Key point here (and cf Swiss experience): “standing up to” the EU has a short run populist appeal (and EU behaviour fails to endear it to close neighbours). But in the medium run - when people see the price in economic damage and lost opportunities - it doesn’t work.
At the moment, the “pick a fight”, maximise “sovereignty” strategy appears price-free: the losses are all hidden beneath the Covid deluge (no one is travelling, effects on trade and jobs are - or are seen to be - swamped by Covid, press and public focus is elsewhere).
When the price of the current government’s choice of Brexit in lost opportunities, business, paperwork and sheer inconvenience emerges from the receding flood waters of Covid, things may well start looking very different.
Especially as, after having had years to work on it, the current government still has no coherent narrative of what it can do as the result of its chosen hard Brexit in terms of improving people’s lives that justifies the costs of that choice (as those become evident).
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The first constitutional issue is the possible abuse of power to shovel funding to areas represented by Ministers and other Tory MPs. The delay in publishing the methodology increases suspicion that the methodology will be tweaked to generate the desired results.
Are our systems of accountability strong enough to detect and call out what everyone accepts in principle must be wrong - a distortion of public spending to areas which the government of the day feels are more politically sensitive at the expense of areas with greater need?
A few, tentative, thoughts on the legal advice disclosed by the Scottish Government on the Salmond case. gov.scot/publications/l…
NB I am not a Scots lawyer, and some of the procedural language is strange to me (though I can get the gist). But the issues of fairness, procedural error, apparent bias and duty of candour are all pretty familiar and as far as I can see much the same in Edinburgh as London.
This is the key chronology - which looks fair enough, having looked at the documents behind it. (It’s from the 29.12.18 document.)
Nothing wrong, here, with “business”. (I guess “enterprise” was rejected because, pace George W Bush, it is the French word translated by the English “undertaking”.)
Interesting passage in @katyballs’ piece about No 10’s plans to use the UK government’s new powers in the UK Internal Market Act.
The powers are here (section 50).
Money is power: if you give unfettered power to the UK government to spend effectively as it likes in 🏴 and 🏴, you affect those governments’ ability to determine priorities in areas within their competence.
This attempt to contrast a “common law” approach to regulation with an EU “civil law” approach is wholly unconvincing. (And I have read the detailed paper on which it is based.) express.co.uk/comment/expres…
There is no consistent “common law” approach to regulation that fits Reynolds description of a judge-led, principles rather than prescriptive approach. Look at regulation that the UK has introduced without any EU involvement (from planning to merger control).
The idea that there is a distinctively “common law”
approach to to regulation (presumably opposed to EU law, said to be “civil law”) is a bit of a Brexiter trope. No real basis for it.
If you look at our planning control system (the basic elements of which are entirely domestic), it’s a bit hard to describe it as based on broad principles with interventions only where necessary.
And some EU legislation - eg medicines - was pretty much based on UK regulation. Indeed, most important EU regulation is characterised by a pretty heavy UK input.