It's very hard to definitively determine which acts are evil, but I'm pretty sure that framing impossible demands ('damned if you do, damned if you don't') for no good reason is on the list. Nevertheless, I think we tend to underestimate just how easy it is to do this.
This is sometimes the result of vindictiveness, but it's more commonly the result of indifference: imposing a set of rules/norms with a blindspot you can maybe see, but simply don't care about, largely because you'll never be in the position to make that impossible choice.
I've been complaining about the ways this indifference manifests in bureaucratic systems for quite a while now (cf. deontologistics.co/2019/11/04/tfe…). But I think it's important to see how we can channel this indifference even when we don't have any special role in enforcing rules/norms.
I think this is nowhere more strikingly obvious, and thus more actively ignored, than on the social boundary between the homed and the homeless:
Virtually every demand we make upon the homeless, either as a purported condition of assimilation back into society, as a punishment conditioned by some infringement of said society's norms, or as gift conditional upon our own good graces, is constitutively impossible.
There are few things more representative of the evils of our society than police demanding a homeless person move on: 'Where?' there's no positive answer, only 'Not here'. It's not the policeman's job to find them a place to go. This particular buck stops nowhere.
I don't have anything else particularly enlightening to say about this, because there are no solutions to these evils that aren't conditional upon widespread systemic changes whose nature and possibility are highly non-trivial. The least we can do is not to ignore the issue.
Still, I think there are similar cases we have more control over. Cases where an implicit demand ('Do something!') is met by an inevitable clarificatory question ('But what?'), where the all too easy response ('You figure it out, that's not my job') could be usefully avoided.
Often, it really is our interlocutor's job to figure these things out, either because they claim some special social role (e.g., politician, police, manager, etc.), or because this is something we may expect of anyone who has the capacity (e.g., adult, educated, citizen, etc.).
But social sanctions that contain no corrective instructions, by default get interpreted as brute evaluations not of our actions, but of our character, or even more primitive features of our very existence: 'you ought not to be' packaged as 'you ought not to do'.
I think this is the underlying logic of claims made by marginalised groups who insist that their right to exist is infringed by the ways in which the demands made upon them are articulated: 'It's not your job to figure out how we can live' entails 'You're willing to let us die'.
Just in case anyone misreads me here: I'm saying this is a materially good inference in most cases you'd care to mention, and perhaps in more than you'd immediately recognise. The impossibilities of living are both more common and more varied than the actual deaths ever shows us.
If ethics is about anything, it's coping with these concrete impossibilities in ways that confront rather than ignore their ubiquitousness: looking at what we (individually) can't do, and asking what we (collectively) should do about it. This is never going to be easy.
But it's a task we can divide amongst ourselves, refusing to give any one person more than their fair share, in the awareness that, when the buck has nowhere else to go, it's up to us to pick it up and pass it on again, circulating moral responsibility in social solidarity.🖖

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More from @deontologistics

22 Mar
I don't claim to be an expert on the history or politics of protest, but I'm a specialist in a particular kind of logical fallacy: the conflation of obligation (duty) and supererogation (virtue). I think it's worth seeing how this plays into discussions of 'peaceful' protest.
There's much to be said about the virtue of non-violent resistance as a strategy of protest and contestation. But the way in which liberal ideology fetishises protest as a means (voice) shorn of its end (change) thereby positions this strategic virtue as a public duty.
Do we have a duty to be 'peaceful' when we protest? I'd argue that there's no such specific duty beyond the more general and defeasible obligation to respect one another's rights to safety and property. Why? Because the 'we' such a duty might apply to is barely constituted.
Read 13 tweets
21 Mar
On reflection, I think what most personally frustrates me about the current compact between research and teaching in the academy is that my own writing is more clearly pedagogical than hermeneutic, but this has not earned me any points towards becoming a pedagogue.
I would rather explain the key ideas of a thinker, or rehearse the dialectical development of a key concept, in ways that both optimally compress them and make them maximally accessible to non-specialist scholars. I think this is a virtue, but it really isn't rewarded in any way.
I can do the exegetical nitpicking when needed, and I respect it when it is done well, but for every insightful close reading that breathe life into the context of a philosophical thought there are a dozen lifeless analyses, half of which are also wrong.
Read 11 tweets
21 Mar
This is a good question to aspire to have an answer to. For most people it means something like: "What's the most important, most holistic piece of wisdom you could give me, which opens up onto the rest of your concerns, unlocking the better questions I could ask?"
This tends to be context specific, as the little taste of wisdom that will hook each individual is different, but if I had to aim to maximal generality I'd say: "The secret to life is knowing what mistakes are worth making, but you can only learn this by making some that aren't."
That's got enough of the paradox about it to be intriguing in a way that encodes an entry point into both more specific yet abstract questions in ethics and logic, while still functioning as concrete advice independently of whether those questions are chased up immediately.
Read 9 tweets
18 Mar
One small thought for the evening: I rag on Nietzscheans a lot, but there's a peculiar hermeneutics of power that is broader than Nietzsche's influence, even if he is a representative figure in it. I also don't think this hermeneutics is worthless, just that there are excesses.
I could, and probably should, write a book about these excesses, but I see the sort of Tory history Nietzsche specialised in as a useful corrective to the sort of Whig history that Hegel is famous for (cf. my piece on Hesse's Glass Bead Game - glass-bead.org/article/castal…).
But the excess that concerns me this evening concerns the relation between power and joy. Nietzsche is often, quite rightly, compared with Spinoza, the other great thinker of the conjunction of power and joy (cf. Deleuze). There's obviously a significant relation here.
Read 28 tweets
16 Mar
So, this morning I'm thinking about Stan Lee's maxim ('with great power comes great responsibility') and the discursive responsibility that comes with the discursive power of having a personal communication platform (everything from a syndicated column to a Twitter account).
To recap my basic stance on moral logic: 1) ought-implies-can (Kant), entails that decreased capacity implies decreased responsibility, 2) with great power comes great responsibility (Lee), which entails that increased capacity implies increased responsibility.
I think that these principles permit us to deploy claims about what *is* the case as reasons in discourse about what we *ought* to do without falling into the naturalistic fallacy (Hume) and deriving how things ought to be in any given instance from the way things already are.
Read 61 tweets
15 Mar
Someone pay me and @tjohnlinward to write a treatment for this.
For anyone who wants to hear the oral history:
Just to give you a slight inkling of the semiotic riches to be plundered here, the Worm was said to have coiled itself around the hill on the top of which this monument now stands: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penshaw_M…
Read 5 tweets

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