Not often policy analysis comes from #FYB, but Alfie has a good point here worth discussing…..

Operationalising military use of social media….. A thread.

1/n

Alfie rightly says that Ops are built on intelligence. But in modern warfare (or perhaps more accurately constant competition), they’re built on information and narrative. This is the "Grey Zone" as covered in the amazing @haynesdeborah podcast.

2/n

The British Army currently has a very formal SM structure being delivered both officially and unofficially, all very controlled, focussing heavily on providing "positive" stories aimed at recruitment.

#Kettlebells #BeMoreDog

3/n

Regulated by a loose #DigitalArmy guide, open to interpretation. Very politely highlighting that anything could be considered inappropriate (even if it isn't) and V&S are there to beat you with if someone interprets an out of context comment badly. 4/n
army.mod.uk/media/4612/adr…
As for the formal accounts, they're basically a long feed of navel gazing or self-promotion. Where we talk to ourselves at best, or at worst just use them as a way to grub up to reporting or senior officers.

#Bumsnorkle

5/n

At this point I'd just like to say there are some great exceptions, like @Cookie2148 who's willingness to engage on CASTLE and its outputs has been pretty refreshing.

#NotASnorkle #NeverCalledHimSir

6/n
This has led to an atmosphere of mistrust and wariness, where Defence tries to control the uncontrollable by policing the individuality of 250k people, missing the real benefits and opportunities of official and formal social media messaging.

7/n
Defence would be better served getting out of the individual SM game and letting its people speak for themselves. Using V&S as a guide, including trust, making it clear that intervention is by exception and should be a last resort to manage inappropriate/illegal behaviour.

8/n
Instead, we should be officially focussing on the thing that matters - competition with hostile actors. Influencing (not controlling) the information narrative. In an age of bots, fake accounts and troll farms, this is something we are singularly failing to do.

9/n
As an example, a media narrative about 77 Bde exists and 6 Div stood up in 2019 specifically with the remit of "Information Operations and unconventional warfare".

10/n

warfare.today/2019/08/01/bri…
But if we look at their Twitter feed - @6thUKDivision, the account formally known as FTC became active again on 6XX formation in Aug 19, after over 4 years of silence.

11/n

They then proceeded to publish a scattering of tweets, some explaining the units in the Division.....

....completely understandable and well advised for a new organisation...

12/n

And some that fell into the standard and banal SM puff pieces already mentioned.

#CheersDits

13/n

And this lasted for approximately 35 days, when the useful and official blue tick Twitter account effectively went silent. Tweeting nothing at all, but liking approximately 1 post a month until Apr 20. Then….silence…

14/n
This is not a dig at that unit, and I could find a list of similar accounts that clearly rely on ad-hoc action from a stressed and overworked SO3 who's been given "that social media thing" as a tertiary task or worse.

15/n
The simplest thing would be to ensure any account has a clear owner, with a thought through narrative of positive, engaging promotion with a clear target audience and objective (and not just your boss!). Because bad use of SM is worse than no use of SM.
#SoundsLikePlanning
16/n
But for key accounts and specific roles (perhaps @6thUKDivision is one of them), there's an opportunity to get on the front foot and use SM as a tool of competition. In an age of bad information and fake news, to use official accounts to take the fight to bad actors.

17/n
This isn't new and was exactly what @campbellclaret used to do so effectively as part of the Labour government, albeit in a less SM led time.

18/n
The abilities of Defence could be used to highlight and expose examples of online manipulation, interference and misinformation perpetrated by actors or states. Doing case studies, highlighting recurring or common methods to undermine truth.

#TwoCanPlayAtThisGameSunshine

19/n
An example of this would be the work that @bellingcat does using OS information. Using that methodology, specifically targeting known bad actors, amplifying using official military accounts, we can build our narrative rather than reacting to theirs.
20/n
bellingcat.com
There would of course be challenges to this approach.

Some foreign nations might protest, but at the same time not admit responsibility so.....bothered.

21/n
Foreign media mouthpieces for adversarial regimes would target the output from these accounts as some kind of fake news in its own right. Let them They'd do it anyway and are speaking only to their own people and not ours, who are the real audience.

22/n
As long as output is truthful, provable (at least a clear evidence chain), rapid to respond (not tied up by long approval), a reputation can be built for honest reporting, building a trusted counterpoint, blowing open the unchallenged narratives of our adversaries on SM.

23/n
A similar theme was explored in relation to discussions on Russian Naval activity in the North Sea by the @wavellroom recently and is exactly the case in point, where we've been defensive and let a threat narrative seem much worse than the reality.

24/n
In the end, SM is a non-lethal weapon. At the moment it's mainly pointed at ourselves. With the right desire and a willingness to act without a paralysing fear of things going wrong, we can turn it on those who want to do us harm.....they are already doing it to us!

25/25 Fin!

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