(2/) Thanks to China's investments in the BeiDou satellite navigation system, nearly every civilian fishing vessel operating in the South China Sea can perform a maritime surveillance role. This is because BeiDou has built-in two-way texting capabilities.
(3/) When Chinese fishermen are carrying out their normal fishing activities, if they spot a foreign vessel, they can use BeiDou to quickly report the foreign vessel to the authorities (e.g. the CCG or PLA).
(4/) Coverage in Chinese state media and assessments from the Hainan province government confirm that authorities in the PRC see the combination of BeiDou and ordinary fishermen as a useful way of detecting and handling foreign fishing vessels.
(5/) Accordingly, provincial and central authorities have put a lot of money into BeiDou, outfitting thousands upon thousands of fishing boats with BeiDou equipment and installing BeiDou infrastructure throughout the South China Sea, achieving 100% coverage in contested areas.
(6/) Beyond BeiDou, PRC officials have said that "using normalized and sustainable civilian activity is currently the most effective means of declaring sovereignty and defending sovereignty" in the South China Sea. This means encouraging fishermen to hang out in disputed areas.
(7/) Accordingly, authorities have worked to upgrade Hainan's fishing fleets, funding hundreds of new steel-hulled fishing vessels, which assumedly help the fishermen operate further from shore for longer periods of time in areas like the Spratly Islands.
(8/) They have also discussed using subsidies, tax benefits, law enforcement protection, militia status, and other benefits to incentivize private enterprises to operate fishing boats in the South China Sea to function as a "first line" of defense.
(9/) And finally, authorities are working with private companies to develop aquaculture in the South China Sea, including at Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands, as a way to maintain a continuous civilian presence in the area.
(10/) So basically, even if the ships at Whitsun Reef do not belong to China's maritime militia, these vessels are still likely swarming the area on orders from Beijing.
Also: just in case the final tweet in this thread was unclear. Not denying the militia status of the ships at Whitsun. I'm saying that, regardless of formal PAFMM membership, there's basically no such thing as an "innocent" PRC fishing boat in the SCS, esp. the Spratlys.
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(2/) First, we need to make a distinction between China's massive reclamation campaign and the minor reclamation activities of other claimants. China is the only claimant that has built artificial islands the size of Washington DC.
(3/) Moreover, the US is not imposing "sanctions" on Chinese entities. It is imposing visa restrictions and export restrictions, which are not the same thing as sanctions. This might seem pedantic, but the distinction is important (more on this later).
In my new report with @ChinaMaritime, I reveal how Sansha City has built a system of administrative control in the South China Sea (SCS) and how China is using this system to transform contested areas into de facto Chinese territory.
(2/) Sansha was created in 2012 and is headquartered on Woody Island. Its jurisdiction covers 2 million square kilometers and includes the Paracel Islands, the “Zhongsha Islands” (Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal), the Spratly Islands, and their surrounding waters.
(3/) As China’s vanguard in the SCS, Sansha is responsible for exercising administrative control, implementing military-civil fusion, and performing the work of “rights defense, stability maintenance, environmental protection, and resource development” (维权维稳保护开发).
As usual, @QuincyInst's views on the South China Sea disputes are divorced from reality. In what world should we stop exercising our freedom of navigation in exchange for "affirmations" from China that they won't interfere with our freedom of navigation? That makes no sense.
Moreover, Quincy conveniently fails to address the most pressing issue in the South China Sea: how China uses maritime law enforcement and maritime militia forces to preclude it's neighbors (including U.S. allies and partners) from operating freely within their own waters.
Simply put, you can't provide recommendations for U.S. policy in the South China Sea without addressing the problem of assertive PAFMM and CCG operations. Nothing gets solved as long as China gets to aggressively use the PAFMM and CCG without facing any consequences.
It looks like Chinese international students at @GWtweets are being required to consent to a "Data Privacy Notice for Students in China" to ensure their access to online classes. Students are raising safety concerns because of the National Security Law.
Regarding the content of the notice, students seem particularly worried about a clause that says "GW may transfer your Personal Data to its affiliates or third-party service providers inside or outside of the United States for the above purposes."
There's also a reference to Chinese law, though they stress that "we put in place robust safeguards to ensure that your privacy is protected and to ensure that our legitimate interests are not overridden by your interests or fundamental rights."
Yesterday was the seventh anniversary of the establishment of Sansha City (三沙市). In July 2012, China founded Sansha to govern the entirety of its claims in the South China Sea. What is Sansha? How has it developed over the last 7 years? Why does it matter? A thread: (1/)
Sansha is based on Woody Island (永兴岛) in the Paracel Islands. The prefecture-level city has jurisdiction over the “island-reefs and sea areas” (岛礁及其海域) of the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Zhongsha Islands (Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal). (2/)
The Chinese government announced its plans to establish Sansha City just hours after Vietnam’s National Assembly passed the Law of the Sea of Vietnam on June 21, 2012. Many observers saw Sansha as China’s response. Sansha was formally established a month later on July 24. (3/)