There’s a new @nytimes article out on a @RecordedFuture report coming out tomorrow ok potential Chinese activity targeting Indian electric sites. I’ll hold broad thoughts for the report to drop where I can dig in but a few initial thoughts: nytimes.com/2021/02/28/us/…
First, it’d be no surprise to find that between two states that have conflict (and with some skirmishes bordering on going larger) that there would be targeting of critical national infrastructure such as the electric system (power grid). So the claim seems very reasonable
Interestingly, the NYT writes: “Now, a new study lends weight to the idea that those two events may well have been connected” referring to a power outage last year in India. But what’s interesting is the RF analysts don’t seem to say that noting instead a link is unsubstantiated
It seems the NYT is just offering a potential link but the analysts don’t support it. Not critiquing any party involved but kudos to the analysts for sticking to their point that what they found was interesting and targeted but chose not to speculate further.
The RF analysts were also seemingly transparent that they aren’t doing incident response or have access to the internal networks of the company but are using their collection and in it the targeting of load dispatching is unique enough to consider targeted
Essentially the RF analysts are saying that they’re tracking an adversary and its infrastructure and capability and have found unique victimology in their collection that’s specific and assessing targeting towards Indian load dispatch centers.
I’m looking forward to the technical report but so far it seems they’re being very reasonable and professional here. They notified the Indian CERT, they’re sharing their findings, not claiming it was related to the power outage, but noted it’s targeted to electric systems
I really like that they acknowledge their collection gaps and what they don’t know while sticking to their assessment - and not being led into theorizing or getting into things their analysis didn’t touch. Seems very solid. I like their team so I’m glad to see this
For any more “what does this all mean” we’ll have to wait for the report to drop tomorrow but generally it sounds they found technical evidence to support an assessment of targeting of electric systems in India which fits what we’d expect and could be useful in finding more
For all my colleagues in electric power there’s nothing here that would say any power outage was the result of a cyber attack or anything like that and if RF had any “imminent” risk type intel they’d have shared it. Looks isolated. So rest easy and just read the report tomorrow
Yea their report keeps to the points they made in NYT. Basically making the assessment that they saw a unique cluster of malware (ShadowPad) and C2 servers (noting the way the C2 servers were done not just ShadowPad + C2) target 10 Indian electric power entities
They’re also fairly transparent with everything they’ve done. They note why they came to their conclusions, release the technical details they have, note collection gaps, no alarmism or unsupported claims, etc. It’s a well done report.
I suspect some folks are going to ding them for a few things; they note .com as a shared TLD as an example as being important. Or use of TLS. But I would disagree with any critique on that. Alone sure its not much but they didn’t present it alone. They presented multiple findings
Their will always be data and observations that alone look stupid. But intel analysts take and synthesize a lot of things together. One data point in isolation is almost always bad, as part of an overall story they all have their place. So I’d have done the same
Also I love that they noted there’s strong links to APT41 but don’t have enough insight to say this activity is APT41. That’s perfect. RF, and most, generally wouldn’t know the ins and outs of the APT41 definition. But they are saying yes there is a link and others are tracking
Anyway overall I like that they chose to make the assessment they did because their collection and analysts supported it, not be hyperbolic, and then offered data out for others to use and expand on while linking to other known activity. Kudos RF team
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A quick thread on intelligence analysis in the context of cyber threat intelligence. I see a number of CTI analysts get into near analysis paralysis phases for over thinking their assessments or over obsessing about if they might be wrong. (1/x)
Consider this scenario. A CTI analyst identifies new intrusions and based on the collection available and their expertise note that the victims are all banks. Their consumer wants to know when threats specifically target banks (not just that banks are victims).
The CTI analyst has, from their collection, at this time, and based on their expertise enough to make an activity group (leveraging the Diamond Model in this example) that meet's the requirement of their consumer. So what's the problem?
Yesterday in the Congressional hearing on homeland cybersecurity @C_C_Krebs and @DAlperovitch very kindly called out @DragosInc as a good example/company to work with in ICS/OT. Not “buy Dragos stuff” but “here’s a good example of an approach” and I just want to say thanks
We’ve been afforded a really cool place in the community to be allowed to focus on ICS/OT and have a ton of support from around the community.
What mostly stood out to me on this topic is that both recognized the unique approach required for ICS (Dragos or not)
Enterprise security is very important. And there’s lots to learn from them for ICS. But ICS security is different especially when dealing with physical systems. Understanding the unique risks, systems, etc all matter but most important is understanding the mission and priorities
The fact that so many are focusing on the water plant using Windows 7, which had nothing to do with how the attack was done, is interesting. Folks have an obsession with vulnerabilities and while they can matter a lot it is a fundamentally different value prop in ICS.
The attack took advantage of TeamViewer. In this instance the OS didn’t matter. The TeamViewer application was Internet facing and available. The attack took advantage of the HMI, that’s not a software vuln issue, they just did what operators could do on the system natively
There’s a lot of “insecure by design” systems in ICS. Meaning most of the things you want to do you don’t need a vulnerability or exploit to do.
Also a lot of IT security is system or data security, protect the system don’t let folks get root, encrypt the data, etc. ICS is not
In my career I have found the loudest naysayer voices find themselves in echo chambers to make themselves feel like thought leaders but are often well in the minority and simply not part of where the real work happens, ostracized by the do’ers for being heroes in their own mind.
My advice to the folks who find themselves trapped in those echo chambers is to step out of the social media bubble when necessary and look into the much larger community and partake in it and move the needle forward. In all corners of this infosec industry you’ll find the do’ers
It’s appropriate to have informed discussion about what the best paths forward are. But if you find yourself critiquing more than working - ask yourself what path you’re on. Everyone’s biases, that’s ok, but make sure you’re building up more than tearing down or you’ll be alone
I know there’s a desire to calm people down and have some confidence, but I would advise anyone pretending they have an understanding of the scope of the SolarWinds compromise to dial it down a bit. It’s going to take time, could be more accesses, and our collection isn’t great.
E.g. “right now there are only $X orgs that are impacted” is based on very limited visibility with an expectation we understand all the compromise routes and adversary command and control capabilities. We simply don’t know that to be true and won’t in the first couple weeks
Should average citizens be freaking out? No, this isn’t war stop the hyperbole. From a national security perspective though the President and Congress must have confidence in the integrity of its critical and defense critical sites. We’re no where near “we understand this” yet.
Fun to be on this episode of @DarknetDiaries - the heroes of the story IMO are Julian & @naserdossary who are interviewed as well and were incident responders on the case. Credit to to the @DragosInc intel team for their hard work too (special thx for @ReverseICS@mayahustle)
I think the story really got carried away and at some point Saudi Aramco was named as the victim when in reality they were the first responders helping out their community. Kudos to them and the other unsung heroes. Lots of teams come together to help in such events
I’m thankful Julian and @naserdossary have since joined the Dragos team. Our team is better for having them on it.