This is close to @lastpositivist's #NoHeroes stance. I think I've a slightly different take on this, though not a substantially different one. I always try to begin with Stan Lee's maxim: "With great power comes great responsibility."
I think we have a responsibility to use whatever social power we accrue wisely, and this is the only thing that justifies such power. Yet I also think this is the flip side of Kant's principle of ought-implies-can: that we can't blame people for not doing things they can't do.
The (Hegelian) difficulty that the conjunction of these ideas faces is that, historically speaking, the growth of our (conscious) capacities for action precedes that of our (self-conscious) capacities for criticising/correcting these actions. We are destined to fuck up, a lot.
The difficult question is this: What's the appropriate attitude to historical figures whose sudden ability to wield social power in ways that was without precedent led to unprecedented fuck ups?
I think this is complicated, and almost always involves disarticulating the person qua person in retrospect. Surgically severing the better angels of their nature from their worse demons, opening them up to emulation and avoidance in equal measure.
Say what you like about Brandom's reading of Hegel, but he gives an incredibly good account of this retrospective character of historical reason, and the interplay between its impulses: Hegelian reconstruction (Whig history) and Nietzschean genealogy (Tory history).
It's important to see that 'personhood' is what unites these two tendencies in a way that prevents them from being pulled apart entirely. To treat historical figures as persons is to accept them, as @rechelon puts it, warts and all. To maybe forgive but never forget.
But how does this work at the cutting edge of history? How do you treat yourself as a person when you see there are things to be done and no one else is going to do them? How do you claim the authority that no one can rightfully give you, without evading its responsibilities?
This is where I substantively agree with @rechelon. One has to treat yourself as a person, which means doing everything in your power to signal your mere mortality to others: the fact that you are likely destined to fail in a variety of ways that at best will be learned from.
How this signalling should work, how it gets the job done, is itself a non-trivial problem that is inescapably linked to the moment and context you're in. There are lessons you can learn from the past, but performative personhood is something you're going to fuck up too.
While you have to be able to forgive yourself as a person in order to get anything done, you must under no circumstances permit yourself and others to forgive you as if you were already a figure lost to the past: a heroic exemplar ready for emulation/evasion.
To do so is at best to accept a sort of living death, to recuse yourself and let others take over, and at worst to cut yourself the most abominable slack, to legitimate your every foible for its purportedly world-historical relevance. There's little worse than pompous self-pity.
I think the point where I diverge slightly fro @rechelon, and lean slightly towards @lastpositivist, is that there are different schools of wisdom on how to avoid these pitfalls. There's unfiltered rawness, which I appreciate, but there's equally the craft of self-effacement.
Both have their own peculiar failure modes, from the temptations of brutal honesty (deontologistics.co/2019/10/29/tfe…) to the easy hubris of humour (c. Woody Allen). There's no formula for getting this right. It's ethics all the way down.
I've been thinking a lot lately about living on the ragged edge of history, and how to outgrow the systems of authentication one was shaped by without inventing worse ones patterned upon ones own peculiar personhood. How to claim authority without shirking responsibility.
In short, this ageing millennial is finally trying to grow up and maybe even wise up, in public, with all the embarrassing consequences that entails.
We get to make our own destiny, but we don't get to write our own history, and the war against our worse impulses is never over, no matter how many battles we win in the present.

Solidarity in personhood, my fellow cosmic children.🖖
CODA: The usual points of reference.

1. 'The Adults in the Room' -
2. 'AI Ethics and Questions of Autonomy/Automation' -
4. 'Algorithmic Bias and Bureaucratic Stupidity' -
6. A threading fuck up, linking to 'Promethean Wolf and Orphic Magpie' -
🖖

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with pete wolfendale

pete wolfendale Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @deontologistics

6 Mar
I like this piece, but there’s an aspect of it that doesn’t quite sit right with me. It’s really easy for leftist critiques to accidentally imbibe the imaginary of ‘the market’ as impersonal force by projecting it onto the objects of their critique. I think it does too much here.
The primal awkwardness of most incels is obviously shaped in bad ways by capitalism, neoliberalism, and their ideological apparatuses, but there’s diversity in this awkwardness beyond the stamp ‘the market’ has put on it, and I suspect that it’s worth delving deeper here.
I don’t want to provide a unified theory of the intel here, not only because that would require a lot of work, but because it would also undermine my point. My sympathies are open here: I know many men (not ‘incels’) who’ve been twisted into bad shapes by romantic incapacity.
Read 52 tweets
6 Mar
Better late than never, I suppose? Would've been nice if ~120K of our country's most vulnerable didn't have to die in the name of a bad analogy though. Folk economics has had democidal consequences.
On the ~120K number, it is possible to quibble (cf. channel4.com/news/factcheck…). However, the biggest quibbles were always 'what even is an excess death, really?', an epistemic bubble that has unfortunately been burst by another ~100K excess deaths since.
The question is now solidly *how* to quantify such deaths, rather than *whether* to do so. If you look at Tory governance since 2010, it's hard to avoid the conclusion that it has, through a heady mix of malfeasance and incompetence, been thoroughly democidal. Thanatopolitics.
Read 10 tweets
6 Mar
Since I've seen this argument made over and over again by Nietzscheans of various stripes over the years, let me address it one final time before sleep takes me.
The Real doesn't care about anything. To appeal to this blank indifference in discussions regarding whether you or anyone should care about anything at all is simply to dodge the question: "The universe doesn't care, I'm part of the universe therefore I don't need to care."
You can selectively render yourself into a mere thing if you want, but don't expect applause. This selectiveness is not a strength, but a weakness. A paradoxical form of self-indulgence that undermines selfhood as such: "I merely am what I am, I do whatever I will do."
Read 12 tweets
5 Mar
Someone on FB asked for a definition of Hyperstition, and this is what I came up with: a narrative schema that allows us to aesthetically capture the ways in which our collective anticipations of the future have causal force in the present.
I’m no expert on hauntology, but I think it’s got very similar structure: it’s a narrative schema that allows us to aesthetically unpack the implications of unrealised futures contained in our collective nostalgia for the past.
If hyperstition concerns temporally weird forms of (futural) necessity operating in the present, then hauntology concerns temporally weird forms of (latent) possibility operating in the present. There’s an ecstatic theory of historical consciousness implicit in their juncture.
Read 36 tweets
4 Mar
This was a very weird debate, precisely because it was me attempting to argue with Land on his own turf. I popped briefly into his class, and attempted to defend the position his course was dedicated to attacking. You can see me struggling to get discursive purchase in real time.
For anyone who wants to see the full thing, I think it starts around here:
If you want to know my unvarnished opinion, I think Land is a very capable rhetorician who uses a fairly stable set of rhetorical strategies to avoid being held to the consequences of the commitments he avows. In the limit, he denies even that he has commitments.
Read 36 tweets
3 Mar
Since my Null Journal idea seems to have been popular, it’s probably a good idea for me to say something more about how I think distribution/validation should work in philosophy (and potentially elsewhere). Let me start with some context.
I have frighteningly little concrete job experience outside of seminar teaching. But the main exception to this was running a journal for 3 years (plijournal.com). I was an editorial board member, the editor for two issues, and administrator for longer than that.
I oversaw the whole sausage, from CFP, through review, meetings, editing, formatting, printing, distribution, and finances. I redesigned the whole back end and balanced the books in the process, liaising with libraries coming through intermediaries and individual subscribers.
Read 30 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal Become our Patreon

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!