While most Democrats and Republicans seem to agree on the urgent need for the US to rebuild its infrastructure so as to make American businesses more efficient and American workers more productive, there are “fundamental disagreements between the...
two sides over what counts as infrastructure — not to mention whether or not to raise taxes to pay for it."
In fact whether spending on productive infrastructure investment is paid for through government borrowing, money creation or taxes, the economic benefits of the...
3/5
spending are the same. In each case the increase in the country’s productive capacity will be more than enough to balance the spending.
This doesn’t mean that the way in which the spending is financed is irrelevant, only that its main impact is to determine how the...
4/5
benefits of future growth are to be distributed. The specifics matter, but funding it with taxes probably means that the benefits go disproportionately to workers and the middle classes (assuming taxes are directed mainly to businesses and the rich), funding it with...
5/5
debt disproportionately benefits the rich, and funding it with money creation is probably neutral.
It would be great if there were a way for Congress somehow to separate the spending issue from the issue of how the benefits are to be distributed.
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Very interesting article. There are however two very different sets of debt-related risks, which I think a lot of policymakers and analysts confuse. One set consists of the risks related to “too much” debt, and the other of the risks of...
badly-structured debt, to which “too much” debt contributes, but with which it isn't synonymous, even though too many analysts seem to think it is.
“Too much” debt always leads eventually to a significant reduction in growth once debt can no longer rise quickly enough.
3/13
This occurs because, once it is no longer goosed artificially by soaring debt, growth in economic activity must automatically slow to its sustainable level, and this is exacerbated by a vicious and often self-reinforcing combination of financial distress behavior and the...
The seemingly huge expansion in China's economic activity during the first two months of 2021 mainly reflects the near-collapse last year in the basis for comparison. But while industrial output was up 35.1% year on year, retail sales were...
up only 33.8%, and this probably exceeds the growth in consumption because of government buying included in the retail sales data. This means that after lagging industrial production severely last year, consumption continues to lag production.
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The guys at Plenum (my favorite Chinese research group), suggest that we would do better to compare the January-February data with the first two months of 2019, and they come up with a 16.9% two-year increase in industrial production (for an annualized 8.1%) versus...
Given how complex the global trading system is, Adam, I think we would have to be careful about assuming simple relationships, like China's joining WTO automatically causing a shock to the US economy. First, I think what mattered in China’s case was not WTO but rather...
the long process during which the household income share of GDP was forced down.
This accelerated in the early 2000s when China cleaned up its NPLs by forcing households to absorb the losses, and was the main reason, I would argue, that China’s...
3/8
persistent (since 1993) but small trade surplus exploded after 2004. That is when household consumption “collapsed”, from the already-low 46% of GDP in 2000 to the unprecedented 34% in 2010, driving up the savings rate to well above the more-or-less constant investment rate.
Interesting article: one of the ways in which Beijing hopes to gain control of its “ballooning debt” is by improving the role of the stock markets in providing financing.
While this may seem on the surface a good – even obvious – idea, it mostly...
reflects the lack of systemic thinking about debt and balance sheets. Aside from there being structural reasons for the highly speculative nature of Chinese stock markets, which makes them unlikely to allocate capital efficiently anyway, the reason for China’s soaring...
3/7
debt burden isn’t a “bad” mix of debt versus equity financing. It is the fact that too much of the financing is for projects that are not justified economically.
Equity investors will never be willing to invest in these non-productive government-sponsored...
This paper argues that there's no evidence of an adverse “China shock” on the US economy, and uses the following graph showing employment in the manufacturing sector to make that point.
But as Matt Klein and I argue in our book, this approach is...
based on an obsolete model of trade. First, it has been many decades since the impact of trade on the US or any other economy can be assessed as a function of bilateral imbalances. Given the highly globalized nature of trade, these are really not meaningful...
3/8
any more, and matter only to the extent that they affect overall trade imbalances. And because these are mainly drive by savings imbalances in the surplus countries, which are themselves a consequence of the way income is distributed, I really don’t think bilateral trade...
According to this Caixin article: "As the government battled last year to reboot an economy pummeled by the Covid-19 epidemic, it opened the debt spigot and put on the back burner its long-standing commitment to tackling the mountains of...
debt and hidden financial risks accumulated by local authorities from years of investment spending."
Beijing, in other words, can always achieve more GDP growth simply by encouraging more local government spending on investment, but it doesn't want to. Clearly it...
3/7
believes this spending isn't a good thing.
And it isn't. If it were productive, the debt that funds it could not have soared relative to GDP for the past two decades because, by definition, debt used to fund productive investment causes GDP to grow faster than the debt.