I'm reviewing them through my own article about disaster responses as human-made disasters in Disaster Research and the Second Environmental Crisis edited by Kendra, @USofDisaster, @ProfDisasterspringer.com/gp/book/978303…
ANYWAY, I was struck by this quote, from Kroll-Smith and Couch, The Real Disaster Is Above Ground: A Mine Fire and Social Conflict (1990): books.google.nl/books?id=rrQeB…
"The altruistic community that emerges in the wake of natural calamity contrasts sharply with the social hatred that characterized Centralians’ response to their long-term, humanly-produced disaster”.
"social hatred" as a phrase really resonates with me right now in relation how people are experiencing the pandemic, government responses to the pandemic, and other people reacting to those forces.
please note that by putting the pandemic in this category of disruptive, human-made disasters I am NOT suggesting the virus was made in a lab; rather, the pandemic is the conjunction of the virus with human actions and behavior, many of which worsened its impact.
Not all of those actions were blameworthy. The pandemic only exists because of global travel, but most of the early spread occurred before people understood or could be expected to understand what was going on.
Since then, however, there have been mistakes and misinformation, calculation and profit, some unintentional and some intentional, that have worsened the disaster. The people affected are angry, frustrated, sad. I am angry, frustrated, sad.
Kroll-Smith and Couch write, based on their study of an underground coal fire in Pennsylvania, “communal bonds disintegrate and are replaced by emergent groups that compete for control of the crisis.” Sound relevant?
Another researcher, Freudenburg, surveyed research on technological disasters (1997) and found three broad areas that spur this "social hatred" and harm to communities: ambiguity of harm; the emergence of “corrosive communities”; and sociocultural disruption.
Again, I probably don't even have to elaborate on those for you to see them around you today.
Maybe sociocultural disruption, which isn't a very specific term: he uses it to mean the way authority figures/orgs lose that authority, disillusionment with previously unquestioned social fabric. They way you might trust your government less than you used to, and that is scary.
This is just to say: it is normal to feel uncertain, shaken, angry. It is normal that these feelings lead to anger at others who interpret uncertainty differently or blame someone different or cling to an authority you can't believe in anymore.
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reminds me of the absolutely sanitized annual ritual of People's (Time's? Newsweeks? IDEK) "sexiest man alive" which is always, like, the cleanest whitest most symmetrical except for his hair man we could find and has literally nothing to do with sexiness.
and it's not ONLY visual media either! a lot of written romances lean very heavily on chiseled jaw-broad shoulders to make someone "sexy."
procrastination is not the real reason I'm doing this (although it might be the reason I'm doing it *now*...). It's a story and people want to hear what happens next, that's one reason. I want more people to know about this, that's another. It's been ten years, and the impact
There was so much interest in this thread tracing the Fukushima Dai-Ichi crisis as it happened with reactor 1 that I'm going to do the same for reactor 2 and maybe 3. It's a lot, so I'll be adding to it sporadically. But it's an important story to tell.
I'm drawing from this report I researched and co-wrote for the French nuclear safety institute in 2013-2015 (note there's a page or two in French but after that it is in English) irsn.fr/EN/newsroom/Ne…
The report is drawn largely from official Japanese reports: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station (ICANPS); Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC); TEPCO reports; & this book by Kadota amazon.com/dp/B0833Y1WX9/…
Later today I'm giving a talk on Fukushima Dai-Ichi as part of @UniLeiden's very cool semester-long study of a crisis, with different sector-area specialists invited to talk. I'm in mainly because of this report I co-wrote years ago for @suretenucleaire irsn.fr/FR/expertise/r…
so as I prep here are a few details about the unfolding of the crisis you may not be familiar with
The operators, and the rest of the plant, did not know right away that a tsunami had hit. How would they know? They were in windowless rooms and communications were down or jammed because of the earthquake.
The article doesn't explain why the system is vulnerable in this way, but the situation reminds me of my research on the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident, when operators were desperately trying to connect to grid electricity to cool the stricken plant before meltdown.
I would like to understand why this is the case in the electricity network and whether it's possible to mitigate it, but in the case of FD1, I think many people believe the tsunami damaged the nuclear reactors directly. it didn't. The reactors scrammed correctly and stopped.
They needed to be cooled safely after that. But the earthquake had knocked out a grid connection, and the tsunami had (famously) damaged the emergency generators.